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PART 1: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS* 
Why Innovation Matters to Tasmania: The Role of Capability in Economic 
Development 
 
For almost eight decades, between 1914 and 1983, a single focused and 
cohesive government strategy drove Tasmania’s economic development. Known to all 
Tasmanians as ’hydro-industrialisation’, the strategy was powerful and effective: 
energy-intensive private manufacturing industry would be attracted to Tasmania by an 
abundance of low-cost electricity, which would come in turn from harnessing 
Tasmania’s endowment of water, through government-built dams and power stations. 
It worked. By building a sophisticated manufacturing sector, the strategy 
transformed Tasmania from an isolated backwater, with an economy consisting mostly 
of subsistence farmers alongside a few wealthy landholders, into a confident, outward-
looking, and capable industrial community. 
But in 1983, when the era of public-private cooperation that created this 
transformation was closed by the High Court’s decision to terminate the Franklin Dam 
project, Tasmania lost its development mainspring. For 25 years, our state has lacked a 
vision to replace hydro-industrialisation. Since 1983, repeated battles over specific 
projects, usually with environmental concerns at their centre, have punctuated efforts 
to find a new direction. None has produced the new vision Tasmania needs. 
The strategy outlined here offers a perspective that can. 
Hydro-industrialisation was at heart an innovation strategy. It consisted of a 
series of investments to reconfigure Tasmania’s natural and human resources to create 
new industries, new products, and new services. It invigorated Tasmania’s capabilities 
and created opportunity for entrepreneurship. Tasmania today needs a new innovation 
strategy. Innovation (which can be seen as increase in the quality of economic activity) 
has joined economic growth (an increase in the quantity of economic activity) as a 
primary objective of government policy. Innovation—the development of improved 
products, services, and processes, the creation of new markets, and the use of new 
products—is critical to productivity advance. And productivity advance is the essential 
underpinning of prosperity in any economy. In the long run, only by increasing their 
                                            
* Special thanks for collaboration in preparation of this report goes to Rod Stolorz, 
without whose capable and thorough research the report would not have been 
possible. 
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economic output per hour worked can Tasmanians ensure long-term sustainable 
economic development. Innovation increases productivity both by improving 
efficiency (reducing cost) and raising sales (increasing customer willingness to pay). 
The latter is particularly important. Tasmanian companies will need new products and 
services, that can satisfy sophisticated customer demand both at home and in export 
markets, if the state is to build on its recent improved economic performance. 
Importantly, the role of government in hydro-industrialisation was to create 
‘policy platforms’, which enabled innovation and economic growth. In addition to the 
provision of economic infrastructure, government followed a deliberate population 
settlement strategy (a ‘community platform’) to attract and retain immigrants. This 
increased diversity in the Tasmanian population and laid the creative foundations for a 
range of innovations, including the ultimate emergence of the wine and aquaculture 
industries. A governance platform (the Hydro Electric Commission) provided the 
organisational wherewithal to manage the developments, and key government fiscal 
and regulatory levers enabled changed patterns of land use to occur. 
The economic development strategy for Tasmania proposed here, like hydro-
industrialisation, aims to create new platforms for innovation. These platforms draw 
upon Tasmania’s strengths, its physical capacity and human capability, to support a 
sustained vision for the Tasmania we want to live in. It combines economic prosperity 
with community development and environmental responsibility. 
Timing is important. Many of the large manufacturing industries fostered by 
hydro industrialisation need—in today’s global market—to shape different futures to 
retain competitiveness. More positively, the government has a major infrastructure 
strategy underway, education and skills strategies now in place, and a social-inclusion 
strategy under development. An innovation strategy will provide a key frame of 
reference, an integrating perspective, for each of these strategies and, in turn, will be 
supported by them. 
In parallel to these major strategies, government has undertaken many other 
reforms which would benefit from guidance from an innovation strategy. The current 
Review of Land Use Planning Schemes, for example, would benefit from having as a 
key objective of the new Model Scheme to facilitate innovation. Regional planning 
provides the mechanism to better co-ordinate regional infrastructure, economic 
development, and environmental and social interests for the benefit of the region. It 
can also address local environmental, social, and economic issues which may 
necessitate a regional focus. 
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What is an Innovation Strategy and What Should Be its Aims? 
 
‘Too much capitalism does not mean too many capitalists, but too few capitalists.’ 
—G. K. Chesterton, The Uses of Diversity, 1921. 
 
Over the past decade, Tasmania has experienced substantially improved 
economic performance. By and large, however, this performance has been driven by 
increased retail spending and housing construction, and has not been matched by 
significantly improved production or export performance. While on many economic 
measures Tasmania has closed the gap with the mainland states over the last decade, 
we have seen only small increases in the value of goods and services that Tasmania 
sells to the world, the mainland included. 
In the credit-driven economic downturn of 2009, growth driven by 
consumption and housing will be in serious jeopardy. As the world undergoes debt 
deleveraging in 2009 and beyond, spending power will inevitably be undermined. 
Credit crises inflict more harm on the economy than those in which financial stress is 
concentrated in stock markets alone because they destroy purchasing and investment 
power over a wider front. 
While in late 2009 the world appeared to be emerging from the crisis begun in 
2007, the new normal is likely to be different to the old normal. Consumers and 
companies will necessarily operate with less debt: they will need to spend less and 
save more. As an example, between 1992 and 2007, the private sector of the world’s 
largest economy, the United States, accumulated an incremental $66 trillion in debt, 
by far the largest buildup in history relative to income, net worth, and savings. But as 
consumers and companies rebuild their balance sheets, an estimated $24 trillion in 
wealth has been destroyed over the last two years (in home values, equities, fixed 
income bonds, and commodities), exacerbating the stress faced by families and 
companies. Australia’s economy is similarly debt laden, and some leverage ratios 
(debt-to-income and debt-to-housing values) are even worse here than in the US. What 
cannot last won’t last. In such a context, any economy whose prosperity is based on 
consumption and housing prices, supported by rising consumer debt, as has been 
Tasmania’s, will be jeopardised. 
The imperative now is to increase the capability of the Tasmanian economy to 
produce goods and services the world wants to buy. An instructive example for 
Tasmania is the experience of Finland in the 1990s. Like Tasmania, historically 
Finland’s economy has been based on its natural resource endowment and long 
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coastline. Finland’s major industries in 1970 were pulp and paper (40% of exports), 
wood products (16%), and engineered products (including shipbuilding) at 23%. 
Forests and woodland cover 76% of the country. A shipbuilding cluster focused on 
specialised ships, including icebreakers and ferries. But as traditional export markets in 
the Soviet Union collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, Finland entered the most 
severe economic crisis in its history; GDP fell by 6.2% in 1991 and a further 3.3% in 
1992, and exports by 13% in dollar terms in 1991. Government deficits and inflation 
soared, and Finland’s government was forced to cut spending. 
But contrary to conventional wisdom of the time, Finland decided to increase its 
commitment to innovation. It launched what became known as the Center of Expertise 
program, focusing on “strengthening regional competitiveness by increasing 
innovation, renewing the regional production structure, and creating new jobs in 
selected expertise areas.” It tripled its commitment to education, and launched a 
Cluster Program to back the country’s key export sectors. The result has been 
spectacular, with Finland emerging as one of the world’s most dynamic and 
sophisticated economies. Based on renewed capability in its traditional strengths, 
coupled with an electronics industry based on mobile telephony, Finland has built a 
diverse export-oriented economy. 
It is now time that each major sector of the Tasmanian economy, especially the 
private sector but including the public sector, should develop comprehensive 
innovation strategies. These should formulate coherent sets of initiatives to upgrade the 
sectors’ capability to introduce new products, new processes, and new business 
models. The Government’s role in these initiatives should be to focus on those 
activities that cannot or will not be performed by sector participants themselves, and 
should seek to ensure that all elements of an effective innovation system—which 
creates the platform for innovation within communities—are strong and vigorous. The 
Government should not attempt to substitute its own activity for those of companies, 
but to facilitate the activity of others. 
As background, it is important to recognize that government economic policy 
must address at least three separate fields of activity, and these should be conceived 
and implemented separately. Confusion among the goals and implementation 
mechanisms for these three can confound effective performance, on each or all: 
Promotion of economic growth. This includes investment attraction and 
incentives, encouragement of savings, facilitation and regulation of markets, and 
provision of education and training to meet the normal and routine needs of an 
expanding economy. 
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Support for the disadvantaged. Inevitably, those at the bottom of the economic 
pyramid, especially the unemployed, are the least skilled and least motivated. It is 
widely accepted that government has a responsibility to assist these members of the 
community to participate in the economy, and even directly to create employment for 
them. Here priorities include basic skills acquisition, workforce-participation 
incentives, counseling, and facilitation of low-skill and low-motivation-demanding 
jobs. 
Productivity enhancement. Over time, the only way a community can increase 
its prosperity sustainably (ie, without mounting debt) is by raising the economic output 
and value of its combination of economic inputs. Most importantly, it must increase 
the economic productivity of its citizens’ hours worked. Innovation policy addresses 
this task, which the community expects government to perform. Often policy in this 
field is aimed at the higher-performing and higher-motivated participants in the 
economy, whose needs can be very different to the others identified above. 
These different goals cannot be met with the same policies, and in certain 
respects they may even come into conflict. Simply stated, if the purpose of innovation 
policy is to improve productivity, its goal must be: 
 
To enhance competitive capability in the economy’s leading sectors. 
 
Surprisingly, most discussion around innovation policy has until recently not 
focused on this aim. Innovation policies have been directed towards one or more quite 
different goal, most commonly: 
• To create new companies, or even entirely new industries, in supposed ‘high 
technology’ sectors. 
• To gain a financial or other return on government investment in research and 
education, especially through commercialisation of public-sector research-
organisation discoveries. 
• To transform the culture of business or even whole communities, to make it 
more ‘creative’ and innovative. 
In reality, these aims have proven difficult or even impossible for government to 
deliver. Of perhaps even greater concern, the result has too often been programs that 
de facto substitute the public sector for activities more appropriately performed by the 
private sector. It is important to reiterate: Innovation policy in Tasmania should not 
aspire to substitute for the private sector. Rather it should aim to provide a supportive 
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context, within which the risk-taking activities of private companies can be more 
successful when necessary infrastructure or capabilities cannot or will not be provided 
by markets or companies.1 Innovation policy in Tasmania should therefore follow 
several clear principles: 
 
It should have impact on sectors of sufficient weight and potential to matter. 
 
To exercise sufficient impact, an innovation policy must address the needs of 
relatively large sectors. This implies that an innovation policy cannot restrict itself to 
‘research-intensive’ industries. It is well to recall that so-called high-tech industries 
(usually defined as industries with R&D/Sales ratios of more than 4 per cent) make up 
only a small component of manufacturing in any economy, and an even smaller 
component of GDP. 
This is especially true for Tasmania and Australia, but it is also true of all 
developed economies: in most OECD economies high-tech manufacturing makes up 
less than 3 per cent of GDP. All OECD economies, including Australia, consist of a 
combination of large medium-technology and low-technology manufacturing 
industries (such as food and beverages, or fabricated metal products), and large-scale 
service activities (of which the largest are education, health, and social services). As we 
will observe below, this is particularly true in Tasmania. 
Nor is it true that ‘high-tech’ sectors generally account for the greatest 
proportion of either innovation or growth. The AIRC’s Innovation Census of Tasmania 
revealed that so-called low- and medium-technology industries include significant 
proportions of innovating firms, that they develop new products, and that they generate 
significant sales from new and technologically changed products.2 . Similar results 
have appeared in other innovation surveys undertaken in Australia and other countries. 
                                            
1 The approach employed here to formulation of an effective innovation strategy has been 
developed and tested over recent years across several locations in Australia and 
internationally. It is based on well-established understandings from the field of innovation 
economics about how, when, and where innovation actually takes place in a modern 
economy, as described in this report, along with academic papers and studies by the present 
author and others, combined with a growing body of practical experience. A similar approach 
has been adopted by other Australian States, most notably NSW. See especially West, A 
Strategy to Accelerate Innovation in NSW: Outline for Policy Development, from which the 
first section of this report draws. 
2 In the Tasmanian economy, an estimated 70.1 per cent of non-high-tech firms innovated 
during the years 2004-2006, and the various sectors of the Tasmanian economy innovated at 
comparable rates, see Smith and O’Brien, ‘Innovation in Tasmania: An Innovation Census in 
an Australian State’, Australian Innovation Research Centre, Working Paper, 2008. For the 
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Indeed, the very distinction between ‘high’- and ‘low’-technology industries is 
misleading, resting as it does not on the actual ‘knowledge-intensivity’ of any industry, 
but on an inadequate proxy for such a measure: the proportion of the industry’s R&D 
performed internally in individual firms. A more useful classification distinguishes 
internal-R&D-focused industries, in which innovation is driven by formal R&D 
performed inside companies (producing high R&D/Sales ratios), from distributed-
knowledge industries, in which innovation is developed externally to individual 
enterprises, and then optimised internally. Industries can thus be ‘knowledge-intensive’ 
without necessarily a high degree of R&D being undertaken by firms themselves. 
 
It should address real needs these sectors face, based on an analytical understanding 
of the actual innovation process in the Tasmanian economy. 
 
Innovation follows different paths in different sectors. Sectors usually exhibit a 
typical innovation pattern, but these patterns vary considerably in methods, 
approaches, and results. These distinctive patterns must be understood in detail if 
effective policy is to be developed and implemented. The systems that provide the 
platforms within which individual firms or other organisations innovate function quite 
differently from sector to sector, and even from time to time. What promotes 
innovation in one sector may be ineffectual or counterproductive in others. 
Key dimensions of difference include the relative propensity to new company 
formation; product-versus-process focus; and internal-versus-external knowledge 
sourcing. In some industrial arenas, innovation primarily takes the form of new 
company formation (for example, software and certain fields of electronics); in others, 
it manifests through the activities of already-existing large companies. In some sectors, 
such as agriculture, innovation is often developed externally by not-for-profit entities 
and adopted by individual market participants. Innovation in still other sectors is 
primarily product-focused; in some (for example, metals and energy production) it is 
process-focused. It is science-based in some sectors (including pharmaceuticals); in 
others, marketing-focused. 
 
                                            
Australian economy as a whole, and using a different methodology, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics estimated that at least 30 per cent of firms typically innovate over any three-year time 
period. In manufacturing, the most intensively innovating sectors are machinery and 
equipment and chemicals, each with about 50% of firms innovating. Nevertheless, in such 
‘traditional’ industries as food products, textiles and metal products between 30 and 35 percent 
of firms are reported by the ABS as ‘innovating’: see Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innovation 
in Australian Business 2003, 8158.0, Canberra, 2005, p.7, 10. 
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It should complement, not attempt to substitute for, and certainly not compete with, 
the activities of private companies. It should aim to strengthen the market position 
and capabilities of private firms. 
 
To be effective in supporting innovation, the policy should in the first instance 
‘do no harm’—that is, it should not distort market incentives by attempting 
inappropriately to substitute public-sector activity for those of the private sector. It 
should limit its domain to fields in which infrastructure, capability, and resources are 
both demonstrably required to support innovation and in which it is not feasible for 
private companies or markets, in the normal course of affairs, to undertake the 
specified activity. 
In general, there are two broad reasons why economically necessary 
capabilities might be absent in an economy such as that of Tasmania. One relates to 
value capture, the other to risk bearing. Markets ‘fail’ in certain instances. In the 
creation of physical and knowledge infrastructure, for example, it is sometimes not 
possible for individual firms to capture sufficient benefit from a particular investment to 
make the commitment worthwhile, even though such investment might be greatly 
beneficial to the economy as a whole, or to an industrial, regional, or community 
sector. Second, individual firms or markets might not be able effectively to diversify 
and manage the specific form of risk involved in certain types of innovation. 
Innovation policy in Tasmania should focus on addressing these needs rather 
than attempting to create entirely new high-technology industries or provide a direct 
financial return to government from publicly funded research. 
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How Innovation Happens in Tasmania: Results of the AIRC Innovation 
Census 
 
Although it is a small, island community at the periphery of the world economy 
and based on so-called low-technology industries, Tasmania has a modern, developed 
capitalist economy. Effective innovation policy for Tasmania must be based on an 
accurate understanding of the processes through which innovation takes place in its 
own key industries. Fortunately, a growing body of research is accumulating about 
these issues, including notably in Tasmania. Research into how, where, and why 
innovation happens in capitalist economies has recently emerged as a major field 
within the study of economics, and has now yielded certain well-established results. 
We know much more today about what promotes, and what retards, innovation than 
we did 20 years ago. These results can form the basis for effective policy. But several of 
these insights contravene conventional wisdom, and suggest new directions for 
innovation policy in Tasmania. Key findings of innovation economics include: 
 
Innovation is diffused across the economy. 
Innovation is not confined to a small group of high-technology industries, nor is 
it driven by a small set of sciences or technologies. Statistical studies of innovation, 
particularly the AIRC’s Innovation Census of Tasmania, but also from Australia and the 
European Union, reveal that innovation (in the sense of development and sales of new 
products and services) is distributed broadly across the economy in all developed 
countries.3 Low and medium technology sectors are not in absolute decline in most 
OECD countries; they remain large and persistent as a proportion of both 
manufacturing output and Gross Domestic Product. Industries that are regarded as 
‘traditional’, ‘mature’, or ‘low tech’ often generate substantial sales from 
technologically new products or processes. 
Similarly, and potentially importantly for Tasmania, the service sector is strongly 
innovative. This finding is especially important since the service sector makes up the 
largest component of all developed economies, Tasmania included, as will be explored 
below, although in Tasmania the service sector is a significantly smaller proportion 
than on the mainland. 
                                            
3
 Smith and O’Brien, ‘Innovation in Tasmania: An Innovation Census in an Australian State’, 
AIRC Working Paper, 2008; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innovation in Australian Business 
2005. 
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The implication of these findings is that government policy to promote 
innovation should not necessarily aim to develop de novo industries whose product is 
high technology. Creation of an innovation-effective economy should not be reduced 
to sponsorship of ICT, biotechnology, or nanotechnology industries, nor are R&D/sales 
ratios necessarily the most important focus of innovation policy in many sectors. 
Indeed, since business R&D is disproportionately concentrated in ‘high technology’ 
sectors (approximately half takes place in these sectors, which, to reiterate, account for 
less than 3 per cent of GDP), tax credits for R&D can amount to little more than a 
subsidy to a small proportion of the economy, from the larger—but no less 
innovative—majority. 
 
Within industries, innovation is concentrated.  
While innovation is broadly distributed across the Tasmanian economy, within 
particular sectors it is concentrated. The Innovation Census found that less than 80 
firms in Tasmania account for more than 80 per cent of all innovation sales, and that 1 
per cent of firms (specifically, eight firms) account for more than 40 per cent of 
innovation sales. At the other end of the spectrum, 50 per cent of firms accounted for 
only 3 per cent of innovation sales.4 In short, most innovation is led by a few 
companies, and others follow by copying or imitating.5 
This finding, too, has important implications for policy. It suggests that 
government policy should aim to enhance the innovation capabilities of leading firms, 
rather than hope to raise the average or promote cultural change across entire sectors. 
Unfortunately, government policy frequently does the reverse: it focuses on supporting 
failing or at best start-up firms, and regards successful firms as not ‘deserving’ support. 
Of course, this observation does not suggest that government should subsidise 
leading innovators. Rather, policy should aim to provide infrastructure, education, and 
knowledge resources that even leading firms cannot undertake alone, to enable 
pioneer innovators to accelerate growth or strengthen their position. 
 
                                            
4
 Smith and O’Brien, ‘Innovation in Tasmania: An Innovation Census of an Australian State’, 
Australian Innovation Research Centre Working Paper, 2008, p. 20. 
5
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innovation in Australian Business 2005. 
 13 
Innovation usually begins with a customer problem, not a technical 
‘discovery’. 
One of the most well-established conclusions of innovation research is that 
innovation should not be viewed primarily as the commercialisation of scientific 
discovery. Much innovation policy is based on an implicit assumption that innovation 
processes are an orderly sequence that begins with R&D. In this view, scientific 
researchers first discover useful things, engineers then transform these discoveries into 
manufacturable products, after which marketers sell the results to customers. 
In fact, innovation projects more often begin at the end point of the sequence 
outlined above. Companies usually start by utilising their understanding of particular 
customer needs to identify a potential new product (this does not imply that they 
simply ‘listen to customers’; often firms understand potential needs better than do 
customers). After conceiving the potential product, the company initiates an innovation 
project. Usually, firms endeavour to create new products by utilising their own existing 
capabilities; this is much the cheapest and safest route. Should they encounter 
problems beyond their existing expertise, however, they may launch an R&D project, 
whether entirely internal or partially external. 
But note that in this more-common sequence R&D follows identification of a 
customer need, and is launched after the project has begun. R&D may well participate 
in an innovation project, along with such corporate functions as manufacturing, 
marketing, regulatory approval, and capital allocation, but it is rarely the initiator of the 
project. 
Nor is R&D usually the major financial component of innovation projects.  
Statistical surveys of innovation in Australian business show that on average only 26.4 
per cent of the cost of innovation projects consisted of R&D expenditure (despite tax-
based incentives to classify as much expenditure as possible as ‘R&D’). Non-R&D 
expenditures incurred during innovation efforts for items such as training, market 
research, design, and engineering development were more than twice those for R&D.6 
In Tasmania, different sectors revealed widely divergent proportions of 
innovation expenditure committed to various purposes.  In the information, media, and 
telecommunications sector, R&D was indeed the largest component of innovation 
expenditure, but not a majority (32 per cent), followed by acquisition of advanced 
machinery, equipment, or software (25 per cent). In the much larger combined 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing sectors, however, acquisition of advanced machinery, 
                                            
6
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innovation in Australian Business 2005. 
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equipment, or software made up an overwhelming 63 per cent of expenditure, and 
R&D only 16 per cent.7 
Yet innovation policy in Australia has until recently consisted overwhelmingly 
of incentives for R&D, combined with pressure for commercialisation from publicly 
supported research bodies. Based on the understanding above, these policies are likely 
to miss the mark or produce undesirable consequences and should not be pursued in 
Tasmania. 
 
The returns from innovation are disproportionately captured by those who 
bear and manage its risk. 
The defining characteristic of innovation as an economic activity is that its 
outcomes are much more uncertain, hence more risky, than those of routine activity. 
This suggests that those who bear this economic risk—particularly by financing it—
should be able to capture a significant, perhaps apparently disproportionate, share of 
its return (given their weight in total GDP). And so it is. Recent studies have shown, for 
example, that the proportion of total profit in the US economy captured by the finance 
sector has grown from 14 per cent in 1981 to 39 per cent in 2001.8  
An important implication of this finding is that while innovation may take place 
broadly across the economy, the capture of the economic benefits that flow from 
innovation may be quite concentrated, sectorally and regionally. Even in the industries 
that predominate in Tasmania, it is investors who capture much of the potential return 
from innovation, and it is important that as much of that value as possible be retained 
locally—with the implication that it is important to finance innovation locally. 
Communities that are effective in building finance institutions capable of managing 
innovation risk will likely capture more than their ‘fair’ share of value. Development of 
a vibrant financial sector should thus be viewed not merely as desirable to support the 
innovation activities of other firms, but as an end in itself—a means to capture value 
from innovation taking place elsewhere in the economy. This is important for a small 
economy such as Tasmania, and not only for the global financial centres of London, 
New York, or Sydney. 
                                            
7
 Smith and O’Brien, ‘Innovation in Tasmania: An Innovation Census of an Australian State’, 
Australian Innovation Research Centre Working Paper, 2008, p. 23. 
8
 Steve Galbraith, ‘Trying to Draw a Pound of Flesh Without a Drop of Blood’, Morgan Stanley 
US and the Americas Investment Research, 8 September 2003; Steve Galbraith, ‘Fading Fog’, 
Morgan Stanley US and the Americas Investment Research, 21 September 2003. The Morgan 
Stanley data are for S&P 500 corporations. 
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A mismatch between the risk profile of a particular technology and the structure 
of finance vehicles may, moreover, inhibit the propensity to innovate. Some potential 
innovations require finance in too large ‘lumps’, over too long time periods with too 
skewed a return profile, for private financiers to be able to diversify away sufficient 
risk. Government is thus sometimes needed to assist in risk diversification for selected 
technology types. This is an important consideration for Tasmania, which is remote 
from the financial capitals even of Australia, but which—through its superannuation 
and insurance funds—actually generates more than sufficient investment capital in 
aggregate to support its innovation needs. There is evidence, however, that Tasmania 
lacks suitable investment vehicles to manage the types of risk experienced in its key 
sectors. Addressing this mismatch should be a priority for Tasmanian policy makers, 
and some potential options to approach this challenge are included below. 
 
Some essential components of an effective innovation system cannot be 
developed by private firms alone. 
Research to identify characteristics of innovative firms highlights several typical 
features, each of which appear to relate to enabling factors in innovation: 
o Innovating firms are collaborators. Knowledge creation takes place 
through interaction with other enterprises, organisations, and public 
institutions of the science and technology infrastructure. Indeed, 
empirical research has shown that innovating firms are almost invariably 
collaborating companies, that collaboration persists over sustained 
periods, and that universities and research institutes are important 
collaboration partners.9 This finding was confirmed in the Tasmanian 
Innovation Census, which found that 45.5 per cent of innovating firms 
were collaborators, and collaborating firms were much more likely to be 
innovators.10 They collaborate because at least some necessary 
capabilities cannot be maintained internally by the firms themselves and 
must be accessed externally. 
o Innovating firms accumulate capability over time. Past developments 
tend to be utilised to determine future pathways of innovation. 
Cumulative capability acquisition underlies patterns of specialisation in 
                                            
9
 Basri, E. ‘Inter-firm Technological Collaboration in Australia: Implications for Innovation and 
Public Policy’, in OECD Innovation Networks: Co-operation in National Innovation Systems, 
OECD Paris, 2001. 
10
 Smith and O’Brien, ‘Innovation in Tasmania: An Innovation Census of an Australian State’, 
Australian Innovation Research Centre Working Paper, 2008, p. 28. 
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economies, and creates differentiation among regional and national 
economies. Effective policy builds on, rather than ignores or counteracts, 
such accumulated capability. 
o Innovating firms tend to cluster. Multiple studies have suggested that 
successful firms gather together geographically, either ‘horizontally’—
firms in the same type of business—or ‘vertically’— firms connected in 
related value chains.11 Firms within such clusters tend to be more 
successful than those standing alone, perhaps because they tap 
knowledge bases and related expertise that would not exist separated 
from the cluster. Clustering appears to help overcome limitations of 
scale. This finding is an important insight for Tasmania, whose firms are 
frequently held to suffer from lack-of-scale inefficiencies. 
o Innovating firms in all sectors employ science not developed internally. 
Many new products, while not spawned by scientific discovery, draw 
upon science not possessed by firms. Analyses of patents show that an 
increasing proportion of patents cite scientific research, and that a 
substantial proportion of papers cited in industrial patents were produced 
by public-sector research organizations. This is true as much in ‘low 
tech’ industries, demonstrating that while the product of these sectors 
may appear traditional, they are not ‘low knowledge’. In finance, for 
example, university-based researchers were originally responsible for the 
three major innovations of the 20th century: venture capital, options 
pricing, and high-yield bonds. 
These findings lend weight to a key proposition from economic theory: that 
maintenance of a basic research and technology capability should not be left in private 
hands, since returns from knowledge are difficult to appropriate even in the presence 
of enforceable intellectual property and patents.12 The reason is that returns from 
investments in knowledge often ‘spill over’ to other sectors, and that unless such 
returns are incorporated into the economic calculus, investment to build knowledge 
infrastructure might not be economically justifiable—or justifiable only for an agency 
such as government or a not-for-profit institution that can appropriate the return over 
an economy-wide base. 
This proposition was strikingly confirmed in Tasmania, where 142 firms (28 per 
cent of all collaborating firms and 12.7 per cent of innovators) reported that they 
                                            
11
 Michael Best, The New Competition, Harvard University Press, 2006. 
12
 Arrow, K., ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,’ in National 
Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton 
University Press. 
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actively collaborated with the University of Tasmania.13 Collaboration between food-
related enterprises and the University was especially important. Ensuring that the 
University’s research remains healthy, and that interaction between the University and 
Tasmania’s firms is facilitated, should be a priority. Proposals on how to improve these 
relationships are included below. 
 
Formulating an Innovation Policy 
 
If the goal of a Tasmanian innovation strategy is neither to develop new ‘high 
technology’ industries nor to ensure a financial return on government’s investment in 
research and education, nor especially to change Tasmania’s culture, then the process 
of developing an innovation policy for Tasmania should proceed quite differently than 
have some other Australian government jurisdictions in recent times. 
Rather than identifying a list of desirable technologies in which the state hopes 
to build an industry, or a list of alleged commercially valuable intellectual property 
believed to be ‘locked up’ in government-sponsored research organizations, or moving 
immediately to institute programs to promote more ‘commercialisation’, Tasmanian 
policy makers should begin with an analysis of the knowledge, research, capability, 
and resource requirements faced by actual or potential innovators in its high-impact 
sectors. Only on this basis can a relevant and effective policy to support companies’ 
innovation programs be developed. 
From that platform, an understanding can be built of which elements of an 
effective innovation system are already present, which are likely to be developed by 
private organisations, and which might require government support. On the basis of 
such an understanding an effective innovation policy can be constructed. 
A constructed advantage approach necessitates co-ordinated policy measures in 
several directions: 
Economy, for example, regionalisation of economic development, integration of 
knowledge generation and commercialisation, strong local and global business 
networks. 
Governance, for example, strong support for innovators, complementary 
planning and regulatory regimes, joined up government strategy. 
                                            
13
 Smith and O’Brien, ‘Innovation in Tasmania: An Innovation Census of an Australian State’, 
Australian Innovation Research Centre Working Paper, 2008, p. 29. 
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Knowledge Infrastructure, for example, closer engagement with tertiary 
institutions, mediating agencies, utilisation of tacit and local knowledge, understanding 
of embedded local assets. 
Community, for example, ‘liveability’ strategies to attract and retain creative 
workers, health services, and vibrant cultural life. 
Our Tasmanian economy and society, and associated institutions, are all 
potentially sufficiently nimble and connected to undertake the complex co-ordination 
required to construct competitive advantage. Innovation policy is thus an essential 
factor in promoting regional productivity and growth. 
The analytical underpinning of effective innovation policy should proceed in 
three steps: 
 
Identifying high-leverage sectors. 
The purpose of this phase is to identify sectors with strong potential to support 
productivity advance. These will be sectors that combine sufficient weight in the 
economy to be ‘important’ with existing revealed competitive advantage and a record 
of innovation. 
Tests for such weight and competitive advantage would include that the sector: 
• Generated high-wage jobs. 
• Created wealth—increased market capitalisation. 
• Has grown sales faster than average. 
• Exports more than average. 
• Manifests substantial productivity growth. 
• Introduces new products or processes faster than other comparable sectors. 
This phase of policy development requires quantitative analysis, supported by 
appropriate qualitative and synthetic insight into the processes by which high-impact 
sectors interact and support one another, creating an overall ‘character’ for the 
particular economic unit for which the policy is being developed. 
The result will be a target list of economic sectors or industries that offer the 
particular potential to improve economic performance through innovation-based 
productivity advance. 
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Analysing the knowledge infrastructure, business capabilities, and resource-
allocation processes that support innovation in these sectors. 
As noted above, firms rarely innovate alone. Innovation demands continuous 
interaction and feedback between perceptions of market opportunities, technological 
capabilities, and managerial processes within firms. The ability to perceive 
opportunities and to invest in realising them—that is, the processes of formulating firm 
strategy and implementing it through a managed portfolio of innovation projects—are 
among the main characteristics of innovating firms. Many firms lack such 
capabilities—technical, physical, and managerial—and need access to external 
infrastructure, capabilities, and resources to make innovation feasible. 
Innovating firms rely on three primary forms of support: access to science and 
technology, access to capital, and access to high-quality information and knowledge 
infrastructure. The second phase of innovation-policy development should evaluate the 
extent to which these supports are present in the selected high-potential industries, and 
in what respects they can be strengthened. 
 
Access to science and technology. 
As noted above, innovation-related problems often require firms to import and 
integrate knowledge and skills obtained from outside the firm and to utilise information 
infrastructure, usually provided by government. Individual firms frequently find that 
they cannot justify maintenance of sophisticated science and technology expertise in-
house—they simply do not use such capabilities sufficiently frequently to amortise the 
cost of maintaining them at the cutting edge—but that they do need access to them 
periodically. 
Cooperation and collaboration among innovating firms and suppliers, 
customers, design or engineering consultants, universities or research institutes are thus 
frequent characteristics of modern innovation processes. In this context, the role of 
universities and research institutes should not be seen as to generate innovations, but 
to provide access to expertise of the highest quality and to help solve problems 
relevant to innovation efforts by private firms. 
 
Access to financial resources. 
Innovation requires sustained investment under conditions of uncertainty. Firms 
cannot know the future and their strategic innovation choices can be very risky. 
Nevertheless, they must invest in a wide range of innovation-related assets—human 
skills, new capital equipment, design capabilities, strategic marketing, engineering 
 20 
development programmes, and more. Innovation therefore requires access to finance 
that both permits and encourages such investment, and that can manage the risks 
involved. An assessment is needed of whether the finance sector has the capability to 
bear and manage such risk, and possesses the scale required to diversify it. 
 
Access to high-quality information and knowledge infrastructure, especially logistics. 
Finally, innovating firms require access to high-quality physical infrastructure, 
especially logistics and information. In a world in which vital ideas might be sourced 
from any corner of the earth, rapid movement of information is critical. But industries 
differ in their demand for such infrastructure, and it is necessary to build an 
understanding of the specific needs of particular sectors before committing to 
information infrastructure priorities. 
 
Formulating priority initiatives to enhance knowledge and information 
infrastructure, reduce risk, and strengthen innovation capability. 
Combining these two phases of analysis provides the foundations for an 
innovation strategy that can exercise sufficient impact on the Tasmanian economy to 
noticeably enhance productivity. The strategy should focus on increasing innovation 
capability for specific sectors in specific places and communities. This means it should 
be particular to the needs of the innovation system for the sector and for the place and 
community within which the sector is concentrated. 
In general, innovation systems can be thought of as composed of the following 
elements: 
 
People: Skill and expertise. 
For human-resource development programs to enhance innovation, they must 
focus on sectors in which Tasmanian industries are most likely to devote the skills to 
significant innovation projects. Programs to improve human capital for innovation do 
not, of course, substitute for efforts in other fields, such as providing the skills any 
economy needs to undertake and grow its routine activities—they supplement those 
needs, and should be conceived as a special category. 
This is especially so since many innovation-enhancing human-resource 
programs will need to target an elite: those best equipped to take initiative at the 
frontier of markets and technologies. Programs designed for people in these categories 
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might attract envy and criticism from proponents of training directed at lifting citizens 
at the bottom end out of underperformance. 
 
Infrastructure: Physical, information, and logistics. 
The infrastructure required to support innovation may be quite different from 
that designed to meet other purposes, such as everyday transactions or consumer 
entertainment. Assessment of infrastructure priorities against the criteria of their impact 
on innovation will hence likely yield a distinct set of priorities. Very often, vital 
infrastructure will not be provided by the private sector because it is too difficult for 
private companies to capture sufficient returns to warrant the investment. In the classic 
sense, infrastructure is a public good: the returns are captured by those who utilise the 
systems, rather than those who own them. Government has a potentially irreplaceable 
role in providing infrastructure, especially since it can take its return in non-profit form: 
taxes, community well-being, reputation (‘brand’), employment growth, and public 
support. 
 
Problem-solving: Knowledge and science. 
As we will see, many of Tasmania’s most important industries rely heavily on 
knowledge and scientific expertise generated and accessed outside individual firms. 
The industries in which the Tasmanian economy is concentrated commonly exhibit an 
innovation pattern of external sourcing for knowledge. As a result, maintaining and 
extending relevant science and other knowledge capability is of even greater 
importance in Tasmania than in other jurisdictions. 
 
Finance: Capital allocation to innovation. 
No successful innovating country today relies on free markets alone to finance 
innovation. There are good reasons for this. While markets are undoubtedly powerful 
and effective resource allocators, better than any known alternative for most 
transactions, they fail in the face of certain types of economic challenge. This is often 
because they can’t manage the form of information involved—in the case of 
innovation, they can’t manage certain types of information asymmetry, moral hazard, 
and adverse selection.14 As a result of these weaknesses, markets alone sometimes 
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 Information asymmetry occurs when the sellers of risk know more about the degree of 
jeopardy involved in a particular transaction than do buyers. Moral hazard results from the 
creation of an incentive to undertake more risky behavior, or even to cheat, once the risk of 
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neither enable innovators to capture sufficient returns nor insure adequately against the 
consequences of failure. In short, under certain circumstances, neither markets nor 
private investors alone can adequately manage the forms of risk found in innovation 
projects, and they avoid commitment. 
The size and intensity of risk inherent in any innovation project depends in the 
first instance on the structure of the technology itself. Innovation risk can be measured 
along three dimensions: scale, duration, and intensity.  Scale refers to the minimum 
necessary investment needed to bring an individual innovation to market.  Duration 
refers to the minimum period required before an outcome is known.  Intensity refers to 
the likelihood that the product will make it to market.  The greater the first two factors, 
and less the third, the greater the project’s overall risk. 
The key to financing innovation is to match the scale, duration, and intensity 
demands of a project under consideration to the risk-management capabilities of 
particular investment vehicles.15 While venture capital often receives much attention in 
discussions of innovation policy, frequently and especially for the innovation needs of 
most of Tasmania’s important industries, it is not suited to the particular financing tasks 
implicit in the innovation activities under consideration. That is, venture capital is 
effective for only a relatively narrow range of risk scale, duration, and intensity, and it 
does not meet the demands of many industries’ innovation tasks. This does not imply 
that these innovation tasks are not likely to be profitable, or do not meet appropriate 
risk-return criteria. Rather, they are simply not an appropriate investment for the 
structure of financial vehicles available. Under such circumstances, there can be a role 
for governments to augment capital markets and private financial institutions, by 
bearing certain types of risk. 
 
Regulation and planning. 
One of the most powerful ways government can influence innovation is by 
adjusting its regulatory regime to support or discourage it. This lens is rarely employed 
to evaluate regulation in the Australian economy, which emphasises consumer and 
investor protection above all other objectives. But in the contemporary economy, most 
industries exist within a complex web of regulation. As we will see, this is again 
especially true for industries that matter to Tasmania. 
                                            
doing so has been sold to another party. Adverse selection occurs when only the riskiest 
projects are sold to risk managers, creating an unbalanced portfolio. 
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 For more discussion of this issue, see West, J., Financing Innovation: Markets and the 
Structure of Risk in Non-Replication Economics, 2004. 
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PART 2: ANALYSIS AND OUTLINE OF INITIATIVES 
 
Identifying High Impact Sectors: Key Characteristics of the Tasmanian 
Economy 
 
The purpose of this section is to identify sectors of the Tasmanian economy with 
revealed deep capability. Our argument is that these are the parts of the economy with 
greatest likelihood to take the Tasmanian economy up the value hierarchy, by 
strengthening innovation capacity and generating value-added growth, and thus to 
drive productivity advance. It is important to stress that in undertaking this analysis we 
are not hoping to divine the future—that is, we are not claiming that because any 
particular industry was successful in the past it will necessarily be so in future—still 
less are we intending to ‘create’ or ‘pick’ winners by government fiat. Rather the 
purpose is to understand which parts of the economy have already demonstrated 
strength and momentum to improve and expand. And as stated, if these sectors are to 
move productivity in the economy overall, they must be relatively large. 
Media coverage of economic issues rarely focuses on capability. It tends to 
dwell instead on eye-catching stories of managerial blunders or power struggles, 
mergers, acquisitions, business cycles, currency-exchange and interest rates, taxes, or 
fluctuations in energy prices. But none of these are fundamental. They can at best be 
thought of as contributing to shallow capability: short-term pricing and cost issues. 
Shifts in exchange rates, tax levels, and interest rates might buffet companies’ business 
and financial performance, inflating or deflating earnings for a year or two, but they are 
surface phenomena. Underlying the dramas that surround these topics are the 
permanent or enduring factors that determine sustainable prosperity. 
Unfortunately, because the media focus on the ‘shallow’ factors, so too often do 
political leaders, while ignoring the ‘deep’ factors. Deep capabilities develop more 
gradually, and last longer. Some harness elements of nature; others can be nurtured 
deliberately by organisations and individuals. Capabilities include accumulations of 
strategic resources and proprietary knowledge, but these demand for their realisation as 
pricing- and profit-making power organisational routines and employee commitment, 
which in turn enable superior problem-solving. Deep capabilities are thus those 
aspects of the economy that are difficult for others to emulate and that support ongoing 
gains in competitiveness. 
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Three characteristics of economic capability are of particular interest in the 
present exercise: 
In their traded sectors, economies tend to specialise. They concentrate in the 
fields in which they have acquired or built deep capability. Products and services from 
these sectors in a particular geography can generally out-compete those from others.  
While all developed economies include large and relatively similar proportions of 
largely non-trade-exposed sectors—health, education, community services, security, 
home-building, retail, personal services—in their traded sectors, economies can be 
remarkably concentrated. And the traded sector is especially important, for two 
reasons: first, non-traded sectors generally grow only roughly in line with 
demographics (population and per capita income), whereas traded sectors can 
generate far greater expansion as they tap distant and overseas markets. Second, in a 
modern economy, especially a small one, many of the goods and services citizens 
want can be obtained only from afar; generating the income to pay for these imports 
depends on what the community can sell to the world. The economic fate of small 
communities such as Tasmania can thus rest on a surprisingly narrow base of 
capability in very few fields, and sometimes as few as one. Ensuring the long-term 
strength of these sectors ought to be a high priority for any community and its 
government. 
Capability is commonly geographically concentrated. Successful industries 
show a marked tendency to cluster in quite small regions. Such clusters include famous 
names like Silicon Valley in California or the City of London and Manhattan in finance, 
but also such less well-known locations as Aalsmeer, 10 miles southwest of 
Amsterdam, the global cut-flower trading capital (with 60% of global trade),16 or Surat, 
in Gujarat, India which cuts 92 per cent of the world’s diamonds.17 Capability 
concentrates regionally because much of the basis for capability within firms exists and 
is maintained outside firms, in educational and research institutions, finance, local 
industry and community bodies, support and allied service industries, and community 
memory. The combination of these elements can be thought of as the local platform for 
innovation, and the health of these platforms is a vital interest to the future of these 
communities. 
Capability assumes different forms, and is created by different processes, in 
different sectors. Capability can be thought of as the ability to perform tasks that 
matter in competition, and what matters in competition varies industry by industry. 
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 Aravind Adiga, ‘Uncommon Brilliance’, Time magazine, April 12, 2004, from Time.com, 
retrieved 3 November 2008. 
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The combination of these three observations generates an important 
implication: to be effective in promoting productivity advance through innovation, 
government policy ought to focus on sectors in which the economy specialises, and be 
geographically and sectorally specific. There can thus be no effective one-size-fits-all 
innovation policy. 
Analysis to locate sectors in which the Tasmanian economy specialises is a 
matter of identifying those parts of the Tasmanian economy that account for a 
disproportionately large share of Australia’s activity (economic output, value-added, 
employment, and trade) in a given field. Understanding the sources of capability that 
might underlie such specialisation requires deeper investigation into how physical, 
human, organisational, and financial factors combine to impart an ability to perform 
the tasks that matter in that sector. 
By ‘disproportionate’ we mean here those sectors that account for a 
substantially greater share of economic activity in a given field than Tasmania’s average 
share of Australia’s population or economy. Since Tasmania accounts for 2.3 per cent 
of the Australian population and 2.0 per cent of the Australian economy, sectors of 
particular interest will be those in which Tasmania accounts for a much greater 
proportion of Australian activity. 
It is important to stress two issues in presenting this analysis: first, and rather 
obviously, the Tasmanian economy is small. It is less than one-tenth the total size of 
the city of Sydney, indeed it is equivalent to only few suburbs of Sydney and it is by far 
the smallest Australian state. We should not expect, therefore, to identify a large 
number of fields in which Tasmania’s economy excels. Second, and largely as a result 
of the first issue, data on industry size in Tasmania are poor—privacy and sampling 
considerations dictate that data at a granularity that would be available for a larger 
economy are simply not so for Tasmania. 
Nonetheless, the principal features of the Tasmanian economy are clear. Some 
contradict conventional wisdom, even among Tasmanians. Using employment share as 
a proxy for share of economic activity, in its traded sector Tasmania enjoys a 
disproportionate share of only three industry sectors: forestry and associated activities; 
food, including agriculture; and electricity and mineral processing derived from 
electricity generation. Summarising this analysis, features of the Tasmanian economy 
particularly relevant to innovation are: 
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Tasmania is a significant food producer. 
Tasmania enjoys a substantially disproportionate share in several key food 
categories: aquaculture (20.9%), fruit and vegetable processing (13.3%), dairy farming 
(8.8%), fishing (8.7%), dairy product manufacturing (5.8%), ‘other’ food manufacturing 
(4.6%), bakery products (3.5%), horticulture and fruit growing (3.3%), services to 
agriculture (3.3%), grain, sheep, and beef (3.2%), agriculture ‘not further defined’ 
(3.2%), and farm produce wholesaling (2.4%). In 2005-06, food processing accounted 
for 25% of jobs in Tasmania’s manufacturing sector, the highest proportion for any 
state, and with a higher Industry Value Added (IVA) than the Australian average (21% 
versus 18%).1819 And the sector is growing, not declining; between 1990 and 2008, the 
ABS category ‘Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing’ increased its share of the Tasmanian 
economy by 3.7 percentage points, and between 1990 and 2000 grew by an annual 
average 15.2% versus 2.2% for Australia. Between 1990 and 2005, agriculture alone 
increased its Real Gross Value in Tasmania by 50%.20 
Some analysts argue that Tasmania’s concentration in these food sectors is a 
weakness. They suggest that these are ‘mature’, low-technology, and low-productivity 
sectors, with poor growth or improvement prospects. Hence, it is frequently claimed, 
Tasmania ought either attempt to transition out of these sectors, or focus on building 
other, more dynamic industries that are likely to support future productivity and 
growth.21 
On closer examination, however, none of the above claims turn out to be 
supported by data. 
Food is not a low-growth or ‘mature’ sector. Globally, the food sector has 
grown over the last decade faster than other parts of the economy, and than the 
economy as a whole. This is because a large proportion of the world’s population, 
especially in China and India, is finally earning sufficient income to enjoy the diet they 
would like—one with a greater share of protein and high-value foods and less simple 
carbohydrates. As noted above, the food sector has also grown faster in Tasmania than 
the State’s average. Indeed, in recent years regions strong in agriculture have enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity, as rising consumption and limited capacity to increase 
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output have reduced stock-to-use ratios and driven up prices. The Innovation Census of 
Tasmania found that 70 per cent of food-sector firms increased sales in the period 
2004-2006, with an average growth over the two-year period of 65 per cent and 
median of 37 per cent, and food-sector employment growth averaged 66 per cent with 
a median of 33 per cent. Importantly, the Census also found that exports out of 
Australia accounted for 41 per cent of Tasmania’s food sector sales and sales to 
mainland Australia a further 39 per cent. By comparison, for the overall economy sales 
within Tasmania accounted for 64 per cent. 
Food is not a low-technology sector. While it is true that the product often 
appears little changed, the systems used to produce, trade, distribute, and process these 
products are highly complex and the activities needed to produce and sell them are 
increasingly knowledge intensive. The sophisticated services needed to construct and 
maintain these systems make up a major proportion of value creation and employment 
in and around the food sector. As a result, and this is one piece of evidence for the 
increasing knowledge intensivity of Tasmania’s food and primary sectors, the food 
sector has been generating a disproportionate share of higher-skill jobs. The two 
categories of occupation that grew at a faster rate for agriculture in Tasmania than for 
the average of all Tasmanian industries were 'Professionals', and 'Intermediate Clerical, 
Sales, Service Workers'. The number of ‘professionals’ in agriculture grew by 29.8% 
from 1996 to 2006, but 17.6% for the overall economy; while the number of 
'intermediate clerical, sales, and service workers' in agriculture grew by 32.7% from 
1996 to 2006, but 21.3% for the overall economy. Over the same period, the number 
of ‘labourers and related workers' increased by only 1.3% for agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, but by 12.2% for all industries, and within this period—from 2001 to 2006—
decreased by 5.5% for agriculture, forestry and fishing, and increased by 8.8% for all 
industries (the 10-year figure for agriculture was offset by a 7.3% increase in the first 
five-year period).22 
The perception that food is ‘low tech’ is an unfortunate artifact of a commonly 
employed definition of low-, medium-, or high-tech, which simply measures the ratio 
of R&D-to-sales in the industry, classifying those with greater than 4% ‘high’ tech, 
those between 1% and 4% ‘medium’ tech, and those with less than 1% ‘low’ tech. But 
this taxonomy can be misleading: it fails to recognise either that much innovation 
(indeed, in most industries, more than two-thirds) does not stem from R&D, or that in 
many industries, including very often food, R&D is performed not inside the firm, but 
externally by not-for-profit researchers, whether government or other, and then adopted 
by firms, and is therefore not counted in the statistics. The Innovation Census of 
Tasmania revealed that 71 per cent of innovation expenditure in the food industry was 
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non-R&D-related, but that external acquisition of R&D accounted for 31% of R&D 
expenditure, versus 8 per cent for the overall economy. Indeed, while the food sector 
accounted for 4.3 per cent of total innovation expenditure in the economy, it made up 
16.4 per cent of external acquisition. 
And, finally, food is not a productivity improvement laggard. While during the 
1990s productivity advance in the Australian economy as a whole averaged 2.7% and 
during the 1980s 1.5%, the leading productivity-advancing sector was 
‘communications’ on 5.5%; agriculture, far from being a laggard, came in a close 
second, on 5.4%. This finding was confirmed in the Innovation Census, with 79 per 
cent of food sector firms reporting that they innovated during the previous year, 
significantly higher than the average for the overall economy, and that most innovation 
was productivity-enhancing process related. Tasmanian food firms also reported that 
they were collaborating to raise productivity with external consultants, commercial 
laboratories, or private R&D institutes, universities or public-sector research entities at 
a higher rate than the average for the overall economy (50 per cent versus 35 per cent). 
In short, a concentration in food is not a disadvantage for Tasmania, but a 
potential advantage. Tasmania has accumulated substantial strength over several 
decades in an industry now characterised by above-average growth, especially 
globally, considerable knowledge intensivity, and sustained above-average 
productivity advance. 
 
Forestry and forest products remains a strength. 
Forestry remains the sector in which Tasmania has the most disproportionate 
share of Australian employment. Tasmania accounts for 27.1% of Australian forestry 
and logging employment, 7.7% of log sawmilling and timber dressing, 6.3% of paper 
and paper product manufacturing, and 3.1% of ‘other’ wood product manufacturing. 
These numbers make forest products a substantial contributor to the Tasmanian 
economy, with annual average sales of $1.03 billion or 17.3 per cent of the state’s 
manufacturing sector. Total Tasmanian forest-product-related employment in 2007 was 
10,700 (4% of the Tasmanian workforce) and Tasmania accounted for 65% of 
Australia’s hardwood production, 70% of decorative veneer production, 55% of 
newsprint, 45% of woodchip exports, and 50% of printing and writing paper 
production. 
At the primary-production end, commercial forestry is the single major land use 
in Tasmania, covering 24 per cent of the State. These forests constitute a substantial 
and valuable Tasmanian asset. The evident disparity between Tasmania’s share of 
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Australian employment and production in forests and primary forest products and its 
share of employment and production in higher-value-added products indicates the 
potential of this sector to expand its value contribution in Tasmania. In addition, since 
the vast majority of Tasmania’s production forests are now regrowth or plantations, and 
timber is an inherently renewable resource, the industry should be viewed as 
sustainable, and socially and environmentally desirable. These factors combine to 
suggest the industry has considerable potential for more-profitable and innovative uses, 
if community divisions over environmental concerns can be overcome or transcended. 
Appendix B proposes an innovation-based approach to one segment of the 
forest-products industry, the sawn-timber sector, which faces particular challenges in 
the coming years. This sector provides an example of the benefits potentially available 
from an Aggregate Project Plan, a tool commonly employed by leading private-sector 
innovators but adaptable to industry-sector-wide demands. 
 
Tasmania continues to produce a disproportionate share of Australia’s 
electricity. 
With only 2.3% of Australia’s population, in 2007 Tasmania produced 9800 
gigawatt hours (GWh) or 6.2% of Australia’s power, almost three times the national per 
capita average. This output was produced with 5.2% of the Australian electricity-
generation workforce, implying that Tasmania’s energy supplier enjoyed higher than 
average productivity. 
This capacity far exceeded the needs of Tasmania’s home and retail customers, 
and enabled the State to supply major industrial users. Despite possessing only a little 
mining in these fields, Tasmania employs 6.3% of Australia’s basic non-ferrous metal 
manufacturing workforce, primarily in aluminium and zinc smelting. 
 
Tasmania has a disproportionate share of Australia’s museum activity. 
 With a 6.4% share of Australia’s museum employment in 2007, Tasmania was 
in early 2009 already a significant centre for these activities. While Tasmania’s high 
proportion of museum employment was attributable in part to the fact that Tasmania 
possesses by far the greatest share of heritage buildings (more than one-third of all 
Australian heritage-listed buildings are in Tasmania), the greatest proportion of 
museum activity was concentrated around Hobart’s waterfront, and when combined 
with the Tasmanian Symphony orchestra, the Playhouse, numerous private art 
galleries, the Salamanca Arts Centre, the University Art School and Conservatorium of 
Music, and substantial concentrations of researchers at the CSIRO Marine Science 
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facility, and—a few blocks away—the new home to the Menzies Research Institute, 
this area amounted to a de facto creative precinct. With the construction of two new 
art museums in Hobart and the substantial refurbishment of the Tasmanian Museum 
and Art Gallery, this concentration would increase substantially, and suggests the 
possibility of developing a major creative precinct in the heart of Hobart. 
 
 
Tasmania will soon have Australia’s most widely available high-speed broadband. 
 With existing fibre-optic cables across the Bass Strait, combined with the 
Federal Government’s announcement in April 2009 that its 100mbps facility would be 
introduced first in Tasmania, the ‘tyranny of distance’ in information access and 
transmission from which Tasmania has suffered since its foundation looks set to end. 
The ubiquitous availability of broadband infrastructure would create new opportunities 
for innovation in both existing and potential new sectors of the Tasmanian economy. 
 
Other sectors with noteworthy Tasmanian disproportions included tourism-
related services, with 2.8% of Australia’s tourism employment or 2.6% of Australia’s 
gross value added (primarily accommodation, museums, attractions, and related travel 
services), marine engineering, textile weaving, industrial machinery manufacturing, 
principally mining equipment, and gambling services. Industries in which Tasmania 
had a lower share than Tasmania’s share of the national economy include most types 
of mining, and property and business services (13% of Australia’s Total Factor Income 
in 2003-06 versus 6% of Tasmania’s).23 
In the following section we outline initiatives to promote innovation in five 
fields: the food and agribusiness sector, sustainable energy, a creative precinct for 
Hobart’s waterfront, the National Broadband Network, and tourism (which offers the 
potential to leverage key Tasmanian strengths in food, nature, and heritage, including 
museums). 
                                            
23
 ABS Cats. 5220.0 and 5204.0 
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1. Strengthening Tasmania's Innovation Capability in Food: Seven 
Initiatives 
 
As a model of the value that effective innovation policy could contribute and 
what innovation might achieve within the Tasmanian economy, one sector, food and 
agriculture—which displays especially great potential—has been selected here for 
closer attention. What follows is an attempt to indicate how great might be the 
contribution of innovation to the Tasmanian economy, and a proposed coherent set of 
initiatives the Tasmanian Government could undertake to bring about that 
contribution. We believe the potential is comparable only to the value provided to 
Tasmania historically by hydro-industrialisation. 
 
Creating innovation platforms in the Tasmanian food and agricultural industries. 
 
While the analysis above shows clearly that the food and agriculture industries 
are already substantial contributors to Tasmania’s economic well-being—indeed taken 
together and by several measures they are the largest contributors—they have the 
potential to generate far more. The two keys to unlocking this potential are facilitating 
a transition from lower-value land use to higher-value, and the further construction of 
food-processing and consumer-product development companies. These might be 
thought about as the ‘back end’ and the ‘front end’, or the upstream and downstream 
of the food chain. Both these are feasible, but they are by no means inevitable if left to 
their own devices. 
Table 1 provides very rough estimates of the feasible potential for a selection of 
key agricultural products in Tasmania’s future: 
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Table 1: Agriculture and aquaculture potential value increment estimates 
 
 
These data illustrate three scenarios: 
1. Existing land use, with existing irrigation. 
2. An ‘optimised’ land use, with existing irrigation. 
3. An ‘optimised’ land use with feasible additional irrigation, at two levels of land-use 
transition: high and low. 
By ‘optimal’ land use we mean a shift to higher per-hectare net income 
generation, where land types, ecologies, and topologies would support it. For the sake 
of simplicity, and at the risk of obscuring vital differences among good and bad 
seasons, various sub-sectors, and differentially productive soils and geographies, the 
tables are based on conservative estimates for ‘normal’ or ‘average’ years in income for 
key land uses in Tasmania: sheep-grazing for wool and fat lambs, beef cattle, dairy, 
horticulture (itself a very broad category, ranging across fruit and nut trees, specialty 
crops such as opium poppies and pyrethrum, and vegetable row crops), and wine-
grapes. 
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The comparison is startling. It reveals that were Tasmania to utilise its available 
quality farm land for anywhere near its optimal value, but with no additional water 
infrastructure, roughly $0.2 billion in gross value-added could be generated (in this 
first-cut analysis, we have used gross margin—essentially sales revenue minus input 
costs not including wages—as a proxy for value added). Since agricultural production 
in Tasmania is currently worth about $1 billion (or around $0.5 billion in value-added), 
that represents an additional 40% of potential value. With additional—but technically 
feasible—irrigation, that additional value could rise to $4 billion, bringing the total 
value-added of agricultural production in Tasmania to $4.5 billion. With further 
processing, for example making wine grapes into wine, along with growth in 
aquaculture contributing another potential $1 billion, it appears feasible to add an 
additional $5 billion over today’s value-added to Tasmania’s combined agriculture and 
food industry, an amount equivalent to $10,000 per Tasmanian. To conceive how 
great is this contribution, it is worth noting that additional value of this magnitude 
would roughly double Tasmania’s total out-of-state sales and make Tasmania the 
richest state, per capita, in Australia. 
Of course, the reality of how agriculture and food production will evolve is 
impossible to predict. These would be ambitious targets, and this paper does not 
suggest either that Tasmania is ‘on track’ to achieve them or that they would be 
guaranteed even with substantial investment. The future depends on thousands of 
individual land-use and investment decisions, made by individuals, families, and 
companies. All experience indicates that it is impossible for governments to forecast 
accurately or to direct industry-development patterns with any precision. The choices 
of these economic actors will undoubtedly surprise policy-makers and move the 
economy in unpredictable directions, as decision-makers discover unexpected 
opportunities, make mistakes, and calculate their own willingness to take risk and 
commit effort and resources. What government can do, however, is create conditions 
that provide incentives and encouragement, and make innovation more feasible and 
more profitable. 
The benefits of creating these innovation platforms and developing the 
Tasmanian food industry in the directions indicated would be considerable. They 
extend beyond the directly economic into social, cultural, and community goals, and 
would create follow-on benefits to other sectors. Key benefits of promoting innovation 
in Tasmania’s food sector would include: 
The wealth created would be geographically decentralised. All regions of 
Tasmania would gain from a food-oriented innovation strategy, especially the State’s 
north and north-west which include much of the island’s best farmland. Innovation 
strategies that focus on high-technology, large-scale industry, or professional services 
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tend to concentrate the returns in a few centres, chiefly one urban metropolis. The 
strategy suggested here would focus on development of a plurality of industry, deeply 
embedded in regional communities, with particular communities strengthening their 
specialisation and capability and hence distinctiveness. 
The wealth created would be socially decentralised. All economic strata of 
Tasmania would gain, from the less skilled to professionals, managers, researchers, and 
investors. The food industry draws upon a wide range of knowledge and expertise and 
is increasingly sophisticated in the types of skills demanded, as indicated in the 
previous section’s analysis. Nor is the industry exclusively rural or farm-oriented. Much 
of the value created would be in the development of specialty consumer products, and 
as indicated in the previous section, approximately one-third of Tasmania’s 
manufacturing sector is already in food processing. 
The wealth created would be economically decentralised. The economic 
structure induced by these developments need not follow the common bi-focated 
pattern, with a handful of distant giant corporations mostly owned out-of-state, and the 
rest of society wage or salaried employees. Many of the new businesses made feasible 
by this innovation path would be small and medium-sized, and locally owned. In other 
words, wealth-generating assets would be distributed more widely among the 
population, and opportunities for entrepreneurship would abound. To paraphrase 
Chesterton, more Tasmanians would own at least some of the means of production. 
The power and influence created by such a development pattern would be 
decentralised. With regional, community, and economic decentralisation would come 
greater independence and self-reliance. No one group, company, or location would 
dominate. 
The businesses created would be culturally desirable. Tasmanians are 
justifiably proud of the quality of the food produced on their island and the world 
increasingly knows Tasmania for the quality of its product. An innovation strategy of 
the type outlined here would create a dynamic in which the incentive was continually 
to upgrade, occupying the highest-quality segments of the market. Tasmania’s image, 
and self-image, would benefit. Whatever a Tasmanian’s personal view of high-profile 
resource-based projects, few Tasmanians are likely to brag to their mainland cousin 
about the state having the largest pulpmill or alumium smelter in the southern 
hemisphere. They do about having the best cherries, wine, or seafood. 
The businesses created would tap and be advantaged by powerful global 
growth trends. Global growth in demand for premium food far outstrips average 
economic growth and is likely to accelerate in future. As hundreds of millions of 
consumers in China, India, and elsewhere in Asia pass the prosperity threshold needed 
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to upgrade their diets, Tasmania will be ideally situated to meet their needs. In this 
sector, globalisation would benefit Tasmania as it improves access to premium 
markets, rather than disadvantage us as it throws our industries into increasingly 
vicious competition with low-cost alternatives in newly developing economies. 
Allied industries would be strengthened. Two key industries for Tasmania are 
tourism and logistics. Both would gain from an expanded and premium food industry. 
Gourmet tourism is a growing field, and most tourists report that the quality of the food 
they experience during their holiday influences their choice. While Tasmania lacks two 
of the world’s major tourism drawcards, ‘surf-and-sand’ and ‘snow-and-ski’, it can 
build a unique position in wine and gourmet-experience tourism, to ally with its 
nature-experience and heritage appeals. Similarly, by demanding more sophisticated, 
small-batch and information-rich logistics support, a premium food industry offers 
considerable potential across the state to logistics providers. 
The businesses created would be environmentally sustainable, and be seen to 
be so. With careful planning and natural-resource stewardship, a premium-food 
innovation strategy would create a dynamic in which it was in Tasmania’s interest to 
reinforce protection of its environment—since a healthy environment would be at the 
foundation of its most-important industry. Rather than economic-development interests 
pitting Tasmanian against Tasmanian, and economics against the environment, 
economic needs would reinforce environmental imperatives. 
The businesses created would rest upon difficult- or impossible-to-imitate 
assets, and the advantage created would be competitively sustainable. Because the 
foundations to this strategy lie in irreplaceable natural assets—water, arable land, 
sunshine, latitude, and unique know-how—Tasmania’s advantage would not be 
continually under threat of erosion by new entrants and competitors. 
In short, an innovation strategy emphasising upgrade of the agricultural and 
food industries offers the potential to insert a new ‘mainspring’ into Tasmania’s 
economic development—let’s call it ‘hydro-agrarianisation’—one which promises to 
overcome the divisions that have racked Tasmanian society over the past three 
decades, offers something to everyone living here, and can build broad-based 
momentum for years to come. Tasmania can be the Provence or Tuscany of Australia: 
a great place to live, with a sustainable and thriving economic base for long-term 
prosperity. 
It is possible to paint an appealing vision of the advantages Tasmania could gain 
by investment in an innovation strategy, and of the society it would create, but is this 
kind of transition in land management, and value created, really feasible? How might 
it, and its associated value increase, be facilitated, if at all? It certainly cannot be said 
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that Tasmania is currently on the path to the future sketched above. Substantial 
innovation in land use, water use, product specialisation, and skill levels would be 
required to make this vision real. But it is critical to recognise that the strategy outlined 
here is not conjured out of thin air. It rests, rather, on existing assets and strengths of 
the Tasmanian economy, and seeks to augment and connect these to induce 
substantial innovation. 
The vital physical assets are water, land, and sunshine. Tasmania is ideally 
positioned in all three. Indeed, it has these natural elements in abundance. With 0.9% 
of Australia’s land area and 14% of Australia’s water, Tasmania has by far the highest 
ratio of water to land mass of any state, indeed it might be thought of as the ‘Saudi 
Arabia of water’. Tasmania has an abundance of arable land, with 2.3 per of Australia’s 
population and 6% of Australia’s quality farmland. And because Tasmania is the most 
southerly portion of Australia’s land mass, it enjoys the most sunlight during summer 
and autumn, the key ripening period for important horticultural crops, including wine 
grapes. To combine with these natural assets Tasmanians have accumulated 
considerable experience and expertise in food production and are in the early stages of 
building an umbrella brand to gain recognition for these products.
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Case Study – Land use change in the Coal River Valley 1983 to 2013 
 
Prior to construction of the Craigbourne Dam, government analysis had estimated that 
a new dam on the Coal River could potentially increase the area of irrigated land in the 
Coal River Valley from 245 ha to 1,100 ha.  And indeed, by 1992, six years after the 
Craigbourne Dam’s construction, the quantity of irrigated land grown more than four-
fold, to 1,109 ha. Over this time, the total gross margin generated from that irrigated 
land had increased by only 70 per cent, less than one-fold (in constant dollars). By 
2008, however, while the area of irrigated land had grown to only 2814 ha (2.5 times), 
the value produced by that land had jumped by 15 times. Why had that happened, and 
what can be learned from the experience? The table below provides some important 
answers. 
 
Land Use Change - Coal River Valley 1983 to 
2008 
Area Share of 
area 
Avg GM/ha 
5 
Total GM 
 ha % 2008 $/ha 2008 $ 
Pre-irrigation land use (1983) 1 - incl land potentially irrigated by Craigbourne Dam 
High margin horticulture4 125 11.4 15,816 1,977,000 
Other agriculture (120 ha irrigated)6 975 88.6 381 371,475 
 1,100   2,348,475 
Pre-Blundstone Study "low margin" irrigated land use (1992)2  
High margin horticulture4 126 11.4 21,457 2,710,019 
Other irrigated agriculture 983 88.6 1,294 1,271,614 
 1,109   3,981,633 
Post-Blundstone Study "emerging high margin" irrigated land use (1995) 
High margin horticulture4 344 19.2 15,241 5,239,860 
Other irrigated agriculture 1,442 80.8 1,334 1,923,940 
 1,786    
Current "significant high margin" irrigated land use (2008)3 - irrigation supply increased post 1995 
High margin horticulture4 1,093 41.3 30,651 33,501,543 
Other irrigated agriculture 1,551 58.7 1,284 1,991,484 
 2644   35,493,027 
Intended irrigated land use (2013)3 
High margin horticulture4 1,295 25.7 29,033 37,598,000 
Other irrigated agriculture 3,741 74.3 1,339 5,010,300 
 5,036   42,608,300 
1 Land use ha 1983 - SE Tas Irrigation Scheme stages 1&2  Economic Evaluation Tas Dept Ag  table 4, 1983 
2 Land use ha 1992 - Blundstone Study Vol 1 page 19     
3 Land use (ha) - Enhancing Irrigation Water in SE Irrigation District (prelim), Coal River Products Assoc Nov 08 
4 High margin horticulture includes stone fruit, grapes, olives, fresh vegetables, walnuts  
5 Gross margin (GM) for grapes, stone fruit, dairy, beef, sheep are AIRC est,  other refer Crop Gross Margins, DPIW 
6 Gross margin for other agriculture in 1983 is overstated as margins are for irrigated (not dryland) agriculture  
 
In 1992, low-gross-margin agriculture—cereals, lupins/beans, lentils, and other crops—
accounted for 310ha or 28% of the Coal Valley’s irrigated land, while medium gross 
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margin agriculture—peas, pyrethrum, essential oils, lucerne, seed crops and poppies—
made up a further 673ha, or 61%, for a total of 89%. The area of high-margin 
horticulture—fresh vegetables, orchards, and grapes—had remained virtually 
unchanged. 
 
In other words, the area had not innovated, and relatively little additional value had 
been created. The continued emphasis on low- and medium-gross-margin agriculture 
was explained by the 1992 Blundstone Study as resulting from the fact that farmers had 
not shifted to an optimal land use. 
 
With the Blundstone Study, however, which detailed where and how land-use 
transition to higher-value uses could take place, a process of change began. Three 
years after the Blundstone Study, the value of high gross margin agriculture had almost 
doubled (93%), compared with a 37% increase in the nine years from 1983 to 1992 (in 
constant dollars). 
 
Between 1992 and 2008, an additional 967 hectares of high-gross-margin agriculture 
produced $30.8m in additional gross margin, while an extra 738ha of low- and 
medium-margin agriculture increased gross margin by only $0.9m. By 2008, high-
gross-margin agriculture accounted for 94.4% of the total. The average gross margin of 
each additional hectare of high-margin agriculture ($30,654) was 23 times the average 
gross margin of each additional hectare of low and medium margin agriculture 
($1,284). 
 
In summary, while introducing industrial-scale irrigation to the Coal River Valley was a 
necessary pre-condition to transforming the area from predominantly low-margin 
agriculture to much higher gross-margin uses, it was not sufficient. Before the dramatic 
transformation took place, land owners needed to see that new higher-margin uses for 
now-irrigated land were possible, or allow new entrants to buy or lease land. 
Geographic risk (other than water), production risk, financing risk, and market risk had 
to be identified, assessed, tested, and mitigated. Irrigation permitted a new future to 
emerge, but that did not materialise until these impediments were overcome. 
 
Unlocking potential in other parts of Tasmania 
As an example, in 2002, the maximum irrigable area of the South East Region of 
Tasmania (defined here as Kempton, Elderslie, Brighton-Broadmarsh, Tea Tree-Bagdad, 
Coal Valley, and Sorell-Orielton) was estimated to be 48,700 hectares, of which only 
4000ha, or 8.2 per cent, was irrigated. More importantly, 14,300 ha of the total 
irrigable area was found to be capable of supporting higher-margin horticulture such as 
apricots and cherries if irrigation was available (of which 6,900 ha were also suitable 
for wine grapes). Were a similar process of irrigation and facilitated innovation to take 
place over this region, the economic impact would be considerable. 
 
And undoubtedly, the biggest potential is not in the South East, and certainly not in the 
Midlands, but in the North-West and North-East. 
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Maximum Irrigable Area - Hectares 
 
• Source: Table 4.5 Water Resource Options Development in South East Tasmania, Volume 1, DPIWE 2002 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
The purpose of the initiatives proposed here is to add to Tasmania’s natural 
food-related assets, accumulated experience, and organisation, to improve the regional 
platforms through which innovation in this sector can take place. The proposed 
initiatives below are grouped around the major elements of effective innovation 
systems, as identified by lessons gained from the study of innovation processes around 
the world over the past 30 years. 
To make this vision feasible, Tasmania needs a comprehensive and coherent 
strategy comprising the following elements: 
 
1. Upgrade infrastructure: physical, logistics, information, market intelligence.  
The starting point for the ambitious innovation strategy outlined above is 
physical infrastructure, particularly in water, distribution capability, and branding. 
Initiatives to achieve this could include: 
* Substantially increase commitment to irrigation infrastructure. Water 
availability is the key to unlocking Tasmania’s food-production potential. The water 
exists in Tasmania, but only a very small portion is utilised for agriculture. It falls on the 
western half of the island, but is needed on the eastern. The Tasmanian Government 
has currently committed a total of $80 million to irrigation infrastructure, to be 
combined with Federal Government and private capital to support what amounts to a 
relatively modest program of irrigation construction. Given the apparent potential, and 
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water availability, it would be sensible for government to increase that commitment 
considerably, perhaps to as much as $1 billion. While this sum may seem large, in the 
light of Australia’s water challenges and the potential of Tasmania to become the 
southern food basket of the nation, supplying the bulk of its temperate products, such a 
sum does not seem unrealistic. The Federal Government should be approached to fund 
the increase. Of course, the water provided by the schemes will need to be priced so 
that it creates the maximum benefit to Tasmanians. Since the current Federal 
Government projects to spend up to $12 billion on Australia’s water resources, mostly 
taking out capacity in the Murray Darling—indeed, removing an estimated 40% of 
Australia’s irrigated horticulture capacity—committing $1 billion to adding in capacity 
in Tasmania could appear sensible. The alternative might be for Australia to become a 
net food importer, potentially from China. 
* Build an institutional structure to plan, assess, construct, and manage these 
assets. An irrigation system on the scale warranted would require a coherent and 
coordinated approach, which considers Tasmania’s water assets as a whole, and in 
their environmental context. Responsibility for water management in Tasmania is 
currently fragmented across multiple agencies and levels of government, with only ad 
hoc interaction. Much responsibility for water management now rests with Hydro 
Tasmania, which has expertise in electricity generation, dams, pipelines, and project 
management, but its mandate is limited to electricity generation. To remedy this, the 
Tasmanian Government should create and designate a single agency with 
responsibility for water management as a whole (probably excluding drinking water 
supply) and give it the mission to construct the irrigation system Tasmania needs. 
Hydro Tasmania also possesses strong environmental stewardship and planning-
approval capability. Tasmanians need to be assured that an ambitious program of 
irrigation construction would not compromise environmental responsibility in matters 
such as endangered species, catchment management, and stream-flow. 
To meet these needs an independent assessment and approval process would be 
required. Tasmanians must be convinced that every individual project both meets the 
highest standards of environmental and economic scrutiny, but also that it be seen to 
do so. We must design and implement a scrutiny process in which all Tasmanians—
particularly those whose overriding priority is environmental protection—can have 
confidence. No project should be allowed, for example, to contribute to soil salinity. In 
this light, it is important to stress at the outset that while these projects may be 
considered as part of an overall innovation portfolio, each potential project must be 
subject to specific and individual assessment to ensure that it is sustainable—
economically, environmentally, and socially. A broad innovation strategy and desire to 
add to productivity and prosperity must not be seen as justifying compromise of the 
necessity that each project stand on its own merits in these vital respects. 
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Irrigation is only one element of the set of necessary initiatives. Irrigation alone 
will not achieve the ambitious goals outlined above. It is important to reiterate that 
what is proposed in this document is an innovation strategy, not an irrigation strategy. 
Although irrigation is vital, so also are other initiatives: 
* Augment small-batch and specialty logistics. Much of Tasmania’s logistics 
capacity is oriented to high-volume, low-value commodity movement, which is 
unsuitable for small or medium-value, perishable products. Improvement of this 
capacity, coupled with superior information traceability would be a priority under this 
strategy. To prepare for this goal, the government should commission an external study 
to assess Tasmania’s future needs in this light, and recommend how best to meet them 
and integrate small-batch logistics into an overall infrastructure plan. 
 * Make available high-quality information about land-use potential. Land 
owners and potential investors, as well as those who scrutinize candidate investment 
proposals, should have access to a comprehensive, high-accuracy, and publicly 
available data base that classifies land according to its suitability for various 
agricultural purposes. Having one’s land officially so classified could, for example, 
enable farmers to seek support from investors for new development projects, and thus 
facilitate movement up the land-use value hierarchy. Surprisingly, no such 
comprehensive database currently exists in Tasmania, although key pieces of such 
information are scattered among various government and not-government entities. The 
appropriate entity to prepare and maintain such a database is the Tasmanian Institute 
for Agricultural Research, in collaboration with the Department of Primaries Industries, 
Parks, Water and Environment. 
 
2. Improve human capital. 
The actions described above all rest on the willingness and ability of individuals 
to tackle and solve problems. This is a particular challenge in Tasmania’s agricultural 
sector, where the average age of farmers is almost 60. To address this need, the State 
Government should embark on an aggressive, targeted program to augment training 
and skill levels. The greatest needs are at the levels of highest expertise. The Tasmanian 
Government could: 
* Create a top-flight farm-management and food-based entrepreneurship 
tertiary-training institute. Surprisingly, and in spite of the fact that food and agriculture 
is arguably Tasmania’s most important industry sector, it is not possible for young 
Tasmanians to study farm-management in the State. It is possible to study agricultural 
or botanical science, and great emphasis is placed on natural resource management, 
but for farming and food production as a business students must leave the State, going 
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to Marcus Oldham College in Geelong, the University of New England, or Lincoln 
University in New Zealand. A high-quality degree-level program, contributing as few 
as 50 bright, young, well-trained and confident farm entrepreneurs each year to 
Tasmania’s food industry, would be invaluable in making possible the land-use 
transition described above. 
* Create Australia’s leading institute for training high-end chefs. At the other end 
of the food chain, an important gap exists at the pinnacle of cooking and food-
presentation in Australia. Australia currently has no high-end school for training chefs, 
equivalent to the Culinary Institute of America (known as the CIA) or Cordon Bleu in 
Paris. Tasmania should seize this opportunity. Training perhaps 50 world-class chefs 
each year in Tasmania would contribute greatly to Tasmania’s reputation as a home of 
fine food, and training the students with Tasmanian products would increase 
awareness among the influential elite about what Tasmania has to offer. If only 10 
more each year remained in the state, they would over time revolutionise the state’s 
restaurant sector. The benefits to food product development, Tasmania’s brand, and the 
tourism industry go without saying. 
 
3. Reduce the cost to Tasmanian businesses of utilising science and technology. 
The Tasmanian Innovation Census found a high level of external sourcing of 
knowledge in the Tasmanian food and agricultural sectors, along with a high level of 
collaboration between the University of Tasmania and Tasmanian food businesses. 
Tasmania possesses valuable food-related research capabilities in the Tasmanian 
Institute for Agricultural Research (TIAR), Tasmanian Aquaculture and Fisheries 
Institute (TAFI), and the Cooperative Research Centre for Food Safety, all affiliated with 
the University of Tasmania. But important obstacles to collaboration between bodies 
such as these continue to exist, with some exacerbated by government policy. 
Most government programs to encourage commercial interaction between 
publicly funded research institutions and private companies effectively aim to increase 
the price of science and technology to private companies. This result may not be 
intended, but it creates a serious obstacle to private access to public research. 
As governments, especially the Federal Government, have focused on gaining 
the maximum-possible return from public science and technology investment, and as 
research agencies strive to demonstrate their value to government, governments in 
many jurisdictions have created incentives for research institutions to capture as much 
benefit as possible for themselves from their research and expertise, rather than for 
private industry. They do this by maximizing the price of intellectual property and 
technology consulting. These incentives have been promulgated under the banner of 
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‘promoting a more commercial-oriented culture’, but the effect of raising the price of 
any good is usually to reduce its demand, and hence its usage. 
Rather than pushing public research organizations to raise their prices, 
government should encourage these institutions to reduce their prices as far as is 
feasible. Of course, if the price is reduced too far, firms may not sufficiently value 
intellectual property, but certainly if it is increased excessively, its adoption will 
decline. 
To offset this tendency, the Tasmanian Government could: 
* Create incentives for universities to release intellectual property. 
* Open up its own intellectual property, by making it freely available to 
Tasmania-based businesses, with a proviso that an enduring license be granted back to 
the Government. 
* Support universities to collaborate with businesses for problem-solving. This 
could be facilitated by targeted funding for consulting projects to enable the University 
to free its personnel to work with industry. Rather than provide grants directly to 
companies, the government could fund problem-solving efforts that collaborate 
between companies and expertise providers. Such funding would encourage ongoing 
capability formation and maintenance. 
* Expand the developing cluster of food-related research in Tasmania. Tasmania 
is already home to several leading food-related research bodies, and the Tasmanian 
Government has been instrumental as a partner in building them. In addition to these, 
Tasmania could potentially be home to further institutes which could strengthen these 
through collaboration and make available greater expertise to local producers. 
Particular opportunities include relevant specialty areas such as cool-climate wine and 
stone fruit production—a major growth opportunity for Tasmania which could build on 
established work at the Tasmanian Government’s Grove Research Station—and high-
performance foods for athletes and elite soldiers—building on Tasmania’s long-
standing research and production effort with the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation at Scottsdale. These projects can frequently be funded together with the 
Federal Government. 
 
4. Encourage capital allocation to innovation. 
With more than $4 billion in privately managed investment capital in 2006, 
including $2 billion in Tasmanian-domiciled superannuation funds, the Tasmanian 
economy possesses in aggregate more than enough capital to support its innovation 
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needs. The problem is that too little of this capital is devoted to the activities of 
innovation. The result has been serious constraints in the development of innovation in 
the State.24 
Governments in Tasmania and elsewhere have attempted to redress this 
difficulty by offering taxpayers’ funds to start-up and technology companies, through 
grant programs targeted at special niches. Most have focused on new companies in 
high-technology sectors, although in Tasmania a broader range of sectors, including 
(successfully) agriculture, have been promoted in the past. Alternatively, governments 
have offered generous tax concessions for R&D expenditure, in an effort to promote 
business-backed innovation. 
Neither of these approaches has been demonstrated to increase the overall rate 
of innovation in the Tasmanian economy. Worse, both appear to distort capital-
allocation processes and entrepreneurial activity in undesirable ways.  
In the first instance, these programs, especially tax concessions to R&D, amount 
to subsidies to high technology, which as we noted above is a tiny proportion of the 
economy. More seriously, they can induce widespread system-gaming behaviour by 
firms and dependency on government largesse. Increasingly, firms oriented to these 
programs fine-tune their activities in ultimately suboptimal ways to remain eligible. 
Among undesirable consequences of government free-grant programs to support 
innovation are: 
• Selection of senior management on the basis of close relationships with 
government and skill and experience with grant programs—not necessarily ideal 
characteristics for entrepreneurial leaders. 
• Channeling of firm activity to meet government reporting formats, evaluation 
measures, and poorly formulated targets. 
• Deliberate restriction of firm growth in order to remain below eligibility 
thresholds. 
• Development of a mendicant, government-dependent corporate culture. 
• Direction of attention away from real customers, real markets, and real capital 
providers towards ‘free’ government money. 
                                            
24
 50.3 per cent of businesses surveyed by the ABS reported difficulties gaining finance—which 
included ‘excessive economic risk perceived by business’, ‘excessive economic risk perceived 
by financiers’, and ‘cost or availability of finance’—as important obstacles to innovation. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innovation in Australian Business 2005. 
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• Curtailment of growth in private risk-capital vehicles, which are required to gain 
commercial returns on investment and cannot compete with taxpayer-
subsidised investment capital. 
Yet, as noted above, the issue remains: too little Tasmanian and Australian 
investment capital is allocated to innovation activities. To develop alternative policies 
that can address this vital issue, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of why 
insufficient capital might in general be devoted to innovative economic activity. As we 
noted above, the underlying reason is that under certain circumstances private 
investment vehicles cannot manage the associated risks or cannot capture sufficient 
return to attempt innovation. 
As discussed above, capital will not accept innovation risk if it cannot manage 
the terms of risk in the sector under consideration. These vary from sector to sector. 
Government can play an important role in remedying these ‘market failures’, not by 
substituting itself, but by tilting the playing field in favour of productive investment in 
innovation projects, and doing so in ways that match the specific demands of the 
sector in which it aspires to promote innovation. A critical principle to be adhered to in 
this endeavour is that capital be allocated by private investors, who have the 
experience to assess and accept risk themselves, rather than by government officials or 
government-appointed boards. Proposals to achieve this end might include: 
* Avoid free-money grant programs for companies. Government should at the 
very least require that all taxpayer-funded grants be matched by private money. Since 
even this requirement is so readily ‘gamed’, however, the Tasmanian government 
should not initiate new grant programs aimed at private companies in its effort to 
promote innovation. Rather it should increase financial support to innovation in other 
forms, thereby freeing both substantial capital and time of officials to devote to other 
programs. 
* Create loans pools for innovative investment, replenished by repayment on 
achievement of sustained profitability. In place of grants, the Tasmanian government 
could create a pool of low-interest loans, repayable on success, which would self-
replenish. Such a scheme could be modeled, in amended form, on the successful 
Higher Education Contributory Scheme (HECS). While such loan pools will not be 
appropriate or needed in many sectors, which need larger amounts of capital best 
taken in equity form, where access to relatively small amounts of lesser-risk capital is 
needed but lacking, such a financial vehicle may be valuable. 
Financial pools of this type would be especially suitable for agriculture. Many 
fields of innovation in agribusiness suffer from time horizons and rates of return that 
make them difficult investments for other financial institutions. A typical agribusiness 
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investment will take some years to produce cash flow, but then generate reliable, long-
term, inflation-protected returns. Consider a venture to grow wine grapes. 
Establishment of a vineyard is estimated to cost $40,000 per hectare, but will not 
generate cash for five to eight years. What bank would lend under these circumstances, 
even with a mortgage over the vineyard owner’s land? Venture capital firms have a 
different problem with this type of enterprise: while the time horizon and cash-flow 
schedule might be acceptable, the structure of returns in cash will probably not, nor 
will the probable equity structure (farmers will be resistant to selling their land to 
investors as a value-realisation measure). 
Government’s contribution would be to provide the initial capital, then set a 
low interest rate, sufficient only to recoup defaults (which themselves should be few 
given sufficient project scrutiny and due diligence). Such a scheme could partially 
substitute for existing drought-support programs and be employed to encourage land-
use transition rather than reinforce existing, often inappropriate and low value, uses.25 
* Reduce innovation risk by co-investing with investment funds. These funds 
could be made non-terminating, allowing them to support innovation projects of 
longer duration than most venture-capital entities, which must wind up and return 
investors’ capital after seven years. Government could effectively increase the risk-
adjusted return to investment in innovation by partnering with private capital 
providers, thus bearing a proportion of total risk in such vehicles, while accepting a 
below-market rate of return. In such entities, if government ‘capped’ its return at a 
relatively low interest rate, private partners could take the return above that level. The 
result would be a rise in risk-adjusted return, without distortion to the investment 
decision-making process, making such investments more appealing to private 
investors. 
This approach would potentially provide a means for Tasmania’s 
superannuation funds to invest in the long-term future of Tasmania through innovation. 
* Reduce innovation risk by facilitating limited-term crop insurance to qualified 
new projects. A key obstacle faced by innovators is that weather-induced crop failure 
(for example, frost or hail) will wipe out their capital base in the early years of a 
project, in the years between planting and initial cash-flow, that is, before earnings 
have accumulated to a level that will allow the farmer to bear the burden of an 
occasional crop failure. Fear of such random events prevents many projects 
proceeding. The government could mitigate this risk by enabling crop-protection 
insurance for innovators (but not others), such that the risk is diversified across the 
                                            
25 A similar shift in drought support has been proposed by the National Farmers’ Federation. 
National Farmers’ Federation, Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into 
Government Drought Support, 2008. 
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entire state during this period and not faced by single innovators alone. To avoid moral 
hazard (see definition above), candidate projects would need to be independently 
assessed for this insurance to demonstrate that the right crop was planted in suitable 
areas. Such insurance could be provided by private companies, but supported by 
government sufficiently to enable effective contracts to be issued. 
* Allow pre-profit businesses to accumulate advantaged tax credits. This also 
would serve to increase long-term returns, and hence attractiveness, of investment in 
innovation risk. This measure was included in the list of proposal coming from the 
Cutler Commission of Inquiry into Innovation in Australia for the Federal Government, 
and could be adapted at the State level. 
 
5. Reduce regulatory barriers to innovative Tasmanian companies. 
A major problem for innovators in any regulated economy such as Tasmania’s is 
that they are frequently accountable to multiple agencies whose responsibilities and 
charter do not include sponsoring innovation. These agencies might be charged with 
ensuring health and safety, preserving the environment, preventing discrimination, or 
protecting consumers and workers. Any change to the way things are done poses a 
challenge to such regulators. Since by definition innovation means doing something 
new, what the innovator proposes is often not covered by the rules and is, in a sense, a 
threat to the system. Well-meaning regulators then reason that since their charter is 
other than promoting innovation, their first (and sometimes only) reaction should be 
negative. Why, they reason, should the innovation be allowed if it puts at risk the 
agency’s primary mission? And in any case, why should the entire set of rules be 
altered, simply because one small company wants to do something unanticipated? Best 
just to say no! 
To help overcome this problem inherent in modern capitalism, the Tasmanian 
Government could: 
* Develop a one-stop shop for innovators whose projects will require regulatory 
approval (which in the food industry would be virtually all). Often innovators find that 
they require approval from many different entities, the existence of some of which they 
are not even aware at the outset. A single government body—potentially sponsored by 
the Department of Economic Development Tourism and the Arts—that would work 
with innovators to develop timelines, facilitate applications, create regulatory 
checklists, and ease governmental interactions for private entrepreneurs who are often 
not accustomed to dealing with bureaucracies would increase the probability that 
innovators would not be taken by surprise, or give up stymied or exhausted. 
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* Develop a ‘circuit-breaker’ to allow potential innovators to test the feasibility 
of their proposals before permanent or broad regulatory approval is granted. A major 
difficulty innovators face in many fields is that they require system-wide, permanent 
permission to launch their product or change the way a service is provided before they 
are able to test its impact in practice or even whether it works at all. This considerably 
increases the barriers to innovation. It is as if all new drugs had to be approved for 
general release to all patients before a clinical trial could be conducted. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, the institution of clinical trials separates approval to test, 
under limited circumstances and for a limited time, from approval for general release. 
The same concept could be extended to multiple arenas of the economy, from food 
products (for example, raw-milk cheeses) to traffic regulation (permission to run larger 
or different vehicles on specified routes) to ocean-based farming (permission to raise 
abalone in sea cages). 
This would require an agency whose responsibility was to determine the 
conditions under which trials limited in scope and time could be conducted, to 
accumulate data and assess ideas before they were considered for permanent approval. 
Not all new ideas would be allowed even to be tested, of course, but by limiting the 
scope such an agency would reduce the regulatory hurdles for innovators to 
demonstrate their case. 
* Undertake a dedicated audit of Tasmanian regulation to assess its impact on 
innovation risk and incentive. While regulations are often assessed for their impact on a 
wide range of measures, including safety and cost, they are rarely assessed for their 
impact on propensity to innovate. 
* Remove its ban on GMO crops, at least initially for non-human-food crops. 
While some argue that Tasmania gains a marketing advantage from prohibiting 
genetically modified foods, any such advantage is slight, if it exists at all, and it is 
difficult to imagine Tasmania becoming a leading innovator in the food sector if it 
effectively bans the most powerful technology for innovation in this sector ever 
invented. Scientifically, the ban makes little sense—all foods are ‘genetically modified’ 
from their ‘natural’ form, by the use of certain techniques (such as forced selective 
breeding) rather than others (deliberate gene insertion). At the very least, Tasmania 
should lift the prohibition on GM crops not for human food use, such as 
pharmaceutical plants and animal fodder. As time passes, Tasmania’s disadvantage will 
only escalate if it opts out of this dynamic field of technology. 
Furthermore, maintaining a ban on GMOs conflicts with the government’s 
commitment to reduce Tasmania’s output of greenhouse gases. Fertiliser and pesticides 
are both products of fossil fuels, and their use would be substantially reduced by 
genetic modification techniques in crops. 
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6. Upgrade and focus Tasmania’s image and self-image, its ‘brand’. 
To support expanded production and a shift to higher value products, Tasmania 
will need to increase and transform its national and international image. More of 
Tasmania’s food products will sell directly to consumers, and fewer will be 
commodities. Under these circumstances, brand becomes vital. To enable Tasmania’s 
branding strategy to support its innovation strategy, the first step is to recognise that 
building and reinforcing its brand is as important as building physical infrastructure, 
and should not be treated as an after thought or ‘poor cousin’. 
Until recently, Tasmania’s branding effort especially national advertising, has 
focused overwhelmingly on tourism. But images that might be appropriate for tourism 
do not necessarily support branding to meet other goals, and might actually undermine 
them. Images of lonely beaches and remote wilderness, for example, do not necessarily 
help attract young families or entrepreneurs who are looking for vibrancy and modern 
facilities. 
Tasmania’s brand should explicitly be oriented at promoting Tasmania as a 
source of the highest-quality food and as a place for dynamic young families to settle, 
and resource allocations to support the brand should be substantially expanded. To re-
brand Tasmania as a place of innovation, the state’s efforts should beyond advertising 
and focus on portraying our island as a place where leading-edge ideas are debated 
and new technologies adopted. Two initiatives to move the state in this direction 
would be: 
* A nationally prominent festival of ideas. Such a festival should aim to highlight 
the state’s engagement with frontier thinking globally, and to showcase the best of 
local ideas and innovation. By partnering with Internet and media providers, an 
opportunity exists for Tasmania to seize the space as the natural location and leading 
event of this type in the nation and to speak directly with the world. The festival would 
also provide an opportunity for the state to showcase its adoption of new technology, 
demonstrating that it is possible to live here, physically distant from the rest of the 
world, but no longer mentally or technologically so. 
* State-of-the-art utilisation of information technology at tourist sites. This should 
include especially locations where tourists could experience and learn about local 
foods, but should extend to museums, heritage sites, and tourist shopping areas. The 
state could relatively cheaply provide lower-bandwidth wireless access at such 
locations, suitable for the provision of simple information and advertising with a 
common interface, and direct users to local for-profit providers for higher-bandwidth 
needs. 
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* A global business-plan contest. Business plan contests promote new ideas and 
new businesses, but perhaps more importantly, they signal the character and 
enthusiasm of the institutions that sponsor them. Good ideas are brought to the surface, 
and interested entrepreneurs and potential investors focus their attention on the 
sponsors and participants. They are common at Universities, perhaps the most famous 
being that of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and are usually rather small 
scale, although often vital in spurring on the companies that succeed in them. 
Tasmania could potentially attract worldwide attention with the world’s first state-
sponsored business plan competition. It would signal that Tasmania was ‘open for 
business’ and entrepreneurship-focused. To be successful in promoting the state’s 
brand, Tasmania’s contest would need to combine several features: 
• Offer a substantial sum—say, $10 million—to attract worldwide attention. 
• Require that private investors match the state’s prize money. 
• Require that entries be food-related. 
• Require that the winning company be substantially Tasmania-based (though not 
necessarily Tasmanian by origin). 
 
7. Strengthen community strategic and cohesion capability to facilitate 
entrepreneurship. 
None of the above measures will succeed without the enthusiasm and 
commitment of entrepreneurial and dedicated people. In any innovation process, 
unexpected obstacles and unforeseen setbacks will be many. Only relentless will and 
the support of friends and colleagues keeps innovators going. 
And innovators never succeed alone. They draw upon resources, expertise, and 
emotional energy from their community. These communities are almost invariably 
geographically defined. 
The most important support the Government could provide to innovation in 
Tasmania would be to focus on supporting specific industries in specific places. The 
measures outlined above should all be implemented regionally and in coherence with 
one another. Irrigation alone, for example, will not likely create much innovation; 
capital, know-how, and entrepreneurial spirit will also be vital. These exist in 
communities and can be strengthened only at the community level. 
The same drivers that enable national economies to grow—nimble regulation, 
trade, innovation, productivity, skills, connectivity—are also now widely recognised to 
be vital contributors to how well local economies perform. Local and regional 
 51 
development policies require better co-ordination between these drivers to construct 
and reconstruct advantage. Local economic development is a strategic activity best 
delivered through collaborative efforts, which identify long-term economic rationales 
(as outlined in this paper) and niches, and seeks to build on embedded local 
knowledge as well as natural and latent competitive advantages. Thus, for example, 
local councils increasingly play an important role as economic agents in ‘place 
shaping’ (Lyons Report UK 2006). 
* Innovation promotion should be combined with community strengthening, 
and decentralised. To make innovation of the type described here actually happen, 
each sector and region will require a specific mix of measures and will likely 
encounter a unique set of obstacles. This means that a statewide innovation strategy 
should be built up from a series of regional innovation strategies, in the most 
decentralised fashion possible. The ‘subsidiarity principle’ should dominate: no activity 
should be performed at a higher level if it can be performed at a lower one. 
* Innovation policy should mesh with a Tasmanian population-settlement and 
livability strategy. There are now for the first time 500,000 Tasmanians. It is an 
appropriate time to think about the choices we need to make to shape the future 
communities we live in. An innovation strategy will provide important guidance for 
both the skills profiles of Tasmanians in the future and for the places in which they are 
likely to live. This, in turn, will enable government better to plan the social 
infrastructure required to attract and retain its future populations, especially those 
currently at risk of leaving the state, young professionals. A population settlement and 
liveability strategy would focus on the types of communities that we need, to foster the 
creativity and networks that underpin innovation. Tasmania should devote concerted 
effort to understanding where our future regional centres might be, and the types of 
economic social and environmental infrastructures needed to ensure their 
sustainability. 
The Demographic Change Advisory Council has mapped future populations by 
local government area (LGA) and on these projections many LGAs face uncertain 
futures. Some of these LGAs (such as Dorset) are likely to be central to the food 
component of the innovation strategy. The innovation strategy is therefore likely to 
provide hope and sustainability to many of our regional communities. But economic 
opportunity alone is unlikely to attract and retain the skilled workers of the future, a 
range of livability incentives are required in regional towns such as ready access to the 
arts and leisure opportunities, the amenities of a city but the feel of a country village, 
flexible housing options, flexible business ownership and management options, and 
access to skills development opportunities. 
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In the context of an innovation strategy the key objective of a population 
settlement and livability strategy would be to shape the future number, diversity 
(age/skills), and location of Tasmanians to maximise opportunities for wellbeing, 
wealth creation and a creative, stable skilled workforce. 
* Promote community enterprises. Community enterprises are commercial 
operations with a high level of community ownership. An important goal of the 
enterprise is to reinvest in the local community to maximise the local value of each 
dollar. Community enterprises support local communities to increase their knowledge 
of and engagement with uses of local assets, which are then managed in an 
ecologically sustainable manner and for the socio-economic benefits of the local 
community. The exact level of involvement is negotiated within the community and 
between the community and the appropriate agencies and levels of government and 
industry. As an example, some communities might wish local governments to negotiate 
ownership/leasing arrangements of forest assets with Forestry Tasmania, or they might 
use regional natural-resource-management groups or local community economic 
development organisations. This does not limit the options; other creative responses 
will emerge. The three components of community forestry—local involvement, socio-
economic development, and ecological sustainability—are subject to negotiation 
between the parties engaged in the project. Similarly, community enterprises could 
have access on a place basis to the proposed subsidised loan pools. A place-based 
approach enhances the capacity of a mix of local players (councils, small and medium 
enterprises, community agencies) to best understand and extract value from embedded 
local resources through an ‘innovative milieu’. 
* Found a Centre for Entrepreneurship and Local Development. Strong local 
institutions are required to support regional approaches to innovation that increase 
productivity and economic growth. Tasmania needs to build local leadership 
capacity—civic, economic, social, and environmental. Many of our local councils 
struggle to attract or develop leaders. The Centre could provide a focal point for the 
many ad hoc leadership programs already in place, and be more strategic in ensuring 
that regional communities have plans and resources to develop and support social, 
economic, and environmental entrepreneurs. Importantly, such a centre could also 
provide the network capacity that in itself fosters creativity and innovation. An 
important function of such a centre would be to provide knowledge of regional value 
chains, investment strategies, and financial tools for local economic development. 
* Create ‘Small Area Development Plans’. Many farmers and farming 
communities now accept that some traditional farming practices and business 
approaches are no longer sustainable. Communities increasingly seek advice and 
support about how to transition to new futures. Following the successful example of 
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the University’s demonstration farm in the Coal River Valley, small-area development 
plans could model, test, and demonstrate how such transitions might best be 
organised. The strategy would initially target three types of areas: 
• Drought-affected areas (for example, Levendale). 
• Areas likely to access irrigation in the future (for example, Waterhouse). 
• Areas with new irrigation opportunities (for example, Meander). 
The plans would focus on both governance (partnerships between governments, 
businesses, and farming communities) and ‘action learning’. Key elements include: 
• Cultural change. 
• Local land use development plans. 
• Skills strategies. 
• Access to infrastructure funding. 
• Community renewal strategies. 
* The Department of Economic Development, Tourism and the Arts should be 
decentralised. The DEDT is the appropriate agency to sponsor and implement a 
statewide innovation strategy, along with, in the case of food, the Department of 
Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment. But as with education innovation, 
economic innovation cannot be performed from a single central location in Hobart. 
The DEDT’s officers should work in, live in, and be part of local communities. A small 
number of specific regions of Tasmania—probably as few as five local-government 
areas at first—should be selected as models for the region-based innovation strategy 
envisaged here. Each should then be staffed both with DEDT officers, whose task 
would be business-development and economic facilitation, and appropriate technical-
support personnel, in the food sector most likely from DPIW or the Tasmanian Institute 
of Agricultural Research. These officers should be based in, and live in, the appropriate 
local town—and not attempt to commute from Hobart. To be effective, they will need 
to become an integral part of the local community, and yet be capable of seamless 
interaction with the State bureaucracy. 
* A new data collection and analysis capability should be created to assess 
progress and identify opportunities and obstacles. Since the future cannot be known 
with any certainty, it will be essential to be flexible in implementing these initiatives: 
we will have to adapt to unexpected developments and opportunities. The basis for 
such adaptation should be objective data, not anecdotes or hunches. At present, 
however, data on the performance of the Tasmanian economy are often sketchy at the 
level required to answer these questions, especially at regional levels. The Australian 
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Bureau of Statistics is constrained by confidentiality and budgetary requirements, and 
does not collect information with the degree of granularity required to support or 
evaluate a capability-improvement strategy. It will be essential to measure what results 
the strategy is achieving and to identify trends over time in opportunities and obstacles. 
To do this, a data collection and analysis capability resident in Tasmania will be 
essential. It should be able to measure innovation directly, in a continuation of the 
Innovation Census, and identify trends in employment, value-added, and out-of-state 
exports, especially for identified high-potential sectors. 
This should be combined with publicly available analysis of land-use and other 
potentials, and data on local community strengthening. One step in this direction 
would be a comprehensive Tasmanian Atlas, to track and record Tasmania’s rich 
record of human activity in its distinctive urban and natural environments. A projected 
Atlas’s starting place is slated to be the cultural precinct at Hobart’s waterfront, and 
from there it could move outwards geographically across Tasmania, and beyond. Such 
a project would enable and generate specialized, place-based information products to 
educate, entertain, and engage a wide range of locals and visitors. 
* The strategy should be launched in small number of selected showcase 
regions. It is not necessary that these proposals be implemented immediately across the 
entire state. Indeed, it would be desirable that a select few locations be chosen early as 
showcases and proofs-of-concept that the system-platform approach to capability 
improvement proposed here is effective. An ideal way to begin would be to choose at 
first a handful, perhaps five, high-potential food-producing regions around the state, 
river valleys in the first instance, to begin implementation. Success in these would 
encourage others to become involved and provide valuable lessons in the factors that 
underlie success. In this sense, the ‘hydro-agrarianisation’ strategy should follow the 
example of hydro-industrialisation, in which a first example, the Waddamana Power 
Station, was constructed to demonstrate the strategy’s value. With a demonstrated early 
success, enthusiasm and conviction around the strategy mounted rapidly, providing 
invaluable public support and understanding. In the present instance, these could be 
combined with the ‘Small Area Development Plans’ proposed above. 
 
2. Creating a Sustainable-Power Export Sector 
 
While Tasmania currently enjoys only a slight net surplus of power production 
over its present industrial, commercial, and household requirements—and in recent 
drought-stricken years an actual deficit—the State still generates almost three times as 
much power per person as does the mainland. In addition, the overwhelming majority 
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of Tasmania’s energy is sustainably produced and carbon-free. These two observations, 
combined with analysis that reveals considerable potential to augment Tasmania’s 
supply of sustainably derived energy, suggest the possibility of both reinforcing and 
expanding Tasmania’s energy-based economic advantage. 
Yet many of the parameters and policies within which the Tasmanian energy 
industry operates today were established in prior eras characterized by very different 
priorities, constraints, and demands. In particular, they were established before 
Tasmania was connected to the national energy grid by the Basslink cable and before 
non-carbon-derived electricity was recognized as especially valuable. 
These shifts open the potential to an innovation-based energy sector in 
Tasmania. Of primary importance is recognition that Tasmania is well placed to 
expand its available ‘surplus’ in each of four key sources of sustainable and carbon-free 
energy: hydro-electricity, wind-power, geothermal, and tidal.26 Taken together, these 
constitute the basis of a dynamic and valuable set of industries. This physical context, 
combined with a set of policies that encouraged innovative investment, could enable 
Tasmania to become not only a significant producer of sustainable energy, but 
potentially to build further important businesses exporting energy and energy-intensive 
products. 
As with its food potential, the heart of this opportunity is Tasmania’s water 
surplus. This surplus can potentially be exported in four forms: directly (for example, 
by pipeline), as food, as energy directly (export of electricity across the Basslink cable), 
or as energy-intensive products. It is not possible, or even desirable, to specify in this 
report which of these is most attractive. The choice among them should be a matter for 
private investors and operators, subject to the proviso that the Tasmanian community 
submits all proposals to scrutiny to ensure maximum ancillary value is created and 
captured across the Tasmanian economy. 
Tasmania is today not close to realizing this potential. Along with its goal to 
become a substantial high-end food exporter, Tasmania should set itself the goal to 
increase, potentially double, its effective export of energy and energy-intensive 
products. 
How might this goal be achieved? Three measures could move Tasmania 
towards significant exporter status: 
 
                                            
26 Another option, wood-based biomass, would not be carbon-free but could be sustainable.  
And it could potentially be a large net contributor. The proposed Tamar pulpmill, for example, 
is projected to contribute a net 60 Mw, about half the amount that would have been 
contributed, for comparison purposes, by the Gordon-below-Franklin Dam. 
 56 
1. Price major power users at market rates. 
About two-thirds of Tasmania’s power production is absorbed by five large-
scale industrial users, with three taking up a majority: the Rio Tinto aluminium 
smelter at Bell Bay, which employs 550 people directly and about 100 
contractors (and consumes 322 Mega Watts, or approximately 25% of 
Tasmania’s electricity capacity); the Tasmanian Electro Metallurgical Company 
(TEMCO) manganese ferroalloy facility, also at Bell Bay, employing about 250 
people and 60% owned by BHP; and the Nyrstar zinc smelter in Hobart, 
employing about 500 people. In total, these three industrial operations thus 
employ roughly 1400 people, or 0.6% of the Tasmanian workforce. 
While the precise figures are commercial-in-confidence, it is accepted that these 
three companies enjoy long-term power-supply contracts priced substantially 
below market levels, and in recent years below even the cost of electricity 
production (or acquisition) in Tasmania. Hydro Tasmania’s Annual Report for 
2008 states that “The average cost of generation was significantly higher than 
the prices received under existing long-term contracts with major industrial 
customers”.27 
Prior to construction of the Basslink cable, the decision to award long-term 
very-low-cost contracts to these three industrial operations made good 
economic sense. Because a Tasmanian Government-owned entity, the Hydro-
Electric Commission, could acquire the capital to construct hydro-electric 
schemes at relatively low rates, in order to attract new industry and create spin-
off benefits across the economy, and lacking any feasible alternative use for the 
power, guaranteeing power supply at extremely attractive rates—sufficient only 
to recover construction and variable production costs in the long term—could 
be regarded as a sensible economic-development strategy. Indeed, it drove the 
state’s development for 70 years. 
With the present potential availability of alternative uses for the power, 
however, this strategy should be revisited. Two obvious alternative uses are to 
sell the power to the mainland using the Basslink cable, especially when 
demand (and thus prices) spike during the summer months, and to offer the 
power at higher market rates to other potential users in Tasmania. 
How much might be gained from exporting this power? This question is open to 
conjecture, and is of course dependent on the evolution of mainland electricity 
markets and policies related to greenhouse-gas mitigation, but simple analysis 
suggests the gains could be large. Were it feasible, for example, to utilize the 
                                            
27 Hydro Tasmania, Annual Report 2008, p. 13. 
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Basslink cable as an export vehicle, and were it possible to gain an average one-
cent per kilowatt hour premium over the price available locally in Tasmania to 
large industrial consumers, with the capacity to export 500 megawatts per hour 
of electricity year-round, Tasmania could gain an extra $43.8 million per year; 
at a five cent per kilowatt hour premium, the gain would be $219 million per 
year. In a State Government budget of approximately $3 billion per year, this 
would represent almost 8 per cent of expenditures, a substantial sum indeed. 
Were this cash flow to be capitalized (borrowed against for infrastructure 
projects such as hospitals, ports, or educational institutions), at a 6 per cent 
interest rate this cash flow would enable the Government to borrow an 
additional $4.4 billion. It should be emphasized, of course, that these 
calculations are merely illustrative, and constitute neither forecasts nor 
recommended policies for Government (especially not borrowing an additional 
$4.4 billion!), but they do serve to indicate the potential financial impact of 
realizing the full value of Tasmania’s power-generating assets. 
Alternatively, Tasmania could endeavour to attract new power users, especially 
those that may be able to gain more value from Tasmania’s carbon-free status. 
An operator of large-scale Internet server farms, for example, might find it 
commercially attractive to reassure customers that use of their particular search 
engine implied 100% carbon-free power. Such an energy user might be willing 
to pay higher energy costs to gain this status.28 
One potential approach to determine the best allocation of Tasmania’s power 
would be effectively to auction it, as these industrial-users’ power contracts 
approached renewal. Tasmania could then determine which users most valued 
the power, and whether the fully assessed benefits of selling the power within 
Tasmania outweighed the potential value of having it available for export. 
 
2. Create incentives and remove obstacles for new generators to contribute to 
grid. 
Present energy planning in Tasmania focuses on meeting projected local 
demand. It does not orient to potential export growth opportunities, and it no 
longer focuses on the potential to expand the economy by expanding electricity 
availability. But Tasmania has considerable potential to increase its sustainable 
                                            
28 It is worth noting that under the scenario implicit in these hypothetical calculations, 
employment in Tasmania’s heavy-energy-use sector would now be effectively substantially 
subsidized. At a one cent per kilowatt hour foregone opportunity, for example, 500 megawatts 
for a hypothetical 1000 jobs would imply a $43,800 annual effective subsidy (foregone 
electricity revenue gain), per job. 
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energy production. Projects underway at the time of writing are forecast to 
increase Tasmania’s wind-energy output by 700 megawatts (adding to a total 
from all sources 1200 megawatts presently), and it is estimated that Tasmania 
has the potential to produce up to 1300 megawatts of wind energy cost 
effectively, within current technology and grid balancing parameters. In 
addition, highly prospective sources of geothermal energy have been identified 
in Tasmania, and work is underway to develop and exploit these.29 
* The Tasmanian Government should initiate a review of incentives and 
obstacles to new clean-energy generation in Tasmania. Current pricing formulas 
employed by energy regulators are not directed at facilitating this investment. 
And the Federal Government’s planned carbon-pricing schemes will allow no 
premium for Tasmania’s installed base of carbon-free capacity; indeed, 
Tasmanians will be required under their membership of the National Energy 
Market (since 2005) to bear a new share of the cost of carbon trading caps in 
the national grid. That is, as presently designed, the introduction of carbon 
trading will work to the detriment of Tasmania’s energy industry, in spite of the 
fact that it is overwhelmingly carbon free. 
 
3. Build a second Bass Strait cable. 
If Tasmania is to realize its potential as a clean-energy producer and exporter, it 
will need before long a second cable across the Bass Strait. Such additional 
capacity is valuable not just as a conduit for further electricity generation—vital 
at peak times of spiking prices to capture high margins—but also to enable load 
balancing from additional wind power, the fluctuations in which need to be 
offset by more stable and predictable flows. 
 
Critical background to these proposals will be the augmentation of capability to 
source and integrate the variety of energy sources potentially available to Tasmania. 
The establishment of a ‘Living Laboratory of Sustainable Energy would potentially offer: 
• Educational and training opportunities including tertiary courses and 
course components relating to renewable energy technologies. 
• Economic social and environmental sustainability and technical skill 
based courses relating to installation 
                                            
29 Roger Lewis, Geothermal Potential in Tasmania, Presentation to the Royal Society of 
Tasmania, June 16 2009. 
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• Maintenance and servicing of renewable energy components. 
Opportunities in this field exist for both the development of course components for 
world wide export as well as in-house delivery.  
 
It should be stressed that these initiatives ought to be undertaken not in order to 
create ‘green jobs’ per se, but because Tasmania has the real opportunity to combine 
natural advantage with accumulated expertise in this field. Government cannot 
generate competitive industries out of thin air, in this as in any other area. Indeed, the 
pursuit of ‘green jobs’ for their own sake appears to have the potential to mislead 
governments into investing in schemes that seriously distort market economies, and 
dissipate public monies. In that sense, they risk falling into the common fate of most 
government-driven job-creation efforts. A salutary warning is provided, for example, by 
a careful study by Professor Gabriel Calzada from Juan Carlos University in Madrid of 
the Spanish Government’s much-lauded programs to induce ‘green jobs’. Professor 
Calzada concluded that for every ‘green’ job created, 2.2 others were destroyed to 
make way for it. And only 1 in 10 such jobs was sustained for any significant period of 
time.30 
 
3. Founding a ‘Creative Precinct’ for Hobart’s waterfront 
 
With its existing concatenation of museums, including the proposed new Museum 
of Old and New Art (MONA) and a refurbished Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery; 
music (including the Tasmanian Symphony Orchestra and Conservatorium of Music); 
drama (the Playhouse and Salamanca Theatre); the many art galleries in Salamanca and 
Hunter Streets; research at the CSIRO Marine Science facility and Menzies Research 
Institute; education at the University of Tasmania Art School and Conservatorium; and 
many entrepreneurial creative companies in the area, Hobart’s Sullivan’s Cove district 
is already a substantial creative precinct. 
 
The Government of Tasmania now has a unique opportunity to build on this 
foundation and, through an integrated set of relatively low-cash-cost initiatives, 
catapult Hobart’s waterfront to leadership as Australia’s foremost creative precinct. Key 
to achieving this goal would be to encourage the University of Tasmania to return to 
the area with a substantial presence, and to develop the district as an information-
                                            
30 Calzada et al., Study of the Effects on Employment of Public Aid to Renewable Energy 
Sources, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 2009. 
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technology and broadband-application showcase. The outcome would be to give the 
city area and waterfront of Hobart the character of a European or US University city, 
such as Oxford or Cambridge in the UK or Cambridge Massachusetts in the USA, 
highly conducive to creative activity, and to an extent that is no longer feasible in any 
other major Australian city. A similar objective could also be feasible in Launceston’s 
Inveresk district. 
 
The key to achieving this goal is to intermingle the University and other life of the 
Hobart city and waterfront into a ‘mosaic’, in which the variety of creative activities 
overlay and mix with one another, rather than are rigidly separated as at present. The 
community and university should be as close to one another as possible, not as distant. 
The Tasmanian Government could undertake five key steps to achieve these aims: 
 
 
1. Facilitate the University to re-occupy Domain House, and to develop an 
expanded presence in the Domain area. 
 
Australia terms its ‘Ivy League’ equivalent, ‘The Sandstones’. The University of 
Tasmania, as one of Australia’s oldest universities, was originally housed in a 
sandstone building. This building—Domain House—still exists and is presently 
essentially unoccupied. The building is owned by the State Government, and 
could relatively easily be made available to the University, on suitable terms, as 
part of an effort to shift the location of the University into the City area. Images 
are important. Domain House would serve as an ideal ‘icon’ for the University, 
and could anchor a dedicated set of activities in the area. 
 
 
2. Encourage the University to move its operations to the Sullivan’s Cove area, by 
making available the Railyards site behind Hunter Street. 
 
 The Railyards site would make an ideal location for the University’s operations, 
and would offer the opportunity to create a new style of ‘open’ university—with 
full public access and interaction—on a spectacular site that no other Australian 
university could match. The University, and the waterfront area it would shape, 
would mould the experience and life of the Hobart city, literally placing 
creativity at the centre of the city’s life. 
 
 This proposal would offer several benefits to the program to develop an 
innovative Tasmania: 
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o It would bring several thousand students and academics into the 
waterfront area, breathing vigour and energy into the entire district. 
 
o It would create multiple opportunities for the Hobart and Tasmanian 
communities to interact and utilise the University in ways not now 
possible. 
 
o It would exert many ‘spill-over’ effects of intellectual, educational, and 
cultural life into the surrounding area. 
 
o It would shape the ‘feel’ of the Sullivan’s Cove district, ensuring that the 
area did not become an alienating ‘tourist mall,’ as have the waterfront 
regions of too many other Australian and international cities. 
 
To realise this vision, the Government should make several requirements in 
exchange for facilitating availability of the site: 
 
o The University buildings should allow, indeed encourage, public access 
and involvement. One possibility would be to make the ground floor of 
all buildings open to the public and dedicated to exhibitions, museums, 
and auditoria that could be employed for public purposes when not 
engaged for University purposes (too many lecture theatres and auditoria 
are simply idle much of the time when not in official use). 
 
o Students and University staff should be encouraged to mingle in the 
locale area by, for example, the University not providing a refectory—
thus promoting the use of local cafes, restaurants, and other food outlets. 
 
o The buildings should be designed to reflect a 21st century, digital learning 
and research environment, but incorporate an aesthetic that suggests 
permanence and solidity. The University on this site should be subject to 
only two government-mandated planning requirements: that no building 
be taller than or overshadow the Cenotaph, and that the buildings may 
take any form, but must be constructed of stone (on the principle that it is 
impossible to build an ugly building in stone). 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
3. Make Sullivan’s Cove a digital-interconnectivity showcase. 
 
 As an integral part of the effort to build a creative precinct in Sullivan’s Cove, 
the Government could develop the district as a ‘showcase of the possible’ in 
broadband and wireless interconnectivity. The provision of wireless and 
Bluetooth access to the new 100mbps network, combined with investment in 
software platforms that would allow the development of multiple applications to 
demonstrate the unlimited possible uses of such broadband, would highlight the 
engagement of Tasmania with the frontier of application of ‘co-produced’ 
technology. 
 
 In particular, the area could showcase state-of-the-art platforms that could 
enhance the tourist experience of Sullivan’s Cove, by far the most tourist-visited 
site in Tasmania, and at the same time reinforce the perception of Tasmania as a 
location for technically sophisticated applications of information technology. 
 
 
4. Facilitate construction of student accommodation above retail in the city. 
  
 To support university-city interaction, and to inject new life into the Hobart city 
area, now somewhat depleted, the Government should encourage the 
construction of student accommodation in the city, including on the first floor of 
buildings in which retail occupies the ground floor. Many of these buildings are 
presently underutilised, or entirely unoccupied above the ground level. Bringing 
thousands of students, and teachers, into the city would foster a vibrant 
atmosphere that would make the city attractive to residents, Hobart citizens, 
and visitors alike. 
 
 
5. Integrate the State and University Libraries with a Human Interface 
Laboratory. 
 
 By combining the State Library with the University Library, and moving both to 
a purpose-refurbished site such as City Hall, and then co-locating both with a 
Human Interface Laboratory, Hobart could acquire a state-of-the-art facility that 
provided ready access for citizens, students, and scholars, to both printed 
material and digital material. Such a facility would be a core element of 
Hobart’s ‘open University’ initiative. 
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4. Harnessing the National Broadband Network 
 
 The economic development of Tasmania over the past 200 years has been 
driven by a sequence of reductions in the impact of geographic isolation—what 
historian Geoffrey Blainey termed the ‘tyranny of distance.’ As Tasmania became 
increasingly able to integrate with the rest of the world, our economy opened new 
fields of production, specialised, and built important strengths, and in turn local 
producers were challenged by an increasing ability to import. In short, the economy 
became more competitive, in both the sense that its products could compete in the 
world market and that its market was more open to competition. 
 
Most important among the historic reductions in experienced distance have 
been improved shipping (first better sail, then steam, and later oil-power), cheap and 
accessible air travel, and low-cost, instantaneous telecommunications. By further 
reducing the ‘information distance’ between Tasmania and the rest of the world, and 
within Tasmania, high-speed broadband will contribute another important step in this 
process. It will make vastly easier the movement of the modern world’s most valuable 
commodity—information. Ubiquitous high-speed broadband will thus contribute a 
significant new overthrow of the ‘tyranny of distance’. It will enable Tasmania to 
integrate more closely with the world, especially with the mainland of Australia. 
 
The most important impact will be to make it more feasible and appealing for 
individuals who wish to remain engaged with the information-rich contemporary world 
to reside in and operate from Tasmania—to remain here, or to move here. An 
increasing proportion of the modern economy is comprised of businesses whose 
primary product (and input) is information, and these businesses will become more 
feasible for Tasmanians. This will be especially important for addressing Tasmania’s 
deficit in ‘business services,’ a vital growth sector of the contemporary economy, 
which, as noted above, makes up only 6 per cent of Tasmania’s total factor income 
compared to 13 per cent for the Australian economy as a whole. 
 
An increased ability to integrate into the information society and economy will 
therefore create both opportunities and challenges for Tasmanian businesses, and for 
consumers. Put simply, the losers will likely be ‘generalists’—those who do a little of 
many things, servicing a protected local market—and the winners will be ‘specialists’—
those who excel at one thing, and can meet the needs of a bigger market in a single 
field. 
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While the Federal Government will provide the physical infrastructure, the 
Tasmanian Government should take several key steps to ensure that Tasmanians are 
capable of meeting the challenges and taking up the opportunities created. The 
opportunities and challenges for Tasmania will fall under five headings, and the 
Government should address each. The National Broadband Network will: 
 
1. Expand market and capability opportunities for Tasmania’s export-focused 
businesses. 
 
Tasmanian businesses with the potential to sell to broader markets will be 
supported in their capacity to do so by expanded broadband. These will be the 
specialists. They will be found especially in the food sector. But many Tasmanian 
businesses are presently ill-equipped to seize this opportunity. They lack the skills 
and orientation to recognise how to utilise the Internet. 
 
Top priority should be a major program of skills upgrade, and of assistance to 
identify new opportunities, especially for small businesses. In some cases the 
appropriate approach would be to present clusters of similar businesses to the 
world, rather than each operating individually. To address these needs, Tasmania 
will need substantially increased commitment to appropriate skills along with, in 
certain instances, the development of common platforms. Specifically, the 
Government could: 
 
* Provide targeted web-utilisation training to priority sectors. This training should be 
delivered regionally, in order that it be available to businesses outside the 
metropolitan areas. 
 
* Facilitate Tasmanian businesses to connect to markets and consumers through a 
targeted, high-content, Web-interface platform. The ability to market directly to 
consumers—not necessarily only to sell to them, but to provide and gather 
information about preferences and opportunities—would greatly facilitate 
Tasmanian businesses, especially those that are food-related, to reach premium 
markets. 
The Tasmanian Government should facilitate a Web-enabled identity-preservation 
platform for food producers, in which highly specific information could be made 
available about bar-coded, RFID, or unique-numbered products, up to and 
including on an individual-item basis. With such a platform, individual producers 
could provide stories and information about specific products, with links to web 
pages providing dates of harvest, information about individual varieties, cooking 
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and preparation uses, or any form of information desired by consumers or 
processors. Government facilitation of the platform and associated training of the 
producers could potentially substantially reduce the difficulty of website 
construction for individual businesses and improve marketing possibilities for 
individual users, greatly increasing the potential for value capture from product 
differentiation. 
Similar web ‘platforms’ could also be developed for other consumer-related 
industries, in particular the tourism sector. 
 
2. Create platforms for more-effective delivery of public services. 
 
Much of the society-wide productivity-raising benefit of widely available high-
speed broadband will come through the more efficient delivery of public services. 
Tasmania has made some progress in this field, but has far to go. Three approaches 
could accelerate development of web-based delivery of public-sector services: 
 
• A comparative study of best practice from around the world, with particular 
reference to the employment of web-based solutions by governments in smaller 
and isolated regions. Many regions around the world have experimented with 
new approaches to political governance and delivery of public services. Rather 
than attempting to experiment alone, Tasmania could gain much from 
systematic study, and adoption, of the best of these. 
 
• Development of an incremental-innovation improvement program for 
Government services, based on such quality-improvement programs widely 
used by large corporations and utilities as General Electric’s Six-Sigma. 
 
• Develop web platforms available to agencies and government entities with 
similar needs, such as local councils. 
 
• Provide a one-stop shop to enable firms to navigate the thickets of regulation 
and approvals. This is perhaps the most valuable activity Government could 
undertake to promote such business attraction. 
 
 
Attract new businesses to Tasmania. 
 
Ubiquitously available broadband will offer several opportunities to attract new 
businesses to Tasmania: 
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• Businesses that rely on information but need not be tethered to any 
particular geography. These include fields such as funds management, back-
office business services, and a wide variety of on-line services, including 
games. The owners of these businesses may choose to locate in Tasmania for 
lifestyle reasons, and will no longer be constrained by information-distance. 
 
• Businesses that wish to test new products, services, and business models. 
Tasmania offers a developed market, in most respects representative of larger 
markets but sufficiently small and geographically contained to be easily 
evaluated. These businesses may wish to test their concepts in Tasmania, or 
begin initial roll-out here. 
 
• Businesses that utilise Tasmania’s natural advantages but sell their products 
over the web or support the web.  An example might be server farms, which 
provide volume for the Internet but demand large quantities of reliable 
electricity. 
 
 
3. Challenge existing Tasmanian businesses that have relied until now on distance as 
a competitive buffer. 
 
Many existing Tasmanian businesses will be challenged by the availability of 
broadband, and are far from ready to cope with the new competition it will 
engender. These are primarily the generalists. For decades, a wide variety of 
Tasmania’s businesses, especially its smallest and most local, have survived behind 
the protection afforded by the ‘moat’ of Bass Strait, providing a relatively broad 
range of services to their nearby market. 
 
The availability to consumers of high-speed broadband, coupled with improved, 
low-cost, and often overnight, inbound logistics, will remove this source of 
protection, for many. Few Tasmanian businesses are prepared. 
 
Increasingly, access to cheap and fast broadband will make it feasible for 
Tasmanian consumers to take their business to larger and more agile providers on-
line. The first and most obviously affected will be retailers, who comprise a 
substantial proportion of the Tasmanian business community, and who will find 
themselves in open battle with larger, better-stocked, more-responsive, better-
financed mainland competitors. As retail in Australia follows the global trend and 
goes on-line—a trend that has until now been substantially retarded in this country 
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by slower broadband—it will move out of Tasmania. This will impact every 
product category, from newspapers, to clothing, alcohol, food products, books, and 
entertainment (especially movies and music). 
 
But the same trend will also affect many wholesale businesses, and services, 
including education, accountancy, and medicine. Thousands of business in 
Tasmania will for the first time be exposed to competition the likes of which they 
have not hitherto encountered. Anything that can be sourced on-line, will 
increasingly be sourced on-line, and from the mainland. 
 
To strengthen Tasmanian business in the face of this critical challenge, the 
Government could: 
 
• Urgently initiate web-training programs for Tasmanian businesses. This 
training will need to go far beyond simply teaching how to access and use 
the web, but must demonstrate, to small and medium businesses 
particularly, how business will be conducted over the web. It must provide 
high-quality advice on how to prepare for the new competition, as well as 
technical training in web design and usage. 
 
4. Exacerbate social problems from excessive or inappropriate internet usage. 
 
While ubiquitous broadband will bring many benefits and opportunities, it will also 
likely induce real social problems. One will probably be a rise in ‘Internet 
addiction’ and cybercrime. 
 
An ominous example is provided by Korea. In the 1990s and 2000s, Korea blazed a 
path to some of the fastest and cheapest broadband in the world. The President of 
the Korean Agency for Digital Opportunity and Promotion (Kado, Youngi Son, 
however, estimates that as many as 15 per cent of Korea’s population, or 7 million 
people, devote an unhealthy proportion of their lives to the Web.31 Problems 
include excessive use of online games, gambling, and pornography. In response, 
the Korean Government has created the Center for Internet Addiction Prevention 
and Counselling. The centre helped 72,559 people in 2007, up 40 per cent from 
the previous year. To cope with demand, the Government has commissioned an 
additional 90 associated centres throughout the country. Most referrals are 
teenagers, usually males. 
                                            
31 Elizabeth Woyke, ‘Wired: How Korea is battling Internet addiction and cybercrime’, Forbes 
Asia, April 27, 2009. 
 68 
 
To deal with this problem, Government could: 
 
• Commission a study of best practice from around the world in coping with 
‘Internet addiction’. 
 
• Initiate programs in schools, colleges, and the University to treat the 
addiction before it becomes deeply entrenched. This field is one in which 
being prepared before the problem becomes overwhelming is of great value. 
 
5. Leveraging Tasmania’s Advantages in Tourism 
 
The industry that will likely be specially advantaged by several of the key 
initiatives identified in this report is tourism. While Tasmania’s economy is not 
unusually concentrated in tourism by comparison to comparable Australian tourism-
focused regions, and Tasmania’s share of Australian tourism employment is only 
slightly greater than its overall population share, tourism remains an important and 
growing source of employment for Tasmania. Tourism contributed 4.9% of Gross State 
Product in 2008, and employed 13,696 or 6.1 per cent of the workforce.32 
 
The major initiatives outlined here that will reinforce in particular the tourist 
sector are: 
 
• Promoting food and wine innovation. Restaurants and accommodation make 
up the largest share of employment attributed to tourism in Tasmania (4136 jobs 
from a tourism total of 13,696), along with retail trade (3680 jobs). Both these 
will be strengthened by the focus recommended here on high-quality food, and 
especially by the proposal to create a top-flight chef-training school. 
 
More broadly, development of Tasmania’s reputation as the ‘gourmet state’, and 
in particular of a substantial wine industry, would strongly support tourism in 
Tasmania, by creating a powerful drawcard for an important sub-group within 
the overall tourism category. While Tasmania lacks the major tourist drawcards 
of sun-and-surf, snow-and-ski, or deep-history-and-culture, we can appeal to 
the growing market for food-related tourism. Not only would food-related 
tourism increase visitation to Tasmania, but it is likely that the tourism 
                                            
32 Fact Sheet on the Tourism Satellite Account for Tasmania 2006-07, Sustainable 
Tourism CRC, November 2008. 
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dimension of the industry would make up a substantial proportion of the overall 
industry. It is even possible that this dimension would be greater than the core-
product segment of the industry itself. It is estimated, for example, that for each 
dollar of physical produced by a wine district, ten dollars of related tourism are 
created.33 
 
This sector, however, is greatly constrained by Tasmania’s regulatory structure, 
and the consequent non-availability of many of the food items for which 
Tasmania is justly famous. Barely an issue of a national gourmet-food magazine 
passes without an article on some or other specialty Tasmanian product—from 
abalone, crayfish, or scallops, through truffles and apricots, to wagyu beef. But 
try to buy any of these products here as a tourist. These products are somewhat 
available cooked in restaurants, but rarely otherwise. This is an important gap. It 
will be difficult to build a gourmet-tourist sector if food-safety and other 
regulations effectively forbid their sale locally! Tasmania has developed an 
excellent program to make Tasmanian wine widely available to visitors across 
the state; similar results need to be achieved for other food products for which 
the state is becoming recognised. This will require a thorough review of 
regulation and legislation, with a focus on creation of incentives to make these 
products widely available. 
 
Finally, food-related tourism will ultimately be the best form of brand 
development and marketing for Tasmania. As more people visit Tasmania to 
enjoy the state’s special food, more will become ambassadors for our products. 
 
• Development of a Creative Precinct at Hobart’s Waterfront. Hobart’s 
waterfront area is already the State’s most visited tourism asset. By substantially 
enhancing the range of heritage, artistic, and cultural attractions in the centre of 
Hobart, the appeal of this area will be dramatically improved. 
 
Paradoxically, however, to enhance the area’s tourist appeal, it is important that 
it not be designated or planned as a tourist precinct. Tourists increasingly want 
real experiences, enjoyed with local people, not made-up events manufactured 
for their entertainment. Many, waterfront redevelopments around the world 
have fallen into the trap of allowing their waterfront districts to jump straight 
from moribund industrial port to tourist mall. This is not a desirable fate for 
Hobart’s waterfront. 
 
                                            
33 Richard Smart, personal communication. 
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• Harnessing the National Broadband Network. Development of ubiquitous 
broadband will also advantage tourism. It will enable Tasmania to market itself 
more cheaply to the world, and will facilitate tourist interaction with the 
attractions they come to experience. Web-enabled museums, heritage sites, and 
natural places will—if done well—enhance the enjoyment for visitors and 
overcome obstacles to understanding and genuine appreciation of these places. 
 
Ubiquitous broadband also offers the potential to reduce the cost and improve 
the efficiency of operating a small-scale tourist enterprise. Web-based services 
can dramatically reduce the back-office costs of operating an enterprise 
(accounting, personnel, tax and regulatory compliance, and related activities) 
and can also facilitate the front-end: marketing and bookings. Given the 
fragmented nature of the tourist sector, this is a field in which government effort 
to make available industry-wide platforms can be valuable. 
 
 
Conclusion 
An effective strategy should not be seen as a weighty document adorning the 
shelves of officials and libraries. Rather, it should be a living guide to action: a 
coordinated and continuously evolving set of projects that achieves a desired end. In 
the present case, the goal is to improve the productivity of Tasmania’s citizens and 
support the lives we choose to live here in our island home. This document aspires to 
provide a rationale for this goal, and for these actions. 
All the proposals suggested here would, of course, require substantial further 
investigation before adoption. They are not a take-it-or-leave-it blueprint; nor is the 
analysis here an attempt to provide the kind of careful cost-benefit calculation and 
detailed investment scrutiny that will be required before any of these proposals can put 
into practice. But they do illustrate a choice of means by which Tasmania’s capability 
to raise productivity through innovation might be enhanced. They are offered in the 
hope of providing a basis for discussion of the way forward. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Assessing Tasmania’s Agricultural Potential 
 
The focus of recent and proposed irrigation schemes has been on increasing surety of 
supply and making existing (often low value) dryland agriculture and dairying more 
productive by adding more reliable water—rather than transforming land use by 
introducing higher value agriculture on newly irrigated land. 
 
Empirical evidence from the Coal River Valley and cherry and wine industries confirms 
that new irrigation can be used to transform land from low to high value forms of 
agriculture, where soil types and other inputs are appropriate. 
 
This appendix outlines three scenarios of the possible increase in value-added if high 
value agriculture replaced low value (predominantly dryland) agriculture by 
introducing or augmenting irrigation. They are not single answers or solutions and they 
are not mutually exclusive. 
 
The scenarios examine feasible (but uncertain) futures to help the industry and policy 
makers understand what is possible and where innovations to translate potential into 
results might be focussed.   
 
Critically, the final decisions will be shaped by the Tasmanian government’s attitude to 
shifting the current focus from making existing predominantly low-value agriculture 
more secure and productive to introducing high value agriculture, particularly where 
irrigation water can be made available. 
 
The scenarios are at a Tasmanian level, not the region or farm level. They use broad 
based groupings of agricultural products, not detailed individual products. The 
scenarios are feasible but uncertain. The information and specific proposals need to be 
quantified in more detail and tested. 
 
Land use scenarios  
 
Tasmania lacks sufficient information on the amount of land suitable for high value 
agriculture if water is made available. In the absence of this information, we define 
three possible scenarios that provide insight into what might be physically possible. 
 
The scenarios are not intended as ‘proof’ of potential (the actual figures are unknown at 
this time) or evidence that the possible futures will be realised. Nor should the 
selection of examples be taken to imply that these regions offer the most potential or 
that they should be selected as priorities. They aim to convey a sense of what is 
possible if the assumptions were confirmed upon further investigation and if 
subsequent action is taken to change agricultural land use. 
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The scope to transform low value agriculture to high value agriculture through 
irrigation outlined in a number of studies of discrete agricultural areas within Tasmania 
has been used as a reference in generating the scenarios for the State as a whole. 
 
Discrete area studies of high value agriculture in Tasmania 
 
A Poatina Tailrace irrigation feasibility study estimated that 82,000 Ha of 
predominantly dryland grazing land (Class 4 and 5 land) could be irrigated in the 
Northern Midlands if the proposed irrigation scheme was introduced. The study 
identified that high-value agriculture could replace low-value dryland grazing and 
extensive cropping on some of the irrigable land. 
 
“Class 4 land has proved capable of supporting many irrigated cropping enterprises including but not limited to 
potatoes, poppies, peas and cereals when carefully managed. There is also increased interest in establishing 
irrigated dairying enterprises in this region on land with a Class 4 (and possibly some Class 5) land capability 
classification.” 
Preliminary Investigation Feasibility Study 
Poatina Tailrace – Brumby’s Creek Re-regulation Pond Irrigation Scheme  
 
Climate, drainage, slope, aspect and other limiting factors would restrict the capacity of 
some part of this total area to sustain higher value intensive cropping, horticulture and 
irrigated dairying on this Class 4 and 5 land. While the number of hectares that could 
be transformed to high value agriculture was not stated, the available evidence 
suggests it is material. 
 
A 2002 DPIWE study “Water Resource Options Development in South East Tasmania” 
estimated that an additional 44,700 Ha of Class 4 and 5 land currently limited to low 
value dryland agriculture could be used for a mix of high value agriculture including 
intensive horticulture, general cropping and improved pasture for dairying if water 
were available. 
 
More importantly, 14,300 ha of the total irrigable area were found to be capable of 
supporting higher-margin horticulture such as apricots and cherries if irrigation was 
available (of which 6,900 ha were also suitable for wine grapes). 
 
A study of dairy potential in North East Tasmania conducted for the Dorset Economic 
Development Group identified a total of 40,000 hectares of irrigable land is suitable for 
large-scale dairy development in the North East coastal area. The land is 
predominantly used for dryland grazing at present. The study found that around 50% of 
the irrigable area (20,000 hectares) is likely to be actually irrigated, due to limitations 
associated with topography, property shape, roads, power lines, centre-pivot irrigation 
configuration etc.  
 
Taken together, the studies indicate that it is possible to irrigate a total of 166,000 ha of 
land across the three areas. A proportion of that irrigable land area is suitable for high 
value forms of agriculture if reliable water is made available.    
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The determination of what is ultimately irrigated depends in significant part on the type 
of products grown on prospective irrigated land. Water schemes are likely to be more 
viable on land suitable for high margin agriculture. 
 
The studies outlined above illustrate that there is significant scope to increase high 
value agriculture by changing land use. We therefore construct scenarios of possible 
changed agricultural land use for Tasmania as a whole, acknowledging that the 
scenarios are not ‘proof’ - but rather that deeper investigation is warranted, including 
more detailed studies of agricultural potential at the Tasmanian and regional level.   
 
 
Tasmanian agricultural land use scenarios 
 
Four scenarios of agricultural land use in Tasmania have been defined 
 
Current irrigation and land use 
Current irrigation with optimal land use 
Feasible irrigation with optimal land use – low adoption 
Feasible irrigation with optimal land use – high adoption 
 
Gross margins per hectare are applied to each of the four scenarios to derive a value if 
each of the scenarios were realized. 
 
Scenario 1 - Current irrigation and land use scenario  
 
The ‘Current irrigation and land use’ scenario is based on existing agricultural land use.  
The estimates of hectares applied to each agricultural activity have been sourced from 
the publications in the table below. 
 
Activity 
 
Measure Source and comments 
Area of farms 2007-08 
(not all the area is 
grazed/cropped) 
1 541 487 
ha 
ABS 4618.0 (rel May 2009)  Note - down from (previous) 
2003-04 estimate of 1,745,000 ha 
Pasture/grazing 2007-08 775 119 ha ABS 4618.0 (rel May 2009) Note - down from (last) 
2003-04 estimate of 1 241 000 ha 
Dairy farms 2009 72,000 ha Dairy Tas regional profile 2009 
450 farms * 160ha avg farm size 
Sheep and beef farming 
2007-08 
~700,000 ha 50% allocated to each of beef and sheep  
Medium value horticulture 
 
32,000 ha ABS 4618.0 (rel May 2009) 
Wine (bearing area)  2006-
07 
1,196 ha ABS 7121.0DO03 
 
High value horticulture  
2007-08 
388 ha ABS 7121.0DO02  388,000 apricot and cherry trees - at an 
average density of around 1000 trees per hectare 
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Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 
 
Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 are not forecasts or projections of what will happen. They are 
illustrations of what could be possible if water was available on land suitable for high 
value agricultural uses. Markets, cost of water and a range of complementary 
innovations including growing, packaging, distribution and financing the introduction 
of new agricultural products are also factors in realising the possible future.   
 
The scenarios outline three progressively higher levels of magnitude in the possible 
transformation of land from low to high value agriculture if irrigation water was 
available. 
 
 
Scenario 2 - Current irrigation with optimal land use  
 
The current irrigation with optimal land use scenario assumes 11,000 ha of low value 
irrigated agriculture such as barley, oats and wheat is replaced with higher value 
agriculture on existing irrigated land. 
 
 
Scenario 3 - Feasible irrigation with optimal irrigation (low adoption) 
 
The low adoption scenario implies that 136,000 ha or 9.2 per cent of Class 4 and 5 
land (1,478,000ha) is transformed into higher value agricultural uses. The scenario 
assumes that most of the new high value agriculture replaces some of the 700,000 ha 
of beef/sheep grazing that takes place on predominantly Class 4 and 5 soils. 
 
 
Scenario 4 - Feasible irrigation with optimal land use (high adoption) 
 
The high adoption case implies that 231,000ha or 15.7 per cent of Class 4 and 5 land 
is transformed into higher value uses. The scenario assumes that most of the new high 
value agriculture replaces some of the 700,000 ha of beef/sheep grazing that takes 
place on predominantly Class 4 and 5 soils. 
 
Gross Margin $/Ha  
 
The estimates of gross margin per hectare for each agricultural product category reflect 
feedback from agricultural economists and consultants and are common to each 
scenario.  
 
Gross margins are intended to reflect gross return less inputs and other variable costs of 
production per hectare for a representative producer in a normal year – and exclude 
interest, tax, depreciation, farm overheads, and administration.     
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Actual gross margins for a specific producer in a particular year will likely vary 
significantly due to changes in prices and variable costs and from differences in 
agronomic and business management skill available within farming enterprises. 
 
Agricultural land use 
and irrigation 
scenarios - Tasmania Sheep Beef Dairy 
Medium 
value^ 
Horticulture Wine 
High Value^ 
Horticulture 
 
Gross margin $/per Ha 150 225 2,000 5,000 24,000 60,000 
 
 ^  High value - eg cherries and apricots; Medium value - eg poppies 
# For example a 2002 South East Tasmania Water Options study found that 14,300 ha of Class 4 and 5 land in the 
Kempton to Orielton area was suitable for cherries and apricots if water was available. 
 
Scenario summary tables 
 
The total gross margin associated with each of the four scenarios is summarised in the 
following table. 
 
Agricultural land use 
and irrigation 
scenarios - Tasmania 
  Sheep Beef Dairy Medium 
value 
Hort^ 
Wine  High Value 
Hort^ 
Total 
Gross margin per Ha $/ha 150 225 2,000 5,000 24,000 60,000 
  
        
 
Current irrigation and land 
use ha 350,000 350,000 72,000 30,000 1,200 400 803,600 
Gross margin $ 52,500,000 78,750,000 144,000,000 150,000,000 28,800,000 24,000,000 478,050,000 
         
Current irrigation with 
optimal land use ha 345,000 345,000 72,000 35,000 5,000 2,000 804,000 
Gross margin $ 51,750,000 77,625,000 144,000,000 175,000,000 120,000,000 120,000,000 688,375,000 
         
Feasible irrigation with 
optimal land use - Low 
adoption ha 280,000 280,000 150,000 40,000 20,000 30,000 800,000 
Gross margin $ 42,000,000 63,000,000 300,000,000 200,000,000 480,000,000 1,800,000,000 2,885,000,000 
         
Feasible irrigation with 
optimal land use - High 
adoption ha 240,000 240,000 200,000 50,000 35,000 50,000 815,000 
Gross margin $ 36,000,000 54,000,000 400,000,000 250,000,000 840,000,000 3,000,000,000 4,580,000,000 
  
       
  ^  High value - eg cherries and apricots; Medium value - eg poppies, vegetables 
 
 
Fisheries and Aquaculture scenario 
 
The gross value of Salmonids is predicated on industry intentions to double the 2007 
value of the industry by 2015. The scenario for other aquaculture assumes that one or 
more of oyster, abalone, striped trumpeter, rock lobster, and other emerging forms of 
aquaculture grows significantly in the future. 
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 Fisheries and Aquaculture scenario   
Other 
Aqua *  Wild fish Salmonids 
  
Total 
Gross Value Production (GVP) 2006-07 $ 23,414,000 180,193,000 271,823,000 
  
475,430,000 
GVP 2015+ $ 150,000,000 180,000,000 530,000,000 
  
860,000,000 
     
  
 
Gross margin (at 50% of GVP) 2006-07 $    
  
237,715,000 
Gross margin (at 50% of GVP) 2015+ $    
  
430,000,000 
* including new species 
 
 
Implications for policy 
 
Irrigation makes it possible to replace low value agriculture with high value agriculture 
on many areas of Class 4 and 5 land. 
 
An innovation policy for the food and agriculture industry needs to focus on what the 
land becomes suitable for if water is available—and not simply making existing low 
value agriculture more secure and productive. 
 
 
A note on Tasmanian land capability data 
 
A land capability classification study undertaken by the State Government in 1999 
classifies 2.5 million hectares of private land according to its capability to sustain 
broadscale grazing or cropping. 
 
Of the 1.6 million hectares suitable for some form of agriculture (ie Land Classes 1-5) 
almost 600,000 Ha or 38 per cent is classified as Class 4 land with low suitability for 
cropping and high pastoral suitability. Class 5 land accounts for 878,000 Ha or 55 per 
cent of the area capable of some form of agriculture. Class 5 land has been determined 
as unsuitable for cropping and has slight to moderate limitations for pastoral use. 
 
A limitation of the land classification data is that areas of well-drained and well-
structured soils in low rainfall areas without irrigation were classified Class 4 land (low 
suitability for cropping). Second, significant areas of class 4 land (and some areas of 
class 5 land) that are unsuitable for cropping (eg steeper slopes and stony soils), are 
ideal for many high value perennial horticultural activities such as vineyards and stone 
fruits, particularly if reliable water is available. 
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Land Capability Classes on Private Land in Tasmania   
 
Land Class Ha % Classification description (limited to broadscale grazing or cropping) 
 
1 3,055 0.1 capable of intensive crops 8-9 years out of 10 in rotation with pasture or equivalent in 
normal years 
2 20,537 0.8 capable of intensive crops 5-8 years out of 10 in rotation with pasture or equivalent in 
normal years 
3 84,139 3.4 capable of intensive crops 3-5 years out of 10 in rotation with pasture or equivalent in 
normal years 
4 599,647 24.0 capable of limited range of crops and only 1-2 years out of 10 in rotation with pasture or 
equivalent in normal years 
5 878,506 35.2 unsuitable for cropping and slight to moderate limitations for pastoral use - limitations 
can be partially reduced through land management 
6 835,980 33.5 marginally suitable for grazing - land should be retained for natural vegetation 
 
7 71,834 2.9 land with very severe or extreme limitations which make it unsuitable for agriculture 
 
Total 2,493,699   
Classes 1-5 1,585,884 63.6  
DPIPWE Land Capability Classification System 
 
Tasmania needs to develop a land classification that indicates the range of agriculture 
that is possible if feasible irrigation were introduced to areas where rainfall and 
evaporation rates are the key limiting factors at present. The question of whether 
irrigation is economic is for farmers, potential investors and government to consider. 
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Appendix B: The Sawn-Timber Industry: Innovation Planning and the 
Aggregate Project Portfolio 
An Example34 
 
Over the medium to long term (5-20 years), the Tasmanian hardwood sawn-timber 
industry will face several interconnected—and escalating—challenges and 
opportunities. This appendix outlines these challenges, and then considers the 
feasibility of potential options based on innovation to respond to them. 
 
Challenges 
 
The main challenges are: 
 
1. The available hardwood-sawlog resource will decline in quality but increase in 
volume. 
 
As a result of pre-existing and inherited forest-management practices, the 
average quality of the hardwood-sawlog resource available to the Tasmanian 
sawn-timber industry will decline over the coming two decades, at first 
gradually and then steeply.  This decline will likely occur on both public and 
private land, although for somewhat different reasons. Concurrently the volume 
of low-grade logs will increase significantly.  
 
Traditionally, first-grade sawlog (defined as small-end diameter of 30 cm and 
length 3.6 metres) has been sourced from Category 1 slow-growing hardwood 
species from mature native forest (predominantly over 110 years old at harvest) 
and Category 3 regrowth native forest with a harvest range of 80-90 years, or 
60-65 years under intensive forest management (eg thinning). 
   
A series of land-use decisions by governments over the past two decades 
affecting public forested land has significantly reduced the area of native forest 
available for the production of a mandated minimum 300,000m3 of first grade 
hardwood sawlog.   
 
The average quality of first-grade hardwood sawlogs from public land has 
declined as the proportion of Category 8 sawlogs harvested increased 
significantly in order to maintain the volume of first grade sawlogs. 
 
In the period from around 2012 to 2020, the average quality of first-grade 
hardwood sawlog on public land will deteriorate sharply, as up to half 
(150,000m3) of all first grade sawlog is replaced with Class A pruned logs of 
                                            
34 This section is drawn from the AIRC report, The Tasmanian Sawn-hardwood Timber 
Industry: Capacity for Innovation in the Face of Dynamic Industry and Market Change, 
prepared for the Centre for Sustainable Architecture with Wood at the University of Tasmania. 
 
 
 79 
fast-growing species (E. nitens and E. globulus) grown in hardwood plantations 
on a 25 year rotation. These plantation sawlogs have physical properties that 
produce significantly less timber, of lower quality and of less value. 
 
Furthermore, in the 10 years to 2030 virtually all the remaining Category 1 and 
Category 3 hardwood sawlog from mature and older regrowth forest 
(150,000m3) will be replaced with Category 8 sawlog from young native forest 
(particularly young regrowth). 
 
Different drivers will likely also shrink supply of Category 1 and 3 sawlogs from 
private land. In 2005/06, sawlog sourced from native forest on private land was 
around 70,000m3 down from 97,000m3 the previous year. 
 
The volume of native-forest hardwood sawlog from private land may also 
decline significantly depending on the level of future restrictions on private land 
use, the demand for hardwood pulpwood (which drives sawlog harvesting on 
private land), and the extent to which plantation hardwood replaces pulpwood 
from private native forests. 
 
Concurrent with these declines in Category 1 and 3 logs, from 2012, about 
300,000 m3 annually of Class B unpruned plantation sawlogs will be available 
from public plantations for processing. Additional significant volumes may be 
available from private plantations. While generally not suitable for processing 
into high quality products, these logs provide a suitable resource for structural 
commodity products. 
 
Moreover, the distribution of sawlog supply may also change around the State. 
This can have significant implications for the sawmilling industry in Tasmania. 
Traditionally sawmills have been located near sources of timber. With the 
reduction of log supply from native forests and transition to plantation-sourced 
logs, the balance of log supply between regions may change and some existing 
sawmills may lose access to a local resource. 
 
This trend is already occurring in the State, with some softwood processors 
having to ship logs long distances to remain in operation. 
 
In summary, estimates of sawlog sustainable yield over the period 2012 to 2091 
indicate that the sawn timber industry is currently locked-in to a regime of an 
increasing quantity of Category 8 native forests sawlogs and Class A pruned and 
Class B unpruned plantation hardwood sawlogs in order to offset the dramatic 
reduction in the volume of Category 1 and 3 sawlog available from mature and 
older regrowth native forest. 
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2. Markets for high-quality products have improved in recent years and are likely 
to continue doing so. 
 
Demand for appearance/decorative hardwood timber products (flooring, 
furniture, doors, benchtops) and high quality engineered timber (eg laminated 
beams,) has increased in recent years and broad agreement exists that these 
markets are likely to continue to grow. 
 
International markets, including in particular the European Union, increasingly 
value the environmental benefits of wood products and the aesthetic appeal of 
appearance/decorative and exposed structural timber.  The entry into world 
markets of China as a major buyer and consumer timber will similarly place 
upward pressure on prices. 
 
3. The Tasmanian industry’s product mix will likely shift to lower-quality and 
lower-value products. 
 
Category 8 regrowth and Class A pruned hardwood plantation sawlogs recover 
less overall timber (more processing waste and structural degrade), produce a 
much lower proportion of high-value timber (appearance/decorative products), 
and are more costly and difficult to process than Category 1 and 3 sawlog from 
mature/older regrowth native forest. 
 
The inferior properties of timber produced from Category 8 and Class A pruned 
sawlog include more variation in colour and more feature, and a higher 
proportion of physical or production induced degradation (discolouration, 
knots, surface checks, internal checks, spring, bow, etc.). 
 
The current volume of Category 1 and 3 hardwood sawlog is now almost 
exclusively dedicated to higher-value appearance/decorative uses (joinery, 
flooring, doors, mouldings etc) as processors severely reduced or ceased the 
production of lower-value light structural building products (eg house framing, 
trusses etc).    
 
The industry’s first response has been to adapt to the decline in log quality to 
date.  Some in the industry have improved overall and high-value sawn-timber 
recovery rates from Category 8 native forest sawlogs (with their inferior 
structural and appearance attributes) by: 
 
• Consolidating to increase scale and in some cases vertically integrating 
across one or more of growing, processing, distribution/marketing, and 
retailing. 
 
• Specialising in smaller diameter younger and lower-quality first-grade 
sawlogs rather than trying to process both Category 1 and 3 from mature 
native forests as well as Category 8. 
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• Introducing new cutting/drying/re-sawing and finishing technology and 
techniques to reduce the loss in overall timber and higher value 
appearance/decorative product, by minimising physical degradation 
(internal voids, surface cracks, end split, bow, spring, knots) and using 
colour and feature matching to increase recovery of high-value 
appearance grade timber. 
 
Industry has also begun to adapt to process a large supply of Class B unpruned 
hardwood plantation logs by developing milling capacity and commissioning 
applicable research. 
 
 
4. Competition to the Tasmanian industry from both mainland Australian and 
overseas producers will likely increase. 
 
Tasmanian hardwood-sawn-timber producers face competition from five 
principle sources: mainland hardwood producers, international hardwood 
producers, softwood producers, substitute engineered-wood products, and 
alternative material, such as metal and masonry products. All have gained 
strength in recent years. 
 
The total consumption of sawn timber in Australia has since the 1970s 
fluctuated in line with economic cycles between 4 to 5 million m3 pa. The 
proportion within this amount of sawn softwoods has increased steadily, 
however, with an average increase of 3.0% pa in softwood sales over this 
period. By contrast, apparent consumption of sawn-hardwood timber has 
declined by an average of 2.7% per annum. In 2003/04, sawn softwood timber 
accounted for just over three-quarters of total apparent consumption of sawn 
timber in Australia. These trends reflect the increasing availability of sawn 
softwood timber due to its low production cost, and its replacement of 
hardwood in structural timber markets. Softwood timber has a strong presence 
and competitive position in non-appearance solid board markets (framing, 
trusses, engineered beams) and general/industrial uses (pallets, fencing, boxes). 
 
Engineered wood products have enjoyed even stronger growth, due to their 
desirable environmental and performance characteristics, as well as competitive 
price. These products are especially suitable for the high performance structural 
markets. 
 
5. In the absence of substantial change, the Tasmanian industry’s overall 
profitability will likely decline further. 
 
In recent years the inferior physical and appearance attributes of timber 
produced from an increasing proportion of Category 8 native forest logs and 
higher grade plantation logs has reduced overall average returns to sawn-timber 
processors as a result of: 
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• A reduction in total usable timber recovered compared with recovery for 
Category 1 and 3 of native forest sawlog. 
 
• A reduction in the proportion of high-value timber recovered compared 
with recovery for Category 1 and 3 native forest sawlog. 
 
• The increased cost and difficulty of processing hardwood sawn timber 
from a much higher proportion of Category 8 native forest sawlog. 
 
The progressive introduction of Class A pruned plantation sawlogs from 2012 
(that will make up half the first-grade sawlog after 2020) will significantly 
increase the volume of timber with inferior physical and appearance timber 
attributes. This will increase processing costs and dramatically lower the value 
of timber product and overall returns to processors, by an amount greater than 
the impact of the decline in quality of first-grade sawlog to date. 
 
Processors that cannot adjust to the much larger proportion of Class A pruned 
plantation sawlog will find it increasingly difficult to remain commercially 
viable. 
 
Processors that seek to convert the increasing volume of Class B unpruned 
sawlogs will largely be constrained to lower value commodity structural 
products and will have to compete directly with competitive sawn and 
engineered softwood products or identify other niche market opportunities for 
these commodity grade products at considerably reduced margins. 
 
6. Significant change in the Tasmanian industry is impeded by current 
government policy, including the structure of tax incentives and administered 
pricing and volume allocation. 
 
The higher risk and greater uncertainty of investing in dedicated longer-rotation 
hardwood-plantation sawlog species and the tax and other incentives favouring 
short-rotation hardwood plantations grown for wood-fibre (up to around 15 
years) has impeded large-scale private investment in high-quality first-grade 
hardwood plantation sawlog. 
 
Ninety per cent of hardwood sawlogs supply in Tasmania has been largely 
controlled by one administrative body. Administered pricing and allocation has 
inhibited the industry from re-structuring to meet the challenges of a significant 
decline in the availability of Category 1 and 3 hardwood sawlogs. It has 
inhibited the price signal, incentives, and rewards that would encourage 
processors to: 
 
• Invest in larger-scale and/or new/different technology and practices to 
process a much higher proportion of Category 8 sawlog comprising 
smaller diameter and younger native forest sawlog (and increasingly 
Class A pruned plantation sawlog) from 2012. 
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• Develop and expand markets for end-timber products that are capable of 
absorbing higher prices of declining volume of the (much scarcer) 
Category 1 and 3 of hardwood sawlog. 
 
Potential Innovation Options 
 
The challenges listed above are serious. Over the coming decade, the 
Tasmanian hardwood sawn-timber industry will face a stark choice: innovate, upgrade 
and diversify, or substantially shrink. Presented below are potential scenarios through 
which the industry might choose to respond to these challenges.  These options are not 
intended as stand-alone answers or solutions, and they are not mutually exclusive. The 
purpose here is to examine possible futures and alternatives to help the industry and 
policy makers determine how innovation might contribute to a way forward for the 
industry. 
 
Critically, it is apparent that the industry is not likely to innovate substantially or 
sufficiently to meet these challenges without external assistance. It lacks the financial 
resources and critical capabilities to respond effectively alone. What type of hardwood 
sawn-timber industry Tasmania has in 20 years, and even possibly whether there is 
one, will be shaped by the Government’s willingness to commit substantial resources 
to retain a hardwood sawn-timber industry and the ideas and options from across the 
scenarios outlined below. 
 
 
Option 1:  Improve technological utilisation of Category 8 and emerging Class A 
pruned and Class B unpruned plantation sawlog.  
 
This scenario assumes that the quality of first-grade hardwood sawlogs 
will significantly decline and seeks to grow the industry by boosting 
existing products and developing new products and markets for first-
grade sawlogs comprising young regrowth and Class A pruned and B 
unpruned plantation sawlog. For the appearance product market, this 
might be achieved by: 
 
• Expanding recovery of short section appearance timber and 
reprocessing it into high-value products such as end-jointed 
flooring, engineered panel flooring, laminated benchtops, etc. 
• Improving colour matching and grading technologies to maximise 
recovery of appearance/decorative products. 
 
This scenario for the structural market could be realized by: 
• Re-entering non-appearance solid-hardwood board markets – 
trusses, framing etc. 
• Expanding the use of engineered beams,  
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• Expanding rotary-peeled veneers and developing other panel 
products such as Plywood, Laminated Veneer Lumber, Engineered 
Strand Lumber, etc. 
 
Option 2: Improve the industry’s technological capacity to overcome or avoid 
downgrade and increase recovery of the sawn timber.  
 
This scenario assumes that technical advance can overcome the 
problems apparent with processing Category 8 and Class A pruned 
sawlogs. This would focus on: 
 
• Coping with internal check in the E.nitens resource and board 
distortion in the E.globulus resource; and 
• Backsawing plantation and native forest regrowth species without 
unacceptable degrade. 
 
Option 3: Develop new markets and marketing programs to induce greater end 
user acceptance of changing hardwood product characteristics. 
 
This scenario focuses on positioning hardwood timber in the consumer 
market as a preferred material for appearance/decorative and 
structural/engineered uses.  It also aims to align more closely market 
expectations of appearance/decorative attributes with the changing 
quality of timber product available, by making feature and variation in 
colour a positive choice rather than being perceived as inferior. 
 
General market advantages of sawn-hardwood over non-wood 
alternatives include: 
 
• More C02 friendly than concrete, steel, aluminium. 
 
• Potentially lower price relative to anticipated rapidly increasing 
prices of concrete, steel, aluminium. 
 
• Feel, look, warmth personality vs ‘cold/sterile/featureless/bland’ 
steel and concrete for many decorative and structural appearance 
uses (exposed beams) etc. 
 
• More versatile: use and in functions it performs. 
 
• Renewable: certified/accredited sustainable by reputable bodies. 
 
• Potentially traceable to source: where, how grown/harvested. 
 
Under this scenario, markets would need to be educated about the value 
derived from the difference and uniqueness of a natural product that is 
inherently variable in colour and feature and generates utility from 
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enjoyment of the feel, look, warmth, charm, and character of wood 
products in: 
 
• Decorative uses (furniture, mouldings, window frames). 
 
• Structural appearance applications such as exposed beams (in 
commercial or domestic buildings or exposed panels (eg possible 
substitute for cork floor look). 
 
The core message would be that what makes wood appealing and ‘not 
just another perfect but sterile finish’ is the variation and character 
translated through timber’s physical properties and attributes.  The 
Tasmanian industry would need to find and/or develop markets that 
value the natural variation of timber. 
 
Option 4: Increase investment to grow more-suitable timber. 
 
This scenario targets the long-term goal of at least restoring (or potentially 
exceeding) the current level of Category 1, 3 and Class A plantation 
hardwood sawlogs available to the hardwood sawn-timber industry. 
 
On a no-policy-change basis, over the next 90 years the industry will be 
locked-in to a first-grade hardwood-sawlog resource, dominated by 
Category 8 regrowth and Class B plantation sawlog that produces timber 
with inferior properties to that provided by Category 1 and 3 sawlog—
more variation in colour, more feature, (disease, knots, surface cracks 
etc), and a higher proportion of physical/structural degradation (internal 
voids, spring, disease, bow, knots) in the end timber product.   
 
Options to improve the quality of first-grade hardwood sawlogs include: 
 
• Improving the physical properties of plantation hardwood species 
(current 25 year rotation) to recover more high-value timber 
product through intensive (and expensive) silvicultural 
management.  
• Tree breeding and species/genus selection to deliver higher 
quality plantation material for appearance products.  
  
The innovation and policy challenge in this option focuses on how to 
improve the technical feasibility and commercial potential of growing 
Class A pruned hardwood sawlog by addressing factors that include: 
 
• Species selection. 
• Breeding and propagation. 
• Site selection. 
• Plantation management regimes (pruning, thinning, nutrients etc). 
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• Barriers to investment in dedicated long-rotation Class A pruned 
sawlog.  
 
Option 5: Exit or gradually wind down the high-value appearance hardwood 
industry. 
 
Under this scenario, the industry would simply accommodate a 
significant decline in the quality of first-grade hardwood-sawlog 
resource. The overall volume of first-grade hardwood sawlog on public 
land would be maintained at around 300,000m3, but returns to 
processors would decline significantly due to the falling aggregate value 
of timber product (from lower overall recovery and less high-value 
hardwood timber product) and increased processing costs.   
 
The first-grade sawlog sawn-timber industry would consolidate and 
specialise around: 
 
• A few appearance-grade processors that produce some non-
appearance grades as a by-product. 
 
• A few high-volume non-appearance grade mills that also recover 
a relatively low proportion of high value appearance/decorative 
products. 
 
Firms unable to obtain sufficient volume of the declining Category 1 and 
3 sawlog resource and/or adjust to the smaller-diameter Category 8 and 
Class A pruned and Class B unpruned plantation sawlog would be 
assisted to leave the industry. 
 
 
Option Feasibility Requirements 
 
Each of these approaches would require a different set of investments and policies to 
be made feasible.   
 
For each option to be feasible an independent assessment or review of publicly and 
privately held databases of native forest and plantation condition and projected yield 
by regions is required. Log estimates by source, region, species and likely diameter 
class are critical to industry planning and investment in subsequent options.  
 
Summarised below are four key dimensions of feasibility for each option—the required 
policy structure; the finance quantity and type demanded; technology needs; and 
training requirements. 
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Option 1:  Improve technological utilisation of Category 8 and emerging Class A 
pruned and Class B unpruned plantation sawlog. 
 
The starting point of this option would be to re-allocate hardwood 
sawlog to processors willing and able to invest in processing Class A 
pruned sawlog, and then to develop or expand markets for those 
products. 
 
Options to achieve this include: 
 
• Introducing one-off or phased-in time-limited administered 
allocation and pricing of sawlog, commencing from expiration of 
the current contracts in 2012, to compensate for adverse legacy 
aspects of buying existing mills, expanding own mill, or starting 
new mills. 
 
• Introducing market-based sawlog pricing from 2012 and 
assistance to compensate for the adverse legacy aspects of buying 
existing mills, expanding own mill, or starting new mills. 
 
The Government might consider provision of exit assistance to those that 
sell-up or ‘lose’ sawlog allocations of an amount less than the difference 
between the amount they receive from selling (or on losing their 
allocation) and the amount they might have received from continuing to 
operate and trade for longer. 
 
Further, given the constrained cash-flow and profitability position of 
current industry participants, combined with the context of uncertainty in 
which the industry operates, making this option feasible may require 
Government to provide specific assistance that contributes to upgrading 
or introducing new technology and practices that increase volume 
throughput, overall recovery of timber, and recovery of high-value timber 
in particular. 
 
This option would also include significantly greater dissemination of 
existing knowledge and increased investment in gaps in knowledge 
about processing (cutting/drying/re-sawing/finishing) smaller and younger 
re-growth and plantation sawlogs to increase throughput, reduce 
physical defects in the timber (internal checks, spring, bow), and how to 
reduce appearance/decorative defects such as external splits and checks. 
Given that individual industry participants would be unlikely to capture 
and appropriate sufficient individual returns from such investment, this 
commitment might need to be made by the industry as a whole or by a 
Government agency on the industry’s behalf. 
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Option 2:  Improve the industry’s technological capacity to overcome or avoid 
downgrade and increase recovery of the sawn timber.  
 
Improving the technological capacity of the sawn hardwood timber 
industry would largely depend on the level of funding for research and 
development programs targeting timber processing technologies and the 
ability and willingness of the industry participants to adapt these 
technological advancements.  
 
Given the current level of cash flow and profitability of processors, 
Government assistance would be required to establish a comprehensive 
research program focussing on development of new cutting/drying/re-
sawing and finishing technologies required to minimise physical 
degradation. Further assistance would have to be given to industry 
participants to enable them to adopt new processing technologies.  
 
Option 3: Develop new marketing programs to induce greater end-user 
acceptance of changing hardwood product characteristics. 
 
This option would be initiated with a research program investigating 
market perceptions of the importance of uniformity in colour and low 
incidence of natural features in appearance/decorative uses of hardwood 
timber by opinion leaders and other stakeholders, for example designers, 
architects, builders, purchasing officers and customers.  
 
It would then be necessary to develop and implement a substantial and 
sustained marketing program for the industry as a whole, to influence the 
market to value natural variation and features in appearance in 
appearance/decorative applications. 
 
Central to this option would be introduction or expansion of incentives 
to increase the effort by individual firms to educate the market for non-
timber product about lesser-known or under-estimated benefits of 
hardwood timber for appearance/decorative or structural/engineered 
uses—such as the look, feel, warmth, and individuality of natural 
variation in finishes that include variation in colour and features (disease, 
knots, discolouring). 
 
 
Option 4: Increase investment to grow more-suitable timber. 
 
The older-age characteristics inherent in the Category 1 and 3 hardwood 
sawlog  and institutional barriers are impediments to investment in Class 
A plantation sawlog. 
 
Growing Class A pruned plantation sawlog is a less attractive investment 
due to the greater uncertainty and risk resulting from a long interval to 
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first cash flows (well over 25+ years for longer rotation Class A pruned 
sawlogs). 
 
The uncertainty and risks include: 
 
• Growth rates of preferred native-forest hardwood-sawlog species 
in plantations were found to be much slower relative to 25-35 
years for fast-growing species. 
 
• Future sawlog and product prices, plantation-management costs, 
market preferences for timber products, etc. 
 
• Physical risk (fire, drought, pest, other damage/potential loss). 
 
• Sovereign risk (access to resource, tax, or other policy changes 
affecting return). 
 
• The long-term relatively ill-liquid nature of this asset class reduces 
investors’ flexibility to respond to their own needs and changes in 
circumstances. 
 
The development of secondary markets for long-rotation Class A 
hardwood sawlog will help overcome the disincentive to invest in a 
relatively illiquid asset with significant hard-to-quantify risks and a 
relatively long interval to first cash flow. 
 
The specific exclusion of tax deductibility at the time of expenditure 
where the plantation is sold early in the rotation works increasingly 
against the formation of secondary markets, and more so the longer the 
hardwood rotation. 
 
Removing the tax penalty applying to long-rotation plantations would 
enable investors better to manage their risk, value the asset as it matures, 
and deal with investors’ own changing circumstances, by permitting a 
sale of their interest prior to maturity. 
 
The long history of administered pricing and allocation of hardwood 
sawlogs in Tasmania is another institutional barrier that has impeded 
plantation investments.  It does this by limiting information on market-
based sawlog prices that would otherwise contribute to valuing 
plantation investments.   
 
This may improve over time if administered pricing is removed, but it 
remains an area of higher uncertainty and risk in the interim.  
 
The Tasmanian government has trialled plantations of the preferred 
species of native forest for sawn timber. This option would require 
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substantially increased dissemination of existing knowledge on growing 
Class A sawlog, and more investment in gaps in research into selecting 
species, breeding, and growing high-quality hardwood in a plantation 
regime. 
 
Option 5: Exit or gradually wind down the high-value appearance hardwood. 
 
If this path is not to occur by default, in an unplanned and socially 
destructive fashion, difficult decisions would need to be taken early, by 
the combined industry in collaboration with Government, and a clear 
plan developed to mitigate the impact and maximise the long-term 
position of remaining industry participants. 
 
This option would combine increased exposure of industry participants 
to market forces with coordinated measures to reduce consequences for 
industry exiters. Such consolidation or partial-exit strategies are not 
unknown in the global industry, but they rarely work as well as they 
might.  Both industry and Government frequently equivocate and seek to 
avoid recognition of unpleasant realities. The result is commonly half-
measures and poor policy. 
 
To make this option viable would require: 
 
• A clear message quantifying the overall hardwood volume to be 
available and a breakdown showing the significant reduction in 
the volume of Category 1 and 3 hardwood sawlog and increased 
volume of Category 8 and Class A pruned and Class B unpruned 
sawlog over the next 5, 10 and 20 years (ie to 2030). 
  
• A detailed resource audit to inform processors about future 
changes in the resource distribution around the State. 
 
• Notice of an end to administered pricing and allocation of all 
sawlogs at least 2 years in advance (earliest opportunity in 2012), 
so that processors have time to assess their position, seek advice, 
and look within the industry or to government as last resort to exit 
or restructure. 
 
• Financial and other assistance to encourage exit of the weakest 
firms before 2012 and to enable potential entrants or remaining 
participants to assess and prepare for removal of administered 
pricing or compensate for the worst legacy aspects of firms that 
are acquired. 
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An Aggregate Innovation Project Plan 
 
The options outlined above are not mutually exclusive. Ideally, Tasmania would 
proceed on several fronts simultaneously. The set of options outlined here necessitates, 
however, acceptance of different levels of risk, relies upon different time frames, and 
requires different types of finance.  In some options, individual firms could themselves 
potentially capture and appropriate sufficient returns to justify undertaking the 
necessary investment; in others the times scale and appropriability regimes demand 
that industries act together, or that Government act on industry’s behalf (individual 
firms investing in market development, for example, would find it difficult to prevent 
other firms ‘free-riding’ on their marketing programs, for example, and hence face 
difficulty capturing sufficient return to support the substantial and sustained 
commitment of funds required). 
 
In this context, a valuable planning tool is the Aggregate Project Plan, in which a 
balanced mix of options is developed, combining different types and durations of risk, 
along with different instigators. Such an Aggregate Project Plan would also create a 
framework within which industry could discuss, formulate, and implement its own 
priorities, and coordinate its action with Government. 
 
In essence, an Aggregate Project Plan simply establishes an agreed set of project 
categories, arrayed along axes of, for example, risk levels and time durations, then 
determines a proportion of overall resources to be committed to each category.  
Individual projects are then developed to ‘populate’ the Aggregate Plan to make up the 
balance.  Formulation of such plans thus requires four steps: 
 
1. Determination of key dimensions to be employed.  This might be risk level and 
duration, as outlined above, or technological and market novelty, or any other 
agreed dimensions. 
 
2. Development of a matrix with categories allocated to various combinations of 
the key dimensions.  This creates a typology of potential projects. 
 
3. Strategic agreement to commit prioritised proportions of available resources 
to the various categories.  This discussion enables participants to come to 
conclusions about the overall level and balance of resource commitment and 
risk levels to be accepted. 
 
4. Development of individual projects to leverage available resources, within 
prioritised categories.  Different types of risk levels and technology or project 
types will likely require different processes of project initiation and discovery. 
 
Taken together, such a prioritised Aggregate Innovation Project Plan would both 
formulate and guide implementation of the industry’s innovation-based response to the 
formidable challenges outlined above. 
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Appendix C: Lessons from the Coal River Experience: How Irrigation Can 
Contribute to Innovation35 
 
Condemned as “hopelessly uneconomic” prior to its construction by the then Federal 
Minister for Resources and Energy, the Coal River Valley irrigation project has since its 
construction in 1986 proven a highly successful source of wealth for Tasmania’s 
economy. Today, as the State considers a new wave of commitment to the agri-food 
sector with the aim of expanding its position as a high-end food producer, the Coal 
River experience stands as a model of what might be achieved elsewhere in the State.  
 
This study investigates how, why, and where the Coal River irrigation project achieved 
its success to lay the basis for learning how to repeat and build on this performance. 
The purpose of this first section of the report is to draw together the lessons of the study 
and provide insight into how future irrigation and innovation-capability projects should 
be approached and organised, and to consider what further activities—beyond good 
water engineering—are needed to ensure such projects realise their full potential. 
Several important conclusions emerge: 
 
1. The greatest proportion of the value created by the addition of irrigation to the 
Coal River Valley came not from support to existing industries and land uses, but 
from new—and often completely unanticipated—businesses. 
 
In the period between completion of the Craigbourne Dam (1986), with its 
associated irrigation piping, and the ‘Blundstone Report’ (1992), economic output 
from the Valley had increased by an annual $1.6 million (69%). This amount was 
probably not sufficient to justify construction of the project. On that basis, a 
description of ‘hopelessly uneconomic’ might appear valid. 
 
Following 1992, however, by 2008, the value of economic output from the Valley 
increased by $31.7 million, or 9 times (real terms). At that level, the project more 
than amply returned its cost, and indeed could fairly be described as an economic 
bonanza. The clear difference between the two periods is that in the first farmers 
were primarily adding water to existing land uses; in the second they were utilising 
water as a springboard for land-use transition. 
 
In short, the project created value mostly not by ‘drought-proofing’, but by spurring 
innovation. Critically, it is apparent that the provision of water alone was not 
sufficient to spur this wave of innovation. Water was certainly an essential pre-
condition, but for innovation to occur several other factors (identified below and 
analysed in detail in the body of the report) needed to be present. 
 
                                            
35 Excerpted from Building Regional Innovation Capability: The Impact of Irrigation in the Coal 
River Valley, prepared for the Department of Economic Development and Tourism by 
Aleksandra Lejda, Susan Nelle, and Jonathan West at the Australian Innovation Research 
Centre, University of Tasmania. 
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2. The conventional form of economic analysis employed to assess the project’s 
feasibility prior to its construction—cost-benefit analysis—entirely failed, through 
repeated iterations, to judge accurately the project’s value. 
 
A striking feature of the history of the Coal River region is just how many reports 
and analyses were conducted prior to commitment to the project, over many years, 
and how wildly wrong—in the universal direction of underestimation of the 
benefits—were their conclusions. The project was studied and reported upon 
serially for more than 40 years prior to an ultimately political decision to proceed.  
Most reports, including key assessments for Commonwealth agencies, 
recommended against the project.  
 
The common underlying failure in these studies is an inability of the methodology 
to incorporate the results of innovation. These studies commonly employed cost-
benefit analysis, a methodology in which costs are estimated in advance and then 
weighed against time- and inflation-discounted returns, with assessments of 
whether the project is likely to meet desired-return hurdle rates, payback periods, 
or Internal Rates of Return. 
 
A common flaw in such methodologies is that it is extremely difficult to obtain 
reliable and convincing data about potential future returns from innovative projects. 
This is as true in the corporate world as that of public policy. The difficulty is that it 
is impossible to analyse products and markets that don’t yet exist. The preparers of 
such reports typically, therefore, limit themselves to projecting into the future 
existing trends in existing fields. Returns from entrepreneurial and innovative 
projects are often dismissed as ‘speculative’. Even if incorporated, such information 
frequently lacks credibility and is granted little credence. 
 
The upshot is that while the studies are generally reliable about costs, they are 
inherently unrealistically conservative about benefits. 
 
And this is true in reports attempting to predict in advance the likely future 
performance of irrigation in the Coal Valley. The reports assumed a continuance of 
existing land use, then estimated the additional value to be gained from provision 
of a water buffer to production. The result was dramatic underestimation of the 
project’s real value. 
 
3. A few, in fact a handful, of entrepreneurs exercised a disproportionate impact on 
value creation, and their experience influenced the decisions of many others. 
 
The great impact of a very small number of individuals, both newcomers to the 
region and some long-term residents, is strikingly apparent. The same names were 
repeatedly mentioned to this study’s researchers not only as disproportionate 
creators of new value themselves, but also as mentors and sources of inspiration for 
others. 
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The impact of these few leaders results from the fact that value creation came 
primarily in the form of innovation. Since innovation, rather than expansion or 
reinforcement of existing activities, was the principal source of value creation, the 
role of entrepreneurs was magnified. Where few lead, many followed. 
 
An important implication of this observation is that a public policy focus on 
reinforcing the efforts of the few champions of change can outweigh the returns to 
be gained from efforts to raise the average or transform the broader culture in a 
given region. 
 
4. While irrigation was a necessary precondition to the transition to new land uses 
(innovation), to make that transition happen required in addition the presence of 
other economic capabilities and activities. 
 
For landowners to make a transition to new land uses, that is, to innovate, they 
needed several additional elements to be present, beyond water: 
• Convincing information about alternative possibilities, including markets. 
• Access to skills and experience working with novel crops. 
• Development of skills and confidence to undertake the broader range of 
operational, business, and managerial activities often demanded by new 
business models. 
• Availability of finance, in forms appropriate to the product or business 
model under consideration. 
• Access to suitable logistics, which often needed to be considerably more 
sophisticated for the new high-value—commonly highly perishable or 
brand-dependent—products than those of wool or sheep meat. 
 
5. Risk is the defining challenge in land-use transition, and perceptions of excessive 
risk were the main obstacle to overcome in effecting that shift. 
 
Greatly higher risk is in general the defining challenge of innovation, and that was 
shown to be true as well in the Coal Valley experience. Expansion of known 
activities as a path to value augmentation usually induces less uncertainty than 
development of new-to-oneself products or services, or even more so those new-to-
the-world. This is commonly the most important barrier to innovation. 
 
The primary contribution of the other elements of an effective ‘innovation system’ 
in the Coal River Valley was the reduction of the real or perceived risk of new 
products and processes. The key dimensions of risk faced by entrepreneurial 
farmers in the Valley were: entrepreneurial or business-management risk (could the 
individual involved manage the new business model implied by a shift to a new 
line of business); production risk (would the potential new crops actually grow in 
 95 
the region, cost-effectively); and market risk (is there a real market for the product, 
can it be gotten to market cost effectively).  
A vital way to assess the propensity to innovate is to consider the dimensions of risk 
manifest in a given situation, and to assess the effectiveness of external-to-the-firm 
capabilities to reduce or manage it. 
 
6. Deliberately organised community leadership was vital in supporting 
entrepreneurs and sharing experience. 
 
In addition to the disproportionate impact of a handful of entrepreneurs, a single 
community organisation—the Coal River Products Association—played an 
invaluable role in the transformation, at several key times, and on several 
dimensions. The Coal River Products Association lobbied effectively for the 
irrigation project itself, set targets for change, supported entrepreneurs, collaborated 
with demonstration projects, commissioned the influential ‘Blundstone’ report, and 
disseminated its results. 
 
The active part played by the Association meant that key decisions were guided at 
each stage by local knowledge. Initiatives of government had a higher success rate 
because they were designed in advance to meet the needs of local entrepreneurs. In 
essence, deep local knowledge and the support of local actors was an important 
antidote to innovation risk. 
 
Most importantly, the Coal River Products Association and its members played an 
irreplaceable role in mitigating entrepreneurial risk. Farmers attempting innovation 
could call on support and advice from other members of the Association at each 
stage. Several reported that such support, at critical moments, was essential to their 
ultimate success. An important form of assistance was information about potential 
markets, which mitigated market risk. 
 
7. External research and demonstration (University and Government) was 
instrumental in overcoming perceived risk. 
 
A further vital contribution to the reduction of perceived risk, in this case 
production risk, was the impact of demonstrations of new products. The University 
of Tasmania’s decision to trial potential new products enabled sceptical farmers to 
see the products growing. The University farm showcased cherries, apricots, wine 
grapes, plums, chestnuts, and apples. The results demonstrated not only that the 
products would grow cost-effectively in the region, but also provided vital 
knowledge on which varieties were best suited, and know-how on how best to 
grow them. 
 
8. The availability of high-quality logistics was critical in facilitating the foundation 
and growth of new businesses. 
 
 96 
As the Valley’s transition gathered pace, the proximity of the airport emerged as an 
increasingly important enabling factor. Traditional products from the area had 
mostly not needed to be exported fresh, or relied on relatively simple refrigeration 
systems; for the new products freshness, hence speed, was of the essence. 
 
Lessons for future irrigation projects 
 
The Coal River experience suggests several important lessons for future irrigation 
projects: 
 
The projects should incorporate entrepreneurship and land-use transition as explicit 
associated elements from the start. That’s where the value and returns from irrigation 
are likely to be created. 
 
Such projects should aim deliberately to reduce the actual and perceived risk 
confronted by entrepreneurs. It is risk of failure, on several dimensions, that will retard 
the needed shift. Government and non-government entities can assist where they are 
able to help manage the risks: 
 
Management risk: Training, and even more importantly mentoring, can help. 
Production risk: The Coal River experience demonstrates the great value of 
investment in testing and demonstration projects by non-private entities. 
Market risk: Information about potential markets is vital, as is the presence of 
systems to get products to those markets. 
 
Local knowledge of the innovation system is essential: The unfolding development of 
the Coal River region highlights the value of deep understanding of specific 
determinants of innovation capability, at a regional and sectoral level. Whether and 
how innovation actually occurs—in this instance, whether and how quickly farmers 
introduce new crops and business models—is very often dependent on the presence of 
supporting institutions off-farm. Assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of these 
dimensions of an innovation system is vital for informing policy that works. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Tasmanian Department of Economic Development and Tourism commissioned the 
Australian Innovation Research Centre (AIRC) to conduct a study of innovation 
capability within the Coal River Valley. 
 
The Coal River Valley was selected for several reasons:  
 
 Innovators within the region had experimented with diversifying the agricultural 
base, and had led the drive to introduce irrigated crops in the region; 
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• An industry group, the Coal River Products Association, played a significant role 
in encouraging farmers to try new crops, and in building public and political 
support for an irrigation scheme; 
• The Government invested in a major irrigation scheme to provide a reliable 
source of water to support irrigated agriculture; and 
• The combination of climate, soils and an assured water supply attracted 
entrepreneurs to the region with new investment and expertise in intensive 
horticulture. 
The Coal River Valley case study demonstrates the critical need to better understand 
agricultural potential. 
 
Today, as the State considers a new wave of commitment to the agri-food sector with 
the aim of expanding its position as a high-end food producer, the Coal River 
experience stands as a model of what might be achieved elsewhere in the State.  
This study investigates how, why, and where the Coal River irrigation project achieved 
its success to lay the basis for learning how to repeat and build on this performance. 
 
Objectives 
 
The purpose of the Innovation Study was to identify and assess the factors that 
contributed to building innovation capability in the Coal River Valley.  
The specific objectives of the Study were to: 
• Assess the role and impact of the following factors in building innovation 
capability in the Coal River Valley including: public policies and regulatory 
framework, public and private investment, sector innovators, community 
leadership and culture, collaborative industry groups and R&D providers. 
• Apply the findings and conclusions to develop a model for regional innovation 
in Tasmania. 
 
Methodology 
 
The AIRC used three methods to collect data, analyse the findings and draw 
conclusions about innovation capability in the Coal River Valley: 
 A historical profile of the Coal River Valley was developed based on archival 
records, media reports and the correspondence of the Coal River Products 
Association from the 1970’s to 2000; 
 Regional innovators were interviewed using a structured, but open-ended 
questionnaire; and 
• A system of innovation framework was adapted from a study of innovation in 
the Australian dairy industry36 and used to analyse the data and interview results 
to identify the key factors contributing to innovation in the region.   
                                            
36 ‘Future Capability Requirements for Pre-Farm Gate Research, Development and Extension in the Australian Dairy Industry, GHD 
Hassall in association with the Australian Innovation Research Centre, October, 2008. 
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The ‘Innovation System’ 
 
An innovation system framework has been used to analyse the dynamics and 
contribution of the structural elements within the system to its effective functioning.  
The structural elements of an innovation system include: 
 Actors – key players:  the innovators, investors, public policy makers and RD&E 
providers; 
 Knowledge – knowledge base of accumulated capabilities (skills and expertise) 
to develop innovative solutions; and 
 Rules – the institutions that shape behaviour: legal and regulatory frameworks 
and social and cultural norms. 
A functional analysis of the ‘innovation system’ in the Coal River Valley was used to 
identify the key factors that contributed to building innovation capability in the region:  
• Drivers – how innovation opportunities were identified and defined: eg through 
market signals and customer requirements or through new technological 
platforms; 
• Strategy and investment – how innovation opportunities were shaped and 
financed and risks were managed (looking at both public and private investment 
and risk-management strategies); 
• Knowledge and capabilities – how new knowledge, skills and technology were 
accessed and developed to enable innovation; 
• Infrastructure impact – how infrastructure requirements (both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’) 
supported or inhibited innovation; and 
• Institutional impact – how regulations and/or social norms supported or 
inhibited innovation. 
 
ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS 
 
The key findings from an analysis of the innovation system and factors contributing to 
the development of innovation capability in the Coal River Valley are presented below.   
A detailed historical profile, data and interviews with regional innovators in the Coal 
River Valley are contained in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Innovation Drivers 
 
How innovation opportunities were identified and defined 
 
The presence of a reliable source of water made possible by the SEIS, combined with 
appropriate soil and climate characteristics, created the conditions for the development 
of higher value agriculture and intensive horticulture in the Coal River Valley from the 
late 1980s. 
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The stimulus for change came from innovators in the Coal River Valley led by Bill 
Casimaty who saw a need to diversify from traditional dry land farming and grazing 
operations. They identified and experimented with a variety of new crops for which 
they believed there was a demand (or a demand could be created as in the case of 
turf). 
 
The Coal River Products Association (CRPA) played a significant role in rallying 
support from the existing farming community, the public and the several governments 
of the day to drive the campaign for a comprehensive irrigation scheme in the region. 
The CRPA also championed diversification into a new range of irrigated crops for 
existing farmers. 
 
When a reliable source of water was secured, the transformation of the Coal River 
Valley was driven by market opportunities identified by some existing farmers 
(Casimaty and Houston), by the seed companies (South Pacific Seeds), and by new 
entrepreneurs attracted to the region (Qew Orchards, Frogmore Creek and Domaine 
A/Stoney Vineyard). 
 
The region now has some very sophisticated and capable businesses with a global 
customer base. The profiles of these innovators demonstrate that long-term 
relationships with customers based on mutual trust and commitment to delivering 
results stimulate innovation opportunities. 
 
Strategy and investment 
 
How innovation opportunities were shaped and financed, and risks managed 
 
Innovation is a solution-seeking process encompassing a range of risks: eg market, 
production and financial risks. 
 
The history of the transition to higher value agricultural and intensive horticulture in 
the Coal River Valley illustrates the value of reliable and accessible information about 
potential markets and production requirements of specific crops. 
 
The Blundstone report, commissioned by the CRPA provided a comprehensive 
assessment of the potential for intensive horticultural ventures. No individual farmer 
would have been able to develop this information base on his own. 
 
Access to capital is a major requirement for developing an intensive horticultural 
enterprise. The costs of initial capital investment are particularly high as it takes several 
years for most crops to reach maturity. 
 
All of the innovators profiled in the Study have relied on their own private capital with 
the exception of Qew Orchards that also manages an orchard of 100,000 trees as part 
of a Managed Investment Scheme (MIS). 
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Two of the case profiles (StrathAyr and Houston’s Farm) are examples of existing 
farmers who made the commitment to develop an intensive agricultural operation on 
an existing property, and who have prospered after weathering early set-backs. 
 
The remaining professional farmers in the Valley have been more reluctant to invest in 
the required irrigation infrastructure as some of them are also farming on leased land to 
reach the commercial scale needed to be competitive in current market conditions. 
They generally have a mixed farming enterprise in which they include some irrigated 
crops (eg peas, vegetables for seeds). 
 
The innovators’ profiles illustrate that much of the expansion into intensive horticulture 
has been done by new entrepreneurs attracted to the Valley because of the 
combination of water, soil and climate characteristics. They brought new expertise and 
investment to the region. 
 
There is always the ongoing risk of managing fluctuating market prices. Some of the 
innovators are committed to developing niche or superior products and services. 
 
Some, such as South Pacific Seeds, act as a ‘chain captain’ effectively linking Coal 
River Valley growers with global customers. SPS’s managers regularly visit their 
customers and contract with them for seed production at agreed price. The company in 
turn offers guaranteed price contracts along with assistance and advice to its growers. 
 
Knowledge and Capabilities 
 
How new knowledge, skills and technology were accessed and developed  
 
The ability to access new knowledge, technology and skills is essential to building 
innovation capability. 
 
The history of innovation in the Coal River Valley demonstrates the importance of 
accessible sources of science and technology services and the role of effective 
‘knowledge brokers’. 
 
During the early transition to more intensive agriculture, the State Government, 
Department of Primary Industries (DPI) and the University of Tasmania played 
significant roles in identifying and conducting trials of new crops. 
 
The Tasmanian manager of South Pacific Seeds continued to source expertise from the 
DPI through his personal contacts. The Department has also been instrumental in 
helping Qew Orchards identify horticultural crops suitable for the area. 
 
Neville Mendham, a lecturer at the School of Agricultural Science at UTAS, provided a 
direct link between the University and the seed industry in the district through his 
involvement with the University Farm and by becoming a vegetable seed grower 
himself. It was through Dr Mendham that a doctoral student from the University, 
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Cameron Spurr, was contracted by South Pacific Seeds to conduct research on a 
variety of carrot seed. 
 
Cameron turned out to be a consummate ‘knowledge broker’ in the field. Not only 
could he identify the problem, but he could also find the solution and translate it into 
practical advice for growers. With a background in farming and a PhD in agronomy, 
he can effectively communicate science-based solutions to growers. 
 
In practical ways, South Pacific Seeds acts a ‘knowledge broker’ for its growers.  As 
Craig Garland said, ‘we use their equipment and our expertise’ to turn sheep farmers 
into agricultural farmers. SPS uses a hands-on approach to building agricultural skills. 
 
The Coal River Products Association has been acting as a ‘knowledge broker’ for its 
members for many years. The Group invites guest speakers to their regular meetings to 
address issues of interest to its members. By doing so, the CRPA provides an effective 
forum for ‘knowledge vendors’ to reach farmers in the region. 
 
The Association has played a vital role in introducing new land management practices 
to the area by educating its members and effectively disseminating knowledge about 
sustainable farming. 
 
The innovators also demonstrate the impact of ‘accumulated capability.’ They are 
committed to ongoing research. They build on their knowledge base internally through 
continuous innovation and by encouraging their employees to constantly seek for 
better solutions, and externally through accessing specialist expertise and research 
capabilities as needed. 
 
Infrastructure Impact 
 
How infrastructure requirements supported (or inhibited) innovation 
 
The Coal River Valley provides a prime example of the transformational impact that 
major infrastructure projects can have on a region. There is no doubt that the SEIS (and 
subsequent irrigation projects) was the pivotal factor in changing the agricultural 
landscape of the Coal River Valley. Access to a reliable source of water at competitive 
rates was (and remains) the single most important factor in retaining an agricultural 
future for the region. Dry land farming and sheep grazing are no longer a competitive 
option. 
 
There are important lessons to be learned from the way the decisions to build the 
irrigation scheme were made (and not made). 
 
Major ‘hard’ infrastructure projects such as the seven-stage SEIS are long-term projects 
that require long-term commitment. These projects do not fit short-term electoral 
cycles and the loss of ‘institutional memory’ that occurs as personnel (both ministerial 
and bureaucratic) change. 
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Furthermore, the feasibility and economic impact assessments were in most part based 
on projections of existing land uses. History shows that those predictions were 
conservative, and more importantly, failed to take into account future potential use of 
land and the impact of introducing new, intensive horticultural crops. 
 
Table 1 compares actual and projected future land use in the area to be irrigated by the 
SEIS (columns 3 & 4) and land use in 2008 (column 5). The results do not support the 
assumptions made by the Rivers and Water Supply Commission that field crops such as 
lucerne, cereals, poppies and canning peas would consistently occupy 80 to 85 
percent of the irrigated area with the remaining 15 to 20 percent being used for 
intensive horticulture such as cultivation of vegetables, orchards, vineyards and turf. 
The highest margin forms of intensive horticulture account for 39 per cent of land use 
in 2008 and close to 50 per cent if poppies and seed crops are included. 
 
Table 1: Pre- and Post-Irrigation Land Use by Area (ha) 
Crop 
Pre-
Irrigation 
land use in 
CRV 
(1980 
survey)1 
Ha 
Actual land 
use in area 
to be 
irrigated (in 
1983)1  
Ha 
Projected 
future land 
use in area to 
be irrigated 
(1983)1 
Ha 
Post-
Irrigation 
Land Use in 
the CRV 
(2008)2,5 
Ha 
Fresh Vegetables 88 105 160 280 
Stone Fruit 29 20 80 382 
Grapes - - - 300 
Olives - - - 95 
Walnuts - - - 36 
Sub-total: high 
margin 
horticulture 
117 125 240 1,093 
Cereals 312 47 200 600 
Peas 324 - 110 479 
Lucerne 84 28 100 137 
Poppies 25 8 110 140 
Seed Crops - 5 70 104 
Other - -  91 
Sheep 4,600 685  - 
Fat Lambs - - 165 170 
Beef 986 132 35 - 
Dairying 75 70 70 - 
TOTAL 6,2313 1,1003 1,100 2,8145 
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1Source: “Current Land Use in the Coal River Valley”, “Estimated Present Land Use in 
the Area to be Irrigated” and “Future Land Use in Area to be Irrigated” tables in South 
East Tasmania Irrigation Scheme. Craigbourne Dam Stages 1 and 2 – An Economic 
Evaluation 
2 Source: Davey & Maynard (2008). Water Crisis in the Coal River Valley. Preliminary 
Business Case. 
3 Land use includes crops under on-farm irrigation and dryland. 
4Grey peas 
5 Note two irrigation augmentation projects have been implemented since the 
completion of the Craigborne Dam stages 1&2. 
 
Some interviewees cited the critical role of good transport and logistics infrastructure in 
getting fresh products to market. The proximity to Hobart International Airport was 
clearly a facilitating factor for some as well. 
 
The Study also illustrates the positive role played by the Coal River Products 
Association in garnering farmer and public support for irrigation, and in facilitating the 
transition to new agricultural practices. The CRPA is a good example of how 
‘collaborative infrastructure’ can provide a structure and process to facilitate change 
and stimulate effective collective action. 
 
Institutional impact 
 
How regulations and/or social norms supported or inhibited innovation  
 
Although the regulatory barriers were not cited often, many innovators voiced their 
concern for the future. In particular, they are concerned about the trend to convert 
agricultural land into housing estates. The Coal River Products Association continues to 
be vigilant in ensuring that local planning regulations support the continuation of a 
viable agricultural region in the future. 
The continuous existence of the CRPA, the oldest farming group in Australia, is a 
tribute to the underpinning social values in the region. Formed following the crisis of 
the bushfires, it continues to provide a place where farmers can learn from and with 
one another. The Group welcomes newcomers to the area helping them to join the 
community which also provides existing members with new perspectives and access to 
new expertise. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The story of the Coal River Valley illustrates the impact of innovation capability in 
realising the potential of a region. The key factors that stimulated innovation in the 
Coal River Valley—a journey that has taken 40 years and is still underway—are: 
 
 Community leadership  Since the late 1960s, community leaders like Bill Casimaty 
have built a compelling case for changing the agricultural practices of the region. 
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They have mobilised community and political support to realise the potential they 
believed existed for the region. 
 
 Irrigation infrastructure  The history of irrigation in the Coal River Valley 
demonstrates the enormous potential impact of major infrastructure projects. The 
transformation of the region would not have occurred without the SEIS. Equally 
important are the availability of transport and logistics infrastructure to facilitate the 
development of interstate and global agri-food businesses. 
 Innovators  The region had innovators who led by example through trailing new 
crops under irrigation on their properties. Once the commitment to the SEIS 
ensured a reliable source of water, new entrepreneurs were attracted to the area. 
These entrepreneurs brought capital and expertise to invest in intensive 
horticultural enterprises. Some of them now act as ‘chain captains’ in connecting 
individual growers to global markets.  All of them foster a solution-seeking culture 
in their enterprises. 
  ‘Knowledge infrastructure’  Knowledge providers have stimulated and continue to 
support innovation in the region. In particular, the history of agricultural 
development in the region highlights the critical role played by ‘knowledge 
brokers’ in linking innovators to science and technology-based solution providers.   
 ‘Collaborative infrastructure’  There is no doubt that the Coal River Products 
Association played a vital role in the transformation of the region. The Group 
continues to be an effective advocate for agricultural interests of the region. It also 
provides a place where members (existing farmers and new entrants) can learn from 
and with one another in an informal and welcoming setting. 
 
All agree that if the region does not have a reliable source of water, ‘the Coal River 
Valley will become another Acton.’37 
 
 
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The Coal River Valley experience illustrates the development of innovation capability 
in a traditional agricultural region. This section summarises public policy implications 
for the Government and outlines some ways to stimulate regional innovation capability 
in other regions of Tasmania. 
 
By its very nature innovation entails risk that must be managed to encourage 
innovative activity. Governments can contribute to creating conditions that reduce risk 
and stimulate innovation. 
 
Governments can minimise the political risks associated with significant investment 
decisions such as those required to establish an intensive horticultural enterprise, by 
                                            
37 Craig Garland, South Pacific Seeds, Tasmania 
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providing consistent, long-term direction and bi-partisan support for major 
infrastructure projects such as the SEIS. 
 
Government as the regulator 
 
The State Government has oversight of the land-use planning framework. Agricultural 
enterprises in peri-urban areas have particular challenges. Continued development of 
intensive horticulture can occur along side rural housing development. However, new 
residents seeking a ‘rural lifestyle’ often do not understand the nature of professional 
farming, eg the use of irrigation equipment, gas guns, heavy equipment on the roads, 
impact of spraying, etc. 
 
The Government could investigate the possibility of creating an ‘Active Agriculture 
Zone’ designation. Buyers of land in the areas so designated would have to sign a 
caveat outlining the implications of living in the region, eg ‘I am aware that I am 
moving into an Active Agricultural Zone and acknowledge that there will be noise and 
inconveniences due to the conduct of agricultural enterprises.’ 
 
Government as an investor in the ‘innovation system’ 
 
Governments play a significant role in developing the ‘innovation system’. In 
particular, they are direct investors in the development of enabling infrastructure. 
 
Infrastructure projects 
 
The irrigation schemes needed to provide a reliable source of water has been critical to 
the development of higher value agriculture and intensive horticulture in the Coal 
River Valley. 
 
As the history of the planning for the SEIS shows, the economic rationale for such 
major infrastructure projects must be based on the future potential for new land uses, 
rather than projections based on current usage patterns. 
 
Once the feasibility and potential impact of a major infrastructure project is 
determined, the Government is best placed to ensure the financing of the project 
through its own funding, alignment with Commonwealth funding, or a public-private 
partnership. The Government, or an outsourced third party, needs to take on the 
‘investment broker’ or ‘syndicate manager’ role to structure and oversee funding 
packages. 
 
Accessible information 
 
If an infrastructure project has potential for stimulating new higher value uses, the 
Government can also play a role in describing what the range of those uses could be 
based on soil types, climatic conditions, etc. The Blundstone Rural Development 
Project Report (commissioned by the Coal River Products Group, paid for by private 
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and Horticulture Australia funding) is an excellent example of providing ‘public’ 
information for use by private investors. 
 
Knowledge infrastructure 
 
Governments also invest in the development and maintenance of an accessible and 
responsive ‘knowledge infrastructure’. The Government can use its investment to 
ensure that science and technology providers are effectively linked to innovators. 
 
Traditionally in agricultural development, State Governments provided technical 
services directly through public research and extension offices. The Tasmanian 
Government has outsourced these services through the creation of the Tasmanian 
Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR), a joint venture with the University of 
Tasmania. TIAR has tremendous potential to create a ‘knowledge infrastructure’, 
linking innovators and researchers with regional, national and international networks. 
 
To reach its potential, TIAR must act as a ‘knowledge broker’ as well as an R&D 
provider. Through its investment in TIAR, the State retains its capacity to directly 
influence the delivery of RD&E services in Tasmania. 
 
Increasingly, professional farmers and farming enterprises are using private R&D 
service providers who have the specific expertise they need. The Government should 
ensure that such private providers are included in ‘knowledge networks.’ 
 
Regional groups, such as the Coal River Products Association, can play a significant 
role as a ‘knowledge brokers’ and in building regional innovation capability. The 
Government could support the development of such groups where community leaders 
exist to provide local direction and leadership. 
 
Government as a provider of new venture funds 
 
The Coal River Valley Study shows that access to capital for new ventures, such as 
intensive horticulture, has been a limiting factor to many existing farmers in the region. 
The Government could consider increasing access to capital for investment in new, 
high value agricultural ventures through a ‘revolving loan fund’ that it would 
underwrite. 
 
Regional innovation capability 
 
The Coal River Valley Study tells one story of the development of regional innovation 
capability. Applying a ‘system of innovation’ framework has identified the key factors 
operating in the Coal River Valley to stimulate and support the transformation of the 
region from traditional dry land farming to intensive higher value horticulture. 
 
The Government can extract the lessons learned from the Coal River Valley experience 
for application in other regions in Tasmania. It can objectively look at its role in the 
continued development of the Coal River Valley and other regional areas with the 
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provision that ‘not one size fits all’ when it comes to developing regional innovation 
capability. 
 
Innovation capability is best understood through the sector in which it occurs, and 
particularly, through the structure and functioning of the value chains that operate 
within the sector. The Coal River Valley Study shows that opportunities for increasing 
the value of productive agricultural land can be realised, with local growers linked to 
global markets. 
 
From the State Government’s perspective, there are opportunities for increasing the 
value of the agri-food sector across Tasmania. The Food Industry Council of Tasmania 
has identified some issues and opportunities across the sector in his recent Industry 
Strategy. 
 
These potential opportunities could be realised through a combination of local 
leadership and new investment. 
 
This Study offers the State Government some insights on developing regional 
innovation capability for consideration as part of a larger framework for stimulating 
innovation in Tasmania. 
 
In partnership with regional development groups, conduct an analysis of potential 
higher value agri-food development in selected regions in Tasmania.  Make the 
findings public to attract new investors to the region. 
1 In those regions with significant potential for higher value agri-food enterprises, 
assess the health of the ‘innovation system’ in the region. 
2 Identify infrastructure requirements (both hard and soft) that would significantly 
boost the innovation capability within the region. 
3 Establish an ‘innovation investment broker’ function to develop and manage 
regional infrastructure investment in partnership with the targeted regions. 
4 Review planning regulations to support ‘Active Agricultural Zones’. 
 
 
HISTORY OF THE COAL RIVER VALLEY 
 
The historical profile, data and case study interviews with regional innovators in the 
Coal River Valley outlined here informed the AIRC’s findings, conclusions and advice 
on regional innovation capability prepared for the Tasmanian Government. 
The research of historical records and interviews conducted with regional innovators 
and community leaders are presented in two parts: 
A historical profile of the agricultural development of the region including: 
• Settlement 
• History of irrigation 
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• Agricultural development 
• History of the Coal River Products Group 
•  
Case profiles of six innovators in the region 
• StrathAyr Turf Systems 
• Houston’s Farm 
• South Pacific Seeds 
• Qew Orchards 
• Frogmore Creek Wines 
• Domaine A/Stoney Vineyard 
 
HISTORICAL PROFILE OF THE COAL RIVER VALLEY 
 
The Historical Profile provides an overview of the economic and social development of 
the Coal River Valley from settlement to present day. 
It highlights the history of irrigation and contribution of the Coal River Products Group 
to developing higher value uses of productive agricultural land. 
 
SETTLEMENT 
 
The Coal River Valley was one of the first areas of Van Diemen’s Land to be settled by 
Europeans. When the first European explorers discovered the region in 1803/04, they 
reported that “the parkland landscape could be put to the plough”. 
 
In late October 1803, a government surveyor, James Meehan, arrived at Risdon Cove38 
under the instructions to examine the surrounding area. His role was to investigate soils 
and natural resources in the region and to identify possible locations for future 
townships. 
 
The exploration of the Risdon Cove site and the surrounding area in early 1804, led 
Meehan to Pitt-Water at the southern end of the Coal Valley, where he discovered 
traces of coal and named the local river – the Coal River. 
 
Prosperous beginnings 
 
James Meehan recognised the agricultural potential of the area. Fertile soils and clear 
land appeared suitable for crop cultivation. Despite his findings, the agricultural 
potential of the Coal River Valley was not fully appreciated until the 1840s. 
 
The decision to move the settlement’s administrative centre from Risdon to Sullivan’s 
Cove in February 1804 caused major setbacks in further exploration of the Coal River 
Valley and surrounding areas. 
 
                                            
38 Risdon Cove was at the time the settlement’s administrative centre. 
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With the arrival of new settlers, the need for agricultural land around the Hobart area 
increased and so did interest in the Coal River Valley’s agricultural potential. The 
relative ease of clearing the native bush, proximity to Hobart and water transport soon 
started attracting new settlers to the Valley. 
 
The population of the region increased with settlers moving away from Hobart Town in 
search for land and new transportations of convicts arriving in the area, particularly in 
the 1830’s. 
 
According to the report issued by the Colony Administration Commissioner, John 
Thomas Bigge, by 1820 there were between 7000 and 8000 sheep in the Valley. 
 
Historical records also reveal a large variety of crops grown in the Valley at the time, 
such as vines, almonds, walnuts, stone fruit, and hops that became known as “superior 
to those imported from England”.39  
 
The importance of the Coal River Valley as an agricultural and transit area rapidly 
increased. On February 23rd 1824, the Township of Richmond was declared and soon 
became the administrative centre of the region with the building of the Richmond 
Bridge in 1825, the establishment of Military Officers Quarters, Richmond Court 
House, a store, hotels, flour mills and impressive private residences. 
 
In the 1840s, the region was proclaimed the “Bread Basket” of the colony and by the 
middle of the century, it had become a major wheat growing area with much of the 
cereal exported to Sydney. 
 
Years of decline 
 
The prosperity of the Coal River Valley, and Richmond as its administrative centre, was 
deeply affected by the construction of the causeway across the Derwent River at 
Bridgewater in 1849. The development removed the city from the main transit route 
from the south to the north of the colony. 
 
In 1872, the completion of the Pitt Water causeway led to further reduction in transit 
numbers through Richmond. The situation deteriorated again in 1876 with the 
construction of the railway from Hobart to Launceston. The railway ran from Hobart, 
through Bridgewater and Campania, where it turned up north. As a result of these 
infrastructure developments, Richmond and the Coal River Valley remained a quiet 
rural area with little change for many years. 
 
Until the 1930s, the land use in the Coal River Valley was dominated by dryland 
cropping and grazing, with a majority of enterprises specialising in cereals and sheep. 
Only small parts of foothills and slopes were utilised for production of apricots. 
                                            
39 Margaret Mason-Cox (1994). Lifeblood of a colony: a history of irrigation in 
Tasmania. Hobart 
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Overgrazing and land cropping resulted in widespread soil erosion in the Valley. Weed 
infestation and devastation caused by rabbits only added to the worsening condition of 
land in the region. 
 
Post-war Period 
 
The post-war boom, improved pastures and rabbit control halted the general decline of 
the area. Wool, fat lambs and beef became the main sources of income. During the 
late 1950’s several modern dairy operations were established in the district.  
However, by the 1960s, agriculture in the Coal River Valley was once again in a 
depressed state. The situation deteriorated considerably in February 1967 when 37,800 
acres of land were destroyed in the bushfires. The disaster had a devastating impact on 
the communities in the region with many symbols of early progress lost in the fire.  
The situation improved in the 1970s when Richmond gained recognition as a heritage 
area with Georgian Colonial architecture and convict history. The city, with its local art 
and craft galleries, became a popular tourist destination and once again was an 
important place, this time on a tourist route. 
 
Years of Drought 
 
October 1978 marked the beginning of one of the worst droughts in the history of 
Southern Tasmania. The Coal River Valley was officially drought-declared in 1979.  
The drought of 1979-1983 had a devastating effect on the region. As reported in the 
Tasmanian Mail on 11th January 1979: 
 
“The Coal River is only a river in name, being but a chain of pools and water-
holes, and in most instances they are either dry or fast drying up.”40 
 
The cost of re-sowing pastures was approximately $4.5 million, with the cost of 
restocking around $3 million.  Individual farmer losses in the South East of Tasmania 
ranged from $75,000 to $200,000. 
 
The severe drought and increasing demand for water for irrigation, domestic use and 
recreational purposes accentuated the need for an irrigation scheme that would supply 
water to the drought-prone South East of Tasmania. 
 
When the government’s efforts to battle the drought by cloud seeding failed, the need 
to urgently review water supplies for the region resurfaced. 
 
HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN THE COAL RIVER VALLEY 
 
The first dams on the Coal River were build some time before the 1880s. Built on a flat 
river bottom, the dams were susceptible to heavy flooding and many of them were 
soon destroyed.41  
                                            
40 Tasmanian Mail, 11-01-1979 
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One of the earliest attempts to irrigate land in the Coal Valley was during the 1840’s, at 
Glen Ayr, Richmond. By 1849, Glen Ayr had 29 acres of Virginia tobacco and hops 
under irrigation. Construction of a large dam on the farm and “water laid on by 
pipes”42 to the farmhouse were considered a complete novelty in the region.  In 1853, 
a major failure of the irrigation system, followed by a purchase of the farm by Bassett 
Dickson, caused the dam to fall into disuse. 
 
Another attempt at constructing an irrigation system was made at the Campania Estate 
during the 1870’s, with 150 acres under irrigation. 
 
The first permanent and successful dam on the Coal River was constructed at 
Richmond during the late 1930’s. The project offered jobs to unemployed men during 
the Great Depression. The dam was initially used for irrigating nearby market gardens. 
 
Although the potential for development of a large-scale irrigation scheme in the Coal 
River Valley was recognised in the 1880s, it was not until the 1950s that the first 
serious steps towards the development were undertaken. 
 
An engineer from Victoria, E. P. Kendall, was assigned to examine possible sites for the 
dam construction between Richmond and Campania. The investigation led Kendall to 
conclude that “sufficient water could be made available to fully develop this valley of 
5000 acres under irrigation”43. 
 
In Kendall’s view, the irrigation scheme would not greatly affect the productivity of the 
district, as, according to his predictions, the majority of landowners would only use 
irrigation during dry periods to hold their stock. Instead of building a large irrigation 
scheme, Kendall proposed a construction of a small dam that would boost the flow of 
the Coal River during dry periods. 
 
After careful investigation, Kendall concluded that for the region to grow and develop 
its strong agricultural potential, a comprehensive irrigation scheme that would supply 
water to the South East of Tasmania had to be developed. His proposal was submitted 
to the Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board in 1951. It was rejected based on the lack 
of sufficient resources to facilitate a development of such magnitude. 
 
South East Irrigation Scheme (SEIS) 
 
For the next thirty years, the plan to build a comprehensive irrigation scheme in the 
South East of Tasmania was examined by various government bodies and departments. 
 
                                            
41 Margaret Mason-Cox (1994). Lifeblood of a colony: a history of irrigation in 
Tasmania. Hobart 
42 Hobart Town Courier, 03-11-1849 
43 Margaret Mason-Cox (1994). Lifeblood of a colony: a history of irrigation in 
Tasmania. Hobart 
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The Bureau of Agricultural Economics prepared the first assessment of the proposed 
scheme in 1964. Other studies included the 1971 and 1974 reports by McColl and 
Associates, with the latter one updated by the Agricultural Economics Section of the 
Department of Agriculture in 1980 and revised again in 1981. 
 
The push for irrigation in the Coal River Valley gained momentum in the 1970’s when 
Sir Harold Cuthberston, Bill Casimaty and other farmers joined forces in a campaign to 
secure the future of the region by building an irrigation scheme. 
 
In 1973, an opinion census revealed that 72% of landowners in the area wanted the 
irrigation scheme proposal to be presented to the Federal Government for funding and 
approval. Approximately 65% of respondents indicated their intention to irrigate if 
such scheme became available. Those who opposed to the idea were motivated by the 
fact that if the development went ahead, parts of their properties would have to be 
flooded. 
 
Until the early 1980s, the value of the proposed irrigation scheme was mainly 
considered in relation to the existing traditional agricultural enterprises – fat lambs, 
vegetables, dairy and cereal. Under this approach, the scheme was considered “not 
viable” as the irrigation water would only be used to sustain existing enterprises during 
dry periods. Since the early 1980s, it became apparent that the overall viability of the 
scheme was highly dependent on the introduction of a range of new crops to the area– 
essential oils, certified seeds, and stone fruits. 
 
On 22nd May 1981, a meeting of sixty farmers from the district took place at Richmond. 
After suffering one of the most severe droughts in the history of the area, they agreed 
that “the time has come to make a decision on the Coal River project once and for 
all”44. As a result of the meeting, a motion was passed for the State Minister for Primary 
Industries, Dr. Julian Amos, to approach the Federal Minister for National 
Development, Senator Carrick, to grant the necessary funding for the proposed 
scheme. 
 
Despite the urgency of the development, the construction of the dam was not the 
highest priority for the State government at the time, with the main focus directed 
towards the construction of the Warner’s Creek Dam, near Deloraine. 
 
The importance of providing irrigation water to farmers in the Coal River Valley 
diminished over time and the government yet again, abandoned the project. 
 
Stage 1 of the SEIS 
 
The proposal to build the irrigation scheme was reviewed again in May 1982. The site 
for the dam that would form the first stage of the South East Irrigation Scheme was 
identified at Craigbourne, near Colebrook. It was the same site that was surveyed in 
                                            
44 Tasmanian Country, 29-05-1981 
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1959 by Joe Piscioneri, an engineer for the Rivers and Water Supply Commission, who 
later designed the Craigbourne Dam. 
 
In 1983, there were approximately 115 properties within the project area, with only 40 
of them assessed as supporting full-time farming operations and thus viable for 
adopting irrigation practices. 
 
In 1983, following the election of the Gray Government, the South East Irrigation 
Committee was established to carry out an initial study of an irrigation scheme that 
could supply much needed irrigation water to the drought-prone South East of 
Tasmania. The Committee included representations of the Treasury Department, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Rivers and Water Supply Commission and Bill Casimaty 
from the Coal River Valley Products Association. 
 
The South East Irrigation Committee, responsible for reviewing all possible options of 
providing water to the area, decided that the most suitable method for irrigating the 
South East of Tasmania would be by pumping water from the Derwent River due to 
continuous and reliable water supply. Economic constraints, however, forced the 
Committee to abandon that idea and pursue an option of using local catchments 
instead.45 
 
Subsequently, the Committee recommended that the scheme should be comprised of 
seven stages that would provide water to the Jordan and Coal River Valleys, as well as 
to Iron Creek and its tributaries. The first stage of the scheme would involve the 
construction of the Craigbourne Dam and cost approximately $6.5 million. 
 
In February 1983, the Federal Minister for National Development and Energy, Senator 
Sir John Carrick, and the State minister for Water Resources, Mr. John Beswick, 
announced that the Craigbourne Dam would form a part of the seven-stage South East 
Irrigation Scheme. 
 
The Australian Labour Party also announced its support for the development of an 
irrigation scheme in Tasmania. The Opposition Leader, Mr Hawke, declared that 
irrigation schemes in Tasmania, costing more than $50 million, could be build under 
the Federal Labour Government. 
 
“The ALP Economic package for Tasmania encompasses such water and irrigation 
schemes as Warners Creek, Coal River/South-East and Cascades.” 
“In relation to the Coal River/South-East scheme, the ALP recognises that this scheme 
has potential far beyond the first stage, that is the Craigbourne Dam” and the “Federal 
Labour Government will assist with further full investigation of all possible stages.” 
                                            
45 Casimaty, B.G. (1983). Case Study for the Coal River Irrigation Seminar: “Droughts in 
Tasmania” 
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“The ALP recognises the agricultural potential of South-Eastern Tasmania, and if it is 
shown by these investigations that the further stages are viable, then every 
consideration will be given to the construction of these stages over the long term.”46 
 
In 1983, the Federal Government offered to finance the construction of the 
Craigbourne Dam under a grant from the Commonwealth Bicentennial Water 
Development Program, with Stage 2 of the SEIS coming under the National Water 
Resources Program with State and Federal funding. The decision to provide funding for 
the scheme was made on the basis that much of the planning work had already been 
done. 
 
The Tasmanian Government failed to secure the deal for the Commonwealth funding 
for the project due to major setbacks caused by the potential flooding of the Historic 
Colebrook Park in the Coal River Valley. Subsequently, the Federal Government 
withdrew from the project. 
 
According to the Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Peter Walsh, the project 
was “hopelessly uneconomic”, with the cost of irrigation water estimated to be $200 
per Megalitre. The Federal Government “refused to fund the scheme on the grounds 
that it was uneconomic” and it would require “an annual taxpayer subsidy to 
individual farmers”47 of around $40,000 a year. 
 
The decision to proceed with the first stage of the proposed seven-stage South East 
Irrigation Scheme, based upon storages on the Coal River, Jordan River and Iron Creek, 
was made by the Tasmanian Government Cabinet on 9th August 1983.  
In September 1983, the State Government provided initial funding to build the 
12,600Ml Craigbourne Dam and expressed its full commitment to its construction, 
regardless of the availability of Federal funding. 
 
“Irrespective of whether or not there was Federal funding, the State Government would 
definitely build the Craigbourne dam…”48 
 
The total cost of the first five stages of the South East Irrigation Scheme was estimated 
to be around $22 million with the remaining last two stages expected to cost another 
$29 million. 
 
In the early 1984, the government appointed international engineering consultants, 
Gutteridge Haskins and Davey, to design the dam. Later that year, the State 
Government allocated $5,800,000 towards the construction of Stage 1 of the SEIS. 
 
The works on the construction of the Craigbourne Dam began in April 1985. The 
construction of the Craigbourne Dam was delayed due to various issues including 
                                            
46 ALP Tasmania News Release, 04-03-1983 
47 The Mercury, 11-10-1985 
48 Craigbourne Certain, Tasmanian Country, 16-09-1983 
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compensation for farmers losing land to the dam and the proposed construction of a 
levee around the historic Colebrook Park homestead49, later abandoned due to costs. 
 
The Craigbourne Dam was completed on 7th August 1986. The official opening took 
place on 17 November 1986. The dam had a storage capacity of 10,000 mega-litres 
and could provide irrigation water to over 3,800 hectares of irrigable land in the Coal 
River Valley. Following construction of the Craigbourne Dam, irrigation water was 
made available to 64 properties within Stage 1 of the SEIS District. 
 
At full supply level, the surface area of the lake was around 210 hectares. It was 
predicted that heavy, unseasonal rainfall within the catchment area of the dam would 
cause flows sufficient to fill the dam within a few days. Average yearly rainfalls were 
expected to adequately fill the storage within a given year.50 
 
Stage 2 of the SEIS 
 
In 1987, the State Government allocated $800,000 to commence the works on Stage 2 
of the SEIS, with another $2 million allocated in the 1988-89 State budget. 
 
The second stage of the scheme would service 4,500 hectares of agricultural land in 
the Cambridge – Tea Tree area. It was expected that 500 hectares of intensive crops, 
such as vegetable seeds, stone fruits, fresh vegetables, grapes and essential oils, would 
be under irrigation each year.51  
 
The second stage of the scheme did not increase the available water supply, but 
allowed for distribution of water from the dam to the lower parts of the Valley via a 
pipeline and a multi-pump pumping station at the Richmond Weir.  Stage 2 was 
expected to be completed by 1990 at a cost of $4,100,000.52 
 
The Rivers and Water Supply Commission was responsible for investigating proposals 
and implementation of Stage 2 of the scheme. According to the Commission, the 
majority of farmers in the project area expressed strong support for the scheme. The 
RWSC in co-operation with the State Department of Agriculture determined the total 
area of irrigable land for the Stage 2 of the SEIS. A detailed soil survey of the Stage 2 
area was scheduled for the 1988-89 financial year. 
 
In 1989-90 the pump station at Richmond and the pipeline were completed. The 
second stage of the SEIS supplied water to another 56 farms in the Coal River Valley. 
 
In 2000, the scheme had 132 members with water rights of 3,221ML. Since the 
completion of the scheme, numerous studies have been done on its operations and 
reliability. There have also been numerous studies investigating other feasible options 
                                            
49 Tasmanian Country, 26-10-1984 
50 Rivers and Water Supply Commission, Thirtieth Annual Report for the Year 1987-88. 
51 CRPA Correspondence, 1989 
52 The Mercury, 24-09-1987 
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of supplying water to the area, as the dam has not been able to reliably service areas of 
Stage 1 and 2 of the SEIS. 
 
Demand for irrigation water in the Coal River Valley has been increasing since the 
completion of the Craigbourne Dam and the transition from dryland cereal and 
livestock grazing enterprises to intensive crops under irrigation. 
 
Daisy Bank Dam – Connection to Hobart Water 
 
In order to ensure continuity of water supply to the area covered by Stage 2 of the 
scheme and improve the reliability of water supply to Stage 1, a new dam was 
constructed at Daisy Bank during 2000-01. Water to the dam has been supplied during 
off-peak season through a pipeline from Hobart Water and has increased the allocation 
of irrigation water to Stage 2 of the SEIS by 1000 megaliters. 
 
Clarence Re-Use Water Scheme 
 
In 1996, the Clarence City Council identified the potential for wastewater re-use within 
the area serviced by the second stage of the SEIS. The $16 million scheme involved 
piping treated wastewater from the Rosny Wastewater Treatment Plant for use in the 
Coal River Valley and was set to boost agriculture in the region. 
 
The strategy focused on providing treated wastewater commencing with an allocation 
of 420Ml in 2005 and increasing to 3,600 by 2025. The proposed scheme was 
expected to more than double the existing Stage 2 annual water supply of 1,500ML. 
When completed, the scheme had a potential to irrigate up to 6500ha. 
 
Works on the wastewater re-use scheme commenced in August 2003. The project was 
a joint initiative of the Clarence City Council, the Federal Government and landowners 
in the area. The scheme was expected to provide a guaranteed continuity of irrigation 
to farmers in the region and enable them to utilise areas they previously had not been 
able to cultivate. Another advantage was the nutrient content of re-used water that 
would result in reduced need for fertilizers.53 
 
One hundred and thirty five property owners in the district registered to receive water 
from the scheme as soon as the works on the project started. 
 
Criticism of the SEIS 
 
Since the beginning, the proposal to build an irrigation scheme that would provide 
much needed irrigation water to the South Eastern Tasmania attracted a great deal of 
attention and criticism from both members of the public and political parties.  
                                            
53 Information Bulletin, 1521-6600,10-05-1996 
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Criticism of the proposed scheme was mainly directed towards the economic viability 
of the scheme and the relatively small number of landowners that would benefit from 
the scheme.54 
 
The $7,000,000 cost of the first stage of the SEIS was criticised by the State Opposition, 
as being too expensive, considering it would benefit only 50 farmers in the area. The 
Party requested that the construction of the Craigbourne Dam be delayed and a 
comprehensive economic analysis of the development made and published. 
 
The State Government argued that the economic benefits of the dam would be realised 
in the long term and the multiplier spin-off effect would enhance the region and the 
State’s economy.55 
 
“Schemes such as the South-East Irrigation Scheme will provide a major boost to 
Tasmania’s rural sector in the years ahead. The scheme should not be seen in isolation 
but as part of the overall rural economy. It will complement the State’s other irrigation 
areas, not compete with them.”56 
 
Producers from the north of the State were concerned that the development could 
potentially cause “over-supply problems”. According to the Tasmanian Farmers and 
Graziers Association there was little support for the scheme outside of the Coal River 
Valley and, in their view, no more irrigation schemes should be constructed around the 
State. 
 
In response to the questioning of the economic viability of the irrigation scheme, the 
Coal River Products Association launched a campaign to promote new crops in the 
area to illustrate its agricultural potential. According to the secretary of the Association, 
Mr Geoff Crane, “Trials are being carried out and when water becomes available from 
the first stage of the scheme, farmers would be ready to proceed ‘full steam ahead’ 
with commercial areas of the new crops.” He also pointed out that “within a three 
month period… three overseas experts representing American, French and English 
firms, have expressed interest in growing stone fruits, flowers and seed crops in the 
area.”57 
 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COAL RIVER VALLEY 
 
Climate 
 
The Coal River Valley is characterised by a relatively warm and dry climate. The 
average annual rainfall is approximately 500 millimetres compared to potential 
                                            
54 Coal River Irrigation Scheme: Fulfilling its Potential 
55 The Mercury, 24-07-1986 
56 Gray, R. (1985). The Examiner, 21-06 -1985 
57 “South-East dam: a ‘subsidy’ and ‘support’ water scheme”, Tasmanian Country, 22-
03-1985 
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evaporation levels of 1300 mm per annum.58 The mean rainfall does not exceed 50 
millimetres from January until June. In the following months, rainfall is not greater than 
100 millimetres per month.59 High evaporation rates, which in most months exceed the 
rainfall60, make the Coal Valley one of the driest regions in Tasmania. 
 
The dry climate of the region affects river flows. Prior to the construction of the 
Craigbourne Dam in 1986, the Coal River was ephemeral for its entire length, 
particularly during summer months (November to April). Historical records show that 
the river’s stream flow has been highly dependent on annual rainfall in the 
catchment.61 
 
Figure 1: Average annual rainfall in Tasmania 
 
Source: www.bom.gov.au/climate/averages/, Retrieved 07-11-2008 
 
January and February are the warmest months with average maximum temperatures of 
220C.  Average summer temperatures inland at Richmond and Campania are generally 
higher than in the southern parts of the Valley that are more influenced by sea breezes. 
                                            
58 Grose, C.J. (2003). Land Degradation and Salinity Risk Investigations in the Coal 
River Valley, South East Tasmania. Department of Primary Industries Water and 
Environment, Tasmania, Australia. 
59 http://www.bom.gov.au/cgi-bin/climate/cgi_bin_scripts/annual-monthly-rainfall.cgi, 
Retrieved 07-11-2008 
60 Grose, C.J. (2003). Land Degradation and Salinity Risk Investigations in the Coal 
River Valley, South East Tasmania. Department of Primary Industries Water and 
Environment, Tasmania, Australia. 
61 Gurung, S. and Dayaratne, S. (2003). Hydrological Analysis of the Coal River 
Catchment. A report forming part of the requirements for State of Rivers reporting. 
Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment 
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This characteristic makes the higher part of the Coal River Valley suitable for some 
grape varieties that cannot be successfully grown in other parts of the State. 
The Coal River Valley is generally frost-free. Frosts, however, can occur during June, 
July and August. Intensity and frequency of frosts increases from Richmond to 
Colebrook. July has the lowest mean minimum daily temperature of 3.90C at Hobart 
Airport.  Day length in the region varies from 9 to 15.3 hours.  
Despite its advantageous warm conditions and long hours of sunshine, the region is 
windy. The prevailing wind is the north-westerly. During summer months, this wind is 
counteracted by sea breezes from the south-east and south.62 
 
Soils 
 
Soils in the Coal River Valley range from wind blown sands to heavy, cracking clays. A 
major proportion of the Valley, however, is characterised by duplex or duplex 
gradational soils with predominantly clayey, poorly structured subsoils. A high level of 
clay in subsoils increases their susceptibility to structural breakdown if not managed 
properly. Special management is also required on light sandy soils that are susceptible 
to wind erosion. 
 
In is not uncommon for different types of soils to be found within the boundaries of 
one property. Irregularity of soil types dictates irrigation and soil management 
techniques, choice of crops and the use of fertilisers to suit individual soil type. 
 
Variety of soil types largely determines types of crops that can be grown in the region. 
Perennial crops, such as fruit trees, vines and very intensive vegetable crops are 
generally less restricted than annual crops, however their location in the Valley is 
influenced by access to irrigation water. 
 
Land degradation and salinity issues 
 
According to the Coal River Catchment Management Strategy (1998), “virtually all 
forms of land degradation can be found within the valley”. The most common are wind 
erosion, tunnel and gully erosion, soil structural decline, and salinity. 
 
Soil salinity was a major concern when the irrigation scheme was constructed due to 
poor drainage of some soils. 
 
The 2003 Land Degradation and Salinity Risk Investigations in the Coal River Valley 
Report concluded that the current level of agricultural activities in the region has not 
resulted in increased ground water levels and has not affected its quality. 
 
The investigation did reveal a significant salinity risk, particularly on upper terrace 
levels.63  While salinity is evident in the Coal Valley, salt levels in the root zone remain 
low and may only affect salt sensitive crops.64 
                                            
62 Davey & Maynard, (1992). The Blundstone Study 
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Salinity issues have been managed with the assistance of the Coal River Valley 
Landcare Group, established in 1991. The organization has been responsible for 
promoting sound and sustainable agricultural practices amongst farmers in the area 
with major emphasis on drainage works if required. 
 
An on-going programme to monitor depth and quality of ground water and salinity 
levels has been required to ensure the sustainable development of the region. 
 
Pre-irrigation land use in the Coal River Valley 
 
Prior to the construction of Stage 1 of the South East Irrigation Scheme, a majority of 
the land in the region was dominated by sheep enterprises for wool production, prime 
lambs and beef cattle. There were three dairy units operating within the area to be 
covered by Stage 1 and 2 of the SEIS. Small vegetable producers for supply to the 
Hobart markets were also present. Barley and oats were the principal cereal crops, 
with lesser areas of wheat and triticale also grown. Other field crops of importance 
were oil poppies, canning pea seeds and grey peas.65 
Land use in the Coal River Valley based on the 1980 survey of producers is presented 
in Table 2. 
 
                                            
63 Grose, C.J. (2003). Land Degradation and Salinity Risk Investigations in the Coal 
River Valley, South East Tasmania. Department of Primary Industries Water and 
Environment, Tasmania, Australia. 
64 Grose, C.J. (2003). Land Degradation and Salinity Risk Investigations in the Coal 
River Valley, South East Tasmania. Department of Primary Industries Water and 
Environment, Tasmania, Australia. 
65 South East Tasmania: Irrigation Scheme. Craigbourne Dam Stages 1 and 2 – An 
Economic Evaluation 
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Table 2: Land Use in the Coal River Valley, 1980 
Enterprise  Total area (ha) 
Dryland 4,564 Sheep 
Irrigated 36 
Dryland 973 Beef 
Irrigated 13 
Dairying  75 
Dryland 44 Lucerne 
Irrigated 40 
Dryland 120 Barley 
Irrigated 13 
Dryland 19 Poppies 
Irrigated 6 
Dryland 109 Oats 
Irrigated 12 
Wheat Dryland 11 
Triticale Dryland 47 
Grey Peas Dryland 32 
Vegetables Irrigated 88 
Orchard Irrigated 29 
Total  6,231 
Source: South East Tasmania Irrigation Scheme. Craigbourne Dam Stages 1 and 2 – An 
Economic Evaluation 
 
According to the 1983 estimates (see Table 3 below), high value horticultural crops 
occupied only 11 percent of the 1,100 hectares planned to be irrigated by Stage 1 and 
2 of the SEIS. Approximately 975 hectares in the area to be irrigated by the scheme 
were under cultivation of lower-margin crops, with only 120 hectares under on-farm 
irrigation. 
 
A range of crops that could be grown in the Coal River Valley under irrigation was 
determined based on a soil survey conducted by the Tasmanian Department of 
Agriculture in collaboration with the University of Tasmania. A wide range of other 
factors was also considered, such as wind, sunlight hours, topography, frost, rainfall, 
temperature and availability of water. 
 
The variety of crops that could be successfully cultivated in the region under irrigation 
and sustainable management of soil types was significant. The availability of irrigation 
water increased the potential for supplying interstate and international markets with 
high quality essential oils, such as peppermint, boronia, pyrethrum, parsley, caraway 
and spearmint. 
 
The scheme also opened up new opportunities for production of stone fruits, apples 
and pears, strawberries, raspberries, blueberries, Chinese Gooseberries, wine grapes, 
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blackcurrants, fresh vegetables, vegetables for seed production, flowers for bulbs and 
cut flowers. Many of these crops were already present in the area or under 
development. The supply of irrigation water allowed for further expansion and 
intensification of the existing crops and introduction of others. 
 
According to the Rivers and Water Supply Commission, in 1986/87, the following 
crops were being grown in the area covered by Stage 1 of the SEIS: 
 
Pasture, oats, barley, poppies, canning pea seed, lucerne, wheat, peppermint, maize, 
chou mollier, fennel, pyrethrum, pink eye potatoes, broad bean seed, chipping 
potatoes, onion seed, Brussel sprout seed, cabbage and parsnip seed, lettuce, apples 
and apricots.66 
 
Even before the completion of the Craigbourne Dam, expressions of interest from 
interstate and overseas companies to invest in new crops were being presented to 
farmers in the region through the Coal River Products Association. 
 
To promote the agricultural potential of the region and attract investment, the Coal 
River Products Association produced a film detailing the potential of the area in 
horticulture, viticulture, stone fruit, essential oils and cereal. 
 
The following table illustrates the change in land use in the Coal River Valley from 
1983 to 2008 and includes a projection to 2013. 
                                            
66 Rivers and Water Supply Commission, 1986/87 
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Table 3: Actual and projected Land Use Change in the Coal River Valley 
 
Post-Irrigation Land Use 
 
In 1992, land use in the region was dominated by medium margin crops, such as peas, 
pyrethrum, essential oils, lucerne, seed crops and poppies. These crops accounted for 
over 60 percent of irrigated land in the region, while low-margin crops, such as 
cereals, lupins/beans, or lentils accounted for 28 percent of irrigated land. The area of 
high margin, horticultural crops remained unchanged. 
 
The emphasis on low and medium gross margin agriculture in the early post-irrigation 
period (up to 1992) could have resulted from a general risk aversion of traditional 
farmers and high capital cost of investing in on-farm irrigation infrastructure. As 
suggested in the 1992 Blundstone Rural Development Project Report, the optimal use 
of the irrigated land was not being exercised. 
 
The Blundstone Rural Development Project Report67, completed in June 1992, 
identified the potential for higher value horticultural development in the region. The 
increase in the area of high margin horticultural crops from 126 hectares in 1992 to 
                                            
67 Blundstone Rural Development Project, Davey & Maynard Agricultural Consulting, 
June 1992. 
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344 hectares in 1995 can be attributed to farmers capturing the opportunities identified 
by the study. 
 
Over the period 1992 to 2008, an additional 967 hectares of high margin crops 
returned $30.8mln in additional value while an extra 738 hectares of low and medium 
margin crops increased gross margins by only $0.7mln.68 By 2008, high gross margin 
agriculture accounted for a massive 94.4 percent of the total gross margin.  According 
to current predictions of the Coal River Products Association, the total area under 
cultivation will increase to 5,291 hectares by 2013. The area of high margin crops is 
expected to increase only by around 200 hectares, while still accounting for almost 90 
percent of the total gross margins. 
 
Overall, the irrigation scheme facilitated the transition of land in the Coal River Valley 
but it was not until the Blundstone Report that the real benefits of the scheme started to 
become realised. Land owners in the region had to perceive the risk of introducing 
new high margin crops as relatively low or allow new entrants to buy or lease land. 
Information about potential crops and gross margins provided by the Blundstone 
Report along with identification of potential markets and successful introduction of 
horticultural crops by the existing entrepreneurs reduced the overall risk of investment. 
The most recent increase of horticultural crops area may be attributed to the 
entrepreneurial spirit of new investors. 
 
Blundstone Study 
 
In 1991, the Coal River Products Association applied for a research grant with the 
Horticultural Research and Development Corporation to undertake a study of 
horticultural potential of the region. The Corporation offered its financial support for 
the studies of the Physical Resources of the Coal River Valley and Horticultural 
Development of the Coal River Valley. 
 
The Blundstone Study played a vital role in the expansion of higher value agriculture 
and development of horticultural crops in the region. The report identified crops that 
could be successfully grown in the area for interstate and overseas markets. 
 
The Blundstone study looked at a range of intensive horticultural crops suitable for 
introduction to the Coal River Valley. Higher value crops were selected based on their 
characteristics to suit the soil types, topography and climate of the region.  
 
Fresh Vegetables 
 
The Blundstone Study revealed potential for further development of vegetables for the 
fresh market. Proximity to Hobart offered a significant advantage in supplying fresh 
vegetables to the Hobart market. Availability of land and irrigation water as well as 
suitable climate conditions were also favour for the development of fresh vegetables 
production in the region. 
                                            
68 The number of hectares of low and medium gross margin agriculture on irrigated land in 
1992 that was transformed into higher margin agriculture by 2008 is not available. 
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The Study also identified potential vegetable market niches, such as winter lettuce, 
washed potatoes and bunched lines (carrots, silver beet, beetroot, leeks and spring 
onions). 
 
Competition from the existing suppliers in the northern parts of the State, unreliability 
of irrigation water, high capital requirements and high level of expertise in production 
and marketing were considered potential obstacles to the development of fresh 
vegetable sector in the district. 
 
Successful development of a fresh vegetable industry in the Coal River Valley was 
going to be largely dependent on the ability of producers to introduce advanced 
management techniques to complement investment in specialised machinery and 
facilities upgrade. The Study also identified that collective commitment from growers 
was essential to securing ongoing contracts. 
 
Vegetable Seeds 
 
The potential for development of large-scale seed cropping enterprises in the Coal 
River Valley had been recognised for some time. The climate of the Coal River Valley 
offers suitable conditions for growing vegetables for seed production due to dry 
ripening conditions that ensure that seed crops have maximum germination 
percentages. The relative isolation of the Valley also makes it a relatively disease- free 
region. 
 
Successful establishment and operation of seed producing enterprises in the district 
required major investment not only in sowing machinery, irrigation and harvesting 
equipment, but also in acquiring new skills and knowledge. 
 
Some farmers in the valley already had some experience in growing crops for seed 
production with most of their expertise self-taught. 
 
Stone Fruits 
 
The potential of the Coal River Valley to become a major stone fruit producing area 
was recognised. The advantage of the region is the late harvesting season that enables 
the produce to be exported to the mainland during their off-season. 
 
This late production season also limits interstate and overseas competition, particularly 
for apricots, cherries and nectarines. Demonstration orchards of cherries, apricots, 
wine grapes, plums, chestnuts and apples were planted at the University Farm. 
 
The Coal River Valley region is particularly suitable for apricot orchards as it is 
generally frost-free and offers preferable dry conditions during the flowering season.  
As there are only a few other areas in Tasmania suitable for growing apricots, the Study 
recognised that the region had the potential to become the major supplier of apricots in 
Australia. 
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Viticulture 
 
Climate conditions, availability of land and irrigation water, and proximity to Hobart 
also contribute to the attractiveness of the Valley as a wine region. Furthermore, the 
attractiveness of the Coal River Valley, and Richmond in particular, as a tourist 
destination added to the potential development of a wine region in the Valley. 
 
Vineyard expansion was already well under way in the region when the Blundstone 
Report was released, with a number of estates established with an increasing interest 
from interstate and overseas investors searching for suitable sites in the region. 
 
The wine industry was identified as an area that would particularly benefit from outside 
investment. It was recommended that the potential for premium wine production 
should be strongly promoted interstate and internationally. 
 
In summary, the report encouraged existing farmers in the Coal River Valley to focus 
on long-term agricultural potential, particularly of higher value horticultural enterprises 
that would take advantage of the agricultural conditions offered by the valley. Strong 
co-operation between farmers, especially in relation to sharing equipment and storage 
facilities due to high cost of financing was also encouraged. 
 
The opportunities identified by the Blundstone Study attracted new investors to the 
region. In 1995, multi-million dollar investments were made in stone fruit and 
viticulture. Approximately 160,000 stone fruit trees were planted in the area covering 
an area of around 100 hectares.69 
 
HISTORY OF THE COAL RIVER PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION 
 
The Coal River Products Association was established in 1967, following the bushfires 
that devastated the area. The objective of the organization was to set a new direction 
for the region and to provide relief and aid to local farmers. 
 
The role of the group in shaping the development of the region cannot be 
underestimated. It became an important “knowledge broker” for its members and an 
effective representative of their interests in public policy debates. 
 
Early history of the association 
 
In 1967, Bill Casimaty went to England on a Nuffield Farming Travelling Scholarship. 
During the visit, he attended a meeting of the “Grasshopper Club”. Inspired by the way 
the group shared knowledge and experience, Bill thought of setting up a similar 
organization back in Tasmania. 
 
                                            
69 Letter from Bill Casimaty to Dennis Rogers of the Tasmanian Development Board, 
28-02-2000 
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After returning to Tasmania in October 1967, Bill Casimaty and Jim Burn encouraged 
farmers in the Coal River Valley to attend an inaugural meeting of the Association. 
Potential members were drawn from a telephone directory from the section for 
Richmond and Campania and invited to participate in the meeting. Bill was elected the 
Chairman and Jim Burn, Secretary of the group. 
 
The structure and organization of the group were based on the British “Grasshopper 
Club” model and the local Rotary Club, of which Bill was a member. 
 
To attract new members and ensure good attendance, guest speakers were invited to 
regular meetings of the Association. Formal dress was required during the early 
meetings to create a business-like atmosphere. An annual membership fee was applied 
to cover the cost of meals and ensure regular attendance. 
 
Following the bushfires, the main purpose of the group was to share problems and offer 
emotional support. One of the objectives was to set a new direction for the region. 
Under the leadership of Bill Casimaty a concept of introducing new crops to the region 
was born. 
 
Inspired by his overseas trip, Bill Casimaty built two large dams on his StrathAyr farm 
that allowed him to experiment with new crops. Other farmers in the area followed 
and soon on-farm irrigation systems were being built and new crops trailed. 
 
During the 1979-1983 drought it became very apparent that in order to further 
diversify and intensify agricultural production in the Coal River Valley, a 
comprehensive irrigation scheme had to be build. 
 
In a bid for the irrigation scheme, the CRPA represented interests of farmers in the 
region. Members of the Association became heavily involved in promoting the need for 
irrigation in the region and in conducting public awareness campaigns. 
 
“New crops for new markets” was the most popular slogan of the group used in the 
push for construction of the Craigbourne Dam. Publicity events like the press 
conference in Geoff Crane’s empty dam at Strelley in 1980 were directed at attracting 
publicity and State Government’s attention and support. 
 
The Association has continued to be particularly active during difficult times. The 
CRPA would seek assistance and support from the State Government and private 
investors to address water shortages and deal with technical problems. 
 
In 1999, when the Craigbourne Dam was at critically low levels, members of the 
Association proposed building a pipeline from the Derwent River to supply much 
needed water to the region. The proposed $30 million scheme would have enabled 
water to be pumped from Bridgewater all the way to Tea Tree by a pipeline. 
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The role of CRPA in development of the region 
 
The nature of the Association has changed over the years. Originally it’s main purpose 
was to assist farmers in “getting back on their feet” by sharing equipment and 
experience. 
 
The group quickly realised that it could use its collective influence to negotiate better 
contracts for supply of agricultural produce and to improve the services available to 
local businesses and the community. The bargaining power of the group was 
demonstrated during successful price increase negotiations for malting barley with the 
Cascade Brewery. 
 
One of the most important attributes of the Association has been its ability to identify 
problems and collectively search for solutions. 
 
For example, In order to ensure availability of land suitable for agriculture, CRPA was 
involved with local government planning schemes, originally with the Richmond 
Municipality and after 1992, with the City of Clarence and the Municipality of 
Southern Midlands. 
 
To further explore the potential for expansion and growth in the region, the Coal River 
Products Association organised a Future Planning Workshop in April 1995 at Orford. 
The purpose of the conference was to review major changes that had occurred in the 
industry over the past three decades and set a direction for the future. 
 
A new mission statement for the region was produced as a result of the workshop: 
 
“The Coal River Area produces, promotes and profitably markets high quality 
agricultural products (for which we have a sustainable competitive advantage) to 
enrich the long term standards of living of our families and the community.”70 
 
New goals for the district were set. For example, by 2000 the group aimed to have 
developed skills and expertise required to have 350 hectares of crops producing over 
$5,000 gross margin (based on 1995 values). They also aimed to achieve a 100 percent 
increase in hours of employment; expand infrastructure and marketing networks to 
grade, pack and export the produce; and gain approval for secure water supply to 
enable better planning and management of crops.71 
 
An action plan was developed, with an emphasis on training and skills promotion, 
infrastructure, regional development initiatives and irrigation schemes. The ability to 
recognise changing markets and adapt to change was recognised as vital to the 
successful implementation of the strategy. 
                                            
70 Coal River Products Association – Proceedings of the Meeting at Eastcoaster Resort 
(21-22 April, 1995). Tilbury, Steele & Farley Australia, 1995 
71 Coal River Products Association – Proceedings of the Meeting at Eastcoaster Resort 
(21-22 April, 1995). Tilbury, Steele & Farley Australia, 1995 
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In 1999, the CRPA jointly with the Tea Tree Valley Irrigation District commissioned a 
study into potential sources of irrigation water to the area. Results of the study were 
presented to the members of the Association, State Government and other public 
bodies. 
In 2000, a Coal River Valley Catchment Committee was established to develop a 
management plan for the area and facilitate further development of intensive 
agriculture to ensure that economic benefits of the SEIS were being maximised. 
The Association was also involved in the Clarence Re-Use Water Scheme to ensure 
that water from the scheme would be used efficiently.  
The CRPA continues to conduct regular surveys in the region to determine levels of 
investment in irrigation and farm equipment, farm size, employment levels, crops 
grown and potential developments. 
 
PROFILES OF INNOVATORS 
 
The Coal River Valley once dominated by dry land cropping and livestock enterprises 
has been replaced by a “garden” of horticultural crops. 
 
The availability of water and land with appropriate soil and climatic conditions for 
intensive horticulture set the conditions for the transition of agricultural practices in the 
Valley. 
 
It was, however, a combination of local innovators and new investors who transformed 
the region. 
 
They all recognised the potential of the region for new enterprises. They developed 
expertise and sought advice wherever it could be found.  They took considerable risks 
and eventually reaped the rewards.  They still believe in the potential of the Valley, but 
are fearful for its future if secure and reliable sources of water are not available. 
 
These are the stories of six leading innovators. 
 
 
STRATHAYR TURF SYSTEMS, RICHMOND, TASMANIA 
 
The enterprise 
 
StrathAyr is a world leader in sport field and race track construction techniques. The 
company specialises in natural turf production and has a network of distributors 
around the world. StrathAyr Turf System has been installed at sporting venues in Egypt, 
USA, Singapore, Australia, Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand.72 
 
The company was established on the StrathAyr property at Richmond, Coal River 
Valley, in 1968 by Bill Casimaty following his return from a Nuffield Travelling 
Scholarship where he visited Britain, Europe and the USA. In 1972, the business 
                                            
72 www.strathayr.com.au, Retrieved, 15-11-08 
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expanded to Victoria and today, StrathAyr operates a turf farm in Victoria and a mixed 
farm, including turf, in Tasmania. 
 
Along with producing turf for sports grounds, StrathAyr specialises in building racing 
tracks. The first racing track built by the company was used in 1990 in Hong Kong for 
the resurfacing of the Sha Tin Racetrack. The Byr Root (soil free) Turf that was used 
there is now licensed in eight countries around the world. 
 
Why CRV  
 
“Necessity is a mother of invention”73 
 
Bill Casimaty has been described as one of the greatest entrepreneurs in the Coal River 
Valley, and possibly in Tasmania. Always seeking for better solutions, Bill has always 
encouraged his employees to identify and solve problems. 
 
After the wool boom of 1950’s, he realised that dryland farming and sheep grazing 
were no longer sustainable due to low rainfall and relatively small farm sizes in the 
Coal River Valley. His entrepreneurial nature drove him to try a range of new crops 
that had not been grown in the area before. 
 
When he visited the United States to further explore agricultural opportunities and 
acquire new knowledge, he found that the turf industry was just starting to develop and 
for Bill it was enough inspiration to start a similar industry back in Tasmania. 
On Bill’s return to the Coal River Valley, he built two on-farm dams on his StrathAyr 
property to irrigate his existing crops and create an opportunity to introduce new crop 
enterprises. 
 
Relying on his on-farm irrigation system, Bill soon started experimenting with new 
crops such as grape vines, poppies, peas, turf and vegetable seed crops. He had grown 
mushrooms prior to his scholarship and continued for some years but decided against 
investing in new sheds as his turf venture in Victoria was expanding rapidly. 
During the drought of 1979-83, he was forced to pump water to his property from a 
weir at Richmond through six kilometres of aluminium pipes to ensure continuous 
water supply. 
 
Every new contract presents itself with new challenges. 
 
StrathAyr’s first specialist turf concept involved the total removal of soil from the turf 
with a washing process, which made it ideally suitable for the emerging trend towards 
the sand-based sportsfields and racetracks. 
 
The company’s development of its StrathAyr system for sportsfields and racetracks 
resulted in a major breakthrough with the MCG project. The company also developed 
concepts to facilitate the establishment of cricket wickets for venues like the MCG so 
                                            
73 Bill Casimaty, StrathAyr, Tasmania 
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that they could be used for cricket, shortly after the annual grand final event.  
Following three advances in the technology, the company developed its drop-in cricket 
wicket system, which has since been installed in New Zealand and Australia and is 
being trialled at Lords in London. 
 
The company has also developed turf repair systems that facilitate high use, multi use 
sports venues as well as a ModulAyr Turf System, which has been used for several 
Davis Cup Tennis finals and for the Reliant Stadium in Houston, Texas. 
 
Business strategy and investment 
 
As Bill has always been concerned about the small population in his home State, 
StrathAyr expanded to Victoria when the national’s pioneer turf company, Custom 
Lawns, closed its operation in 1972. 
 
“Selling turf was similar to selling mushrooms”74 
 
Both turf and mushrooms involved entry into virgin markets and Bill used publicity and 
public relations to create interest in both products. Turf was a new product in Australia, 
a novelty with no developed market. Bill used figures of the US pioneer in the turf 
industry to forecast his potential demand. 
 
StrathAyr supplied Custom Lawns’ Housing Commission’s contract in Victoria by 
shipping turf to Melbourne. One of StrathAyr’s first projects was the redevelopment of 
the Hobart Showgrounds in 1980 in preparation for the Inter-Dominion Trotting Series. 
 
Capabilities 
 
The Nuffield Farming Travelling Scholarship inspired Bill to form the Coal River 
Products Association and introduce irrigation to the Coal Valley district. 
 
One of the major challenges Bill faced was to develop weed, insect and pest control 
techniques when there were no established methodologies. The Tasmanian 
Department of Agriculture and the University of Tasmania initially provided much 
needed assistance in dealing with weed problems and advising Bill on the use of 
chemicals. StrathAyr soon formed an in-house research and development program to 
deal with a range of agronomic issues. 
 
The company trains its employees to observe the effect of various agronomic 
techniques. Informal research and development, where staff is encouraged to 
constantly seek new solutions is an integral part of the company’s culture. 
 
Research and development is a vital part of StrathAyr’s culture. The company 
continuously develops improved turf concepts and systems. The company has always 
worked closely with several universities and believes in “putting science into practice”.  
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Bill was the founding Chairman of the Tasmanian University Farm Committee and a 
member of the governing body (Council) for many years. 
 
Future challenges 
 
StrathAyr Racetrack and Sportsfield Systems have developed a reputation for providing 
athlete safety to both equine and human participants. Combined with the reputation 
for high use and all-weather benefits, the company plans to use these features to 
expand its international activity. 
 
StrathAyr Turf Systems’ future focus is on market expansion and further development of 
turf systems that resolve problems associated with the use of sportsfields as outdoor 
entertainment venues. Invariably they have to cater for an ever increasing range of 
activities while providing world-class, high-quality sports surfaces. 
 
 
SOUTH PACIFIC SEEDS PTY. LTD., RICHMOND, TASMANIA 
 
The enterprise 
 
South Pacific Seeds is a medium-size company operating on a global scale. The 
company was established in 1986. SPS now has a reputation of one of the most 
innovative producers of vegetable seeds in the world. 
 
The company was established by Phil Hancock and ten colleagues who left Yates 
when it was taken over by another company. Yates was one of the first companies to 
offer contracts for seed production to farmers in the Coal River Valley following the 
construction of the irrigation scheme. 
 
SPS Production now operates in Australia (NSW, TAS, VIC and WA), New Zealand, 
Chile and Argentina. In Tasmania, SPS has contracts with growers in the Coal River 
Valley, Derwent Valley and in the North of the State. 
 
South Pacific Seeds operates its Tasmanian Production branch in The Coal River 
Valley. The company in Tasmania specialises in production of hybrid cabbage, hybrid 
cauliflower, hybrid carrot seeds, onion seeds and spring-sown brassica. The primary 
focus of the enterprise is on hybrid cabbage and hybrid cauliflower seed production. 
 
Why CRV 
 
“Coal River Valley is recognised as one of the                                                                   
best seed production areas in the world for hybrid cauliflower seed”.75 
 
The potential for growing vegetables for seed production in the Coal River Valley was 
recognised soon after the decision to build an irrigation scheme was made. Natural 
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advantages, such as dry summers, long hours of sunlight and relatively frosts free 
winters combined with a supply of irrigation water created an opportunity for the 
region to become one of the largest seed producing areas in Australia. 
 
Business strategy and investment 
 
“SPS has aimed to develop sheep farmers into agricultural farmers.”76 
 
SPS has had a significant impact on farming practices in the Coal River Valley. By 
providing practical and agronomic knowledge and guaranteed-price contracts, SPS has 
been encouraging traditional farmers in the region to switch to intensive seed 
production. 
 
Today, SPS’s seed production is pre-sold on contract to global customers.  SPS, in turn, 
contracts with local growers. SPS provides growers with practical, hands-on advice 
including taking soil samples and providing advice on irrigation techniques and 
fertiliser use to its growers. Craig Garland, the Tasmanian manager, regularly visits their 
properties to offer ongoing support and closely monitors their progress. 
 
“You have to be open and honest with your growers and your customers”77 
 
SPS’ objective is to connect local seed growers to global markets. It has played that 
role very effectively for over twenty years and continues to do so by developing new 
markets and building strong relationships based on trust and friendship with customers 
around the world. 
 
Building trust with growers has been equally important.  To maintain effective working 
relationships with it growers, SPS operates a transparent pricing system and are open 
about margins along the chain. 
 
The initial investment capital was raised by the 11 founders. SPS reinvests its earnings 
in the company to finance expansion and ongoing research. 
 
SPS’ employees are offered an opportunity to purchase shares after two years with the 
company. 
 
“Innovation is critical to our success.”78 
 
South Pacific Seeds has developed an effective problem-solving culture that enables it 
to constantly innovate its operations. Identifying a problem, finding a solution and 
translating the solution into practical steps is at the heart of the company’s innovation 
culture. 
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SPS has been involved in seed research for over twelve years. The majority of the 
research is done and funded internally. SPS also receives financial support for its 
research programs through various R&D grants. 
 
Only ten years ago, most of seed production was handled manually, with a limited use 
of basic machinery. To address increases in the cost of labour, SPS has introduced 
advanced machinery to reduce the use of manual labour. The company’s innovative 
culture has enabled it to develop new technologies and adapt machinery acquired 
overseas to local needs. Today, SPS is a world leader in technological advancements in 
seed production. 
 
To further reduce input costs and their impact on the natural environment, SPS has 
introduced recycled cardboard bulk bins to store and transport seeds. The bins are 
used throughout the entire production cycle, from harvesting and cleaning to shipping 
to global customers. 
 
Capabilities 
 
SPS has always cultivated links with R&D providers, such as the Tasmanian 
Department of Primary Industries, where Craig had been an employee. 
 
SPS in Tasmania has well-established links with the University of Tasmania. The 
relationship developed through Dr Neville Mendham, a lecturer at the School of 
Agricultural Science at UTAS who moved to the Coal River Valley when the water 
became available. 
 
The University Farm played a role in the early development of the seed industry in the 
district by providing research into seed varieties and managing commercial-scale 
demonstrations. 
 
In 1996, SPS was experiencing serious problems with the quality of carrot seeds in 
Australia. A PhD candidate from the University of Tasmania, Dr Cameron Spurr, solved 
the problem which was the beginning of a productive 10 year relationship with SPS. 
 
Future challenges 
 
Future development of horticulture in the Coal River Valley is dependent on the 
continuity of water supply and availability of land for agricultural purposes. Water is 
the most critical issue, many growers have invested heavily into irrigation systems and 
water storage. A guaranteed supply of quality water is imperative to ensure the Valley 
can continue to expand all of the horticultural activities that are occurring. SPS is also 
concerned about the trend towards subdivision of rural land for residential purposes 
and the impact that this has on the ability of farmers to function and carry out their 
operations without unnecessary restrictions. 
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The impact of climate change is another challenge for all growers in the Coal River 
Valley. Intensity and frequency of severe weather patterns are already affecting crops in 
the area. 
 
SPS has potential to continue to expand their operations in Tasmania based on global 
demand from their customers. However, that expansion will be limited by the 
willingness of farmers to commit themselves to contracts for intensive agricultural 
production. 
 
 
HOUSTON’S FARM, CAMBRIDGE, TASMANIA 
 
The enterprise  
 
Houston’s Farm is a major producer of pre-washed, fresh-cut salads in Australia. The 
company was established in 1991 by Anthony and Colin Houston. Over the decade 
from 1995-96 to 2004-05, Houston’s Farm became one of six major fresh cuts 
producers in Australia, supplying seventy five percent of its fresh cut salads to major 
supermarket chains, Woolworths and Coles. 
 
In 2006-07, the Houston’s Farm introduced fourteen new products to its already 
impressive product range. While eight salad varieties were sold under the Houston’s 
brand in Tasmania, the majority of their produce was sold under the Woolworths and 
Coles generic brands. 
 
By early 2007, the company was supplying its products to almost 1,400 supermarket 
stores around Australia. Twenty five percent of their sales were in Tasmania, 40% was 
sold to Woolworths and 35% to Coles supermarkets nationally. 
 
Why CRV  
 
Anthony Houston grew up to be an egg farmer with a quiet ambition to move into 
horticulture. 
 
“I was growing eggs. We were in eggs for 30 or so years, from when I was six years old. 
We didn’t go past it.  But for 20 years this guy Dennis said, ‘Don’t keep growing eggs. 
You have to get into lettuce.’ But I said that we needed water to do that.”79 
 
Twenty years ago, when Anthony and his older brother were running an egg farm in 
the Coal River Valley, battery hens were receiving a lot of negative publicity. The 
Houstons were often in the spotlight. 
 
Getting tired of seeing her husband depressed and concerned about the future, 
Anthony’s wife, Pru urged him to “ring that guy about growing lettuce”. Anthony rang 
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Dennis and said, “You always said you’d help us grow lettuce if we had water. Well, 
we’ve got water.” 
In 1989, with Dennis’ help, Anthony started growing iceberg lettuce on his 35-hectare 
farm. He was later joined by his brother, Colin. 
 
Business strategy and investment 
 
When he first started, Anthony applied his knowledge from egg production to growing 
lettuce and a range of other vegetables, such as cauliflower, celery and broccoli. He 
soon realised that lettuce production required more expertise than he previously 
imagined, and so he began studying it. 
 
Continuity and quality of water supply proved critical to the success of his enterprise. 
As the original irrigation system failed, Anthony pulled in expertise from the mainland 
to design an irrigation system that would suit the soil type. 
 
“Eggs never change”80 
 
Anthony soon discovered that the difference between egg production and growing 
lettuce extended beyond that of water requirements. Input costs into egg production 
were relatively constant and predictable. Early days of lettuce production nearly sent 
him broke. After investing in a cool storage room, the Houston’s Farm was $1 million 
in debt. 
 
In 1991, Anthony and Colin Houston established a private company, Houston’s Farm 
Pty. Ltd., of which they both became equal shareholders. The combination of skills and 
entrepreneurial spirit proved to be a key to the success of the enterprise. 
 
The brothers realised very quickly that the quality of their produce was going to be 
critical to gaining competitive advantage in the market for iceberg lettuce. 
 
In 1993, the Houston’s decided to diversify their production into fancy lettuces, such 
as red coral, green oak and red oak. Production of quality whole lettuces along with 
separately managed egg production, turned the farm into a stable and successful 
enterprise. 
 
“…we got plastic bags and we punched holes in them with a screwdriver and we put 
the lettuces in them and had people out in the shed rolling their arms back and forth to 
get the water out.”81 
 
Anthony and Colin started processing their lettuce in response to their customers’ 
demand. Value adding was not originally part of their business plan.  To keep their 
main customer, Wrest Point Casino, happy, the Houstons started experimenting with 
washing their lettuces using very primitive and inefficient techniques. However, their 
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entrepreneurial nature encouraged them to innovate and make the process of washing 
and packaging their product more efficient. 
 
“We got failure, failure, failure, success.”82 
 
In 1995, the company introduced lettuce leaf mixes, washed and ready to eat. The 
product quickly became popular within the food service industry around the State. 
 
The following year, Houston’s Farm started supplying bulk salads to supermarkets. In 
1997, the company was approached by Woolworths to supply bagged salad to its 
Tasmanian stores. 
 
In 1997, the market for fresh cut lettuce was almost non-existent. A promotional 
campaign, and the introduction of perforated air-tight bags that made the product last 
longer, allowed the Houston’s to expand their markets. 
 
In 1998, the company purchased a commercial washer to ensure better quality and 
efficiency of production. In order to make their product last longer, the Houston’s 
brothers replaced the open trucks with refrigerated ones to transport their lettuce. 
 
Houston’s lettuce soon started being recognised as a top quality product, with an 
increasing number of loyal customers. Their sales were increasing by about 30% a 
year. 
 
“A market-driven animal”83 
 
Driven by the success of Houston’s lettuce in Tasmania, Anthony was keen to take up 
an opportunity to enter the national market. Houston’s Farm began selling its products 
in Victoria through Safeway. However, the sales volumes were very disappointing. 
 
Despite slow response from the Victorian market, the company was experiencing 
significant growth. A new management style was introduced to manage the expanding 
business and settle any differences between the Houston brothers in regards to running 
the business and expansion plans. 
 
Capabilities 
 
When Anthony realised that he had to learn how to run accounts for horticulture to 
prevent his business from going broke, he approached John Maynard, an agricultural 
consultant, to help him identify the costs and determine where the losses and profits 
were. 
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Maynard created a planting schedule for the farm, determining how much of each crop 
to plant, when and where. With modifications, the schedule is still being used by the 
company. 
 
 
Future challenges 
 
“It’s all about land and water, as it always is.                                                                
The business is as big as land and water.”84 
 
Houston’s Farm continues to be one of the most innovative and fast growing businesses 
in the Coal River Valley. The growth of the company has been largely driven by the 
entrepreneurial skills of Anthony and Colin Houston. The only boundaries for future 
expansion are set by the availability of land and, most importantly, continuity of a 
secure water supply. 
 
 
QEW ORCHARDS, CAMPANIA, TASMANIA 
 
The enterprise 
 
Tian-An Pty Ltd/Qew Orchards is a family-owned and operated apricot orchard in the 
Coal River Valley. Qew Orchards specialises in producing tree-ripened apricots for the 
fresh fruit market. 
 
Qew Orchards have grown to become one of the major suppliers of ripe apricots to 
wholesalers around Australia. Three years ago, they also began supplying the fruit to 
major supermarket chains around the country. Qew Orchards also sell apricots directly 
to consumers through door-sales and at country markets. 
 
There are thirteen apricot varieties currently grown in the Chongs’ orchard, such as the 
popular Moorpark, Orange Red, Bergeron, and Sundrop. Apricot varieties have been 
chosen based on quality and volume requirements. 
 
Why CRV 
 
Tasmania has always attracted the Chongs. It was one of their favourite travel 
destinations when they were living in Singapore. After about ten years of visits to the 
State and in search for a lifestyle change, they made a decision to move here. 
 
Water supplied by Stage 1 of the South East Irrigation Scheme enabled the Chongs to 
take advantage of the warm and dry climate of the region. Long hours of sunlight 
create preferable ripening conditions and produce sweeter fruit. The late harvesting 
season has enabled Qew Orchards to target interstate and overseas markets for ripe 
apricots during their off-season. 
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Apricots require relatively dry climate as even moderate rainfall can damage the fruit 
and result in bruising. Apricots are location-specific and there are only a few places in 
Tasmania, such as the Coal River Valley, suitable for growing the fruit. 
 
Business strategy and investment 
 
Setting up a large apricot orchard required a significant capital investment and 
involved   considerable risk. Trees did not produce fruit for the first two to three years, 
which made the early years of operations particularly difficult for Qew Orchards. 
 
Approximately 20,000 apricot trees were planted on the Chongs’ property in 1999. Ten 
years later, there are around 50,000 trees in the orchard. In 2006, the Chongs agreed to 
manage a large apricot orchard as part of a Managed Investment Scheme. Almost 
100,000 trees were planted in 2006 and 2009 marked their first harvest. Qew 
Orchards also leased the apricot orchard from the UTAS Farm. 
 
In developing markets for ripe apricots, Qew Orchards used a customer network 
previously established by their orchard manager. They have also been consulting 
organisations like Austrade to identify potential markets overseas, and have plans to 
expand into Europe and the Middle East. 
 
Qew Orchards recently introduced red pears to their orchard to replace an 
unsuccessful apricot variety. After extensive market research, the red pear was 
identified as a niche product that could provide high margins. Although it is not easy to 
grow, the red pear offered an opportunity to explore new market opportunities and 
utilise processing and storage facilities during the off-season for apricots. The first 
harvest is expected in 2009. 
 
“You have to keep trying new things.”85 
 
Necessity has been the major driver of innovation at Qew Orchards. The enterprise 
developed a problem-solving culture that enables them to constantly seek better ways 
of managing the business by identifying problems and searching for solutions. 
 
The diversity of soil types found within the boundaries of Qew Orchards requires 
advanced management techniques, in particular with regards to irrigation. Individual 
blocks of land have been created within the orchard to allow for application of 
irrigation techniques most suited to individual soil types and ensure the most efficient 
resource use. 
 
The team at Qew Orchards constantly seek more efficient ways of using their resources 
to address issues such as water shortages and high labour costs.  Introducing new 
methods of irrigation, sorting technology and replacing labour-intensive tasks with 
technology have been key to the success of Qew Orchards. 
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To reduce running costs during the off-season, Qew Orchards use their processing 
plant as a storage facility for local businesses, such as wineries. 
 
 
Capabilities 
 
Before investing in apricots, the Chongs considered various investment options, mainly 
in aquaculture, tourism and agriculture. After an extensive search and consultation 
with the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industry, Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism and local farmers, they decided to grow apricots. 
 
Having no previous experience in horticulture, Heather Chong relied heavily on the 
knowledge and experience of horticulturalists from the Department of Primary Industry 
and the orchard manager who acquired his expertise in the field while running his own 
apricot orchard. Heather has since developed the necessary knowledge and skills over 
the years of running the business. 
 
Producing fresh and ripe apricots required an advanced technology that would allow 
for gentle sorting of the fruit to avoid bruising. The required technology was acquired 
by Mr Chong from the United States and has been adopted by Qew Orchards. 
 
 
Future challenges 
 
“Agriculture is not sexy”86 
 
Continuous and reliable water supply is critical to Qew Orchards. Recent drought and 
insufficient supply of irrigation water have forced the Chongs to take some trees out of 
production and implement strict management of irrigation water. 
 
As apricots are seasonal crops and very labour-intensive, the availability and cost of 
labour has is one of major concerns for Qew Orchards. In comparison to other 
countries, the cost of seasonal labour in Australia is high. It is also becoming 
increasingly difficult to find workers who are willing to pick apricots for six to eight 
weeks during the Tasmanian festive season. 
 
The cost and quality of transport services are also concerns for Qew Orchards. High 
cost of transport determines their export potential to a large extent.  A relatively high 
standard of transport services is required as apricots are a very delicate product. 
 
 
FROGMORE CREEK WINES, CAMBRIDGE, TASMANIA 
 
The enterprise  
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Frogmore Creek is an award-winning producer of a wide range cool climate wines 
under their Frogmore Creek and 42 Degrees South labels. Current varieties include 
Pinot Noir, Chardonnay, Riesling, Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Gris. 
 
Frogmore Creek winery also makes wines on a contract basis for over thirty vineyards 
around Tasmania. 
 
The estate was established in 1996 in Penna, Coal River Valley. Tony Scherer is a part 
owner and company director. 
 
Why CRV 
 
Tony Scherer’s  experience with organic farming began in 1974 in California. After 
many years of working on farms, Tony became increasingly concerned about the use 
of chemicals in everyday framing practices. His passion and faith in organic farming 
grew out of clouds of pesticides and herbicides used on US farms in 1960’s. 
 
Tony thought that there had to be a better way of growing fruit and vegetables. He 
began his search by looking at ways of attracting beneficial insects to his crops. A 
friend of his at the time, who today is a world specialist in the field, offered him his 
assistance. 
 
In 1989, Tony arrived in Perth where he continued his research into organic farming. 
He quickly realised that there was no market or infrastructure for organic farming in 
Australia at the time. His experience with organic methods of farming, however, did 
not go unnoticed. 
 
Tony’s passion for wine began when he was approached by local vineyards interested 
in growing their grapes organically. Having been paid in wine, he acquired a taste for 
the beverage and started looking for a suitable site where he could start his own 
organic vineyard. 
 
When he began his search, he “never even heard of Tasmania”. In 1983 he “had run 
out of places to go” on the mainland, and then he came across Tasmania. In May, he 
drove around the island for four or five days and thought that this was the only place 
that would not change during his lifetime and he decided to stay. 
 
Tasmania offered a climate suitable for cool climate viticulture and Tony felt it would 
be an ideal location for his organic vineyard. For almost two years, Tony and his wife 
travelled around Tasmania searching for a suitable site. At one point, they even 
considered going to New Zealand, until they came across the Coal River Valley. 
 
The Coal River Valley not only had suitable climate, soils and irrigation water, but it 
was also close to the capital city – Hobart.  Another benefit of choosing the area was 
the availability of relatively inexpensive land. 
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Business strategy and investment 
 
The company purchased a 430 hectares property at Penna in 1996 and planted 12 
acres of Pinot Noir, Chardonnay and Riesling.  They have continually expanded 
vineyard and winery operations since. 
About a year ago, Frogmore Creek Wines started exporting their wines to the United 
States, mainly to California. It has always been the company’s aim to export wines to 
the States, where they could use their well-established contacts. Since they started 
selling wines to the US market, the volume of sales increased from 20 cases a month to 
300 cases. They are aiming at doubling this volume over the next 12 months. 
 
The company has enjoyed a considerable growth since they purchased the winery in 
late 2003. From average processing capacity of 300 to 400 tonnes of grapes a year, 
they have increased the capacity to 1000 tonnes per annum. This expansion enables 
the Frogmore Creek Winery to process grapes grown at their own vineyard at Penna 
and continue to process grapes from 36 other Tasmanian vineyards under their own 
labels. The company continues to improve their wine making facilities for these 
customers. 
 
What distinguishes Frogmore Creek Wine from other commercial wine producers is 
their engagement in the community and with the environment. Tony and the team at 
Frogmore Creek recognise the importance of preserving the environment. They 
cooperate with the Endangered Species Group to create a habitat for endangered 
species on the property at Penna. 
 
Capabilities 
 
Following his vision, the company did not use any chemicals on the vines when he 
first established the vineyard. In 2006, weed infestation caused by high rainfall, forced 
the company to introduce herbicides to their practices and wines harvested since then 
have not been labelled “organically grown”. 
 
Since the introduction of herbicides in 2006, there has been a 50% increase in yield 
from the vineyard. Currently, the company is hoping to go back to organic methods of 
growing grapes and looking into new, organic ways of dealing with weed and pest 
issues. Three hectares of the property are currently used for running trials of organic 
herbicides. 
 
As climate change has become an issue, the team at Frogmore Creek is collaborating 
with the wines industry to develop measures of reducing their carbon footprints and 
secure sustainable management of the enterprise in the future. 
 
 
Future challenges 
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“Best sites in Tasmania haven’t been planted yet…”87 
 
Out of 430 hectares of the property, approximately 180 hectares are suitable for 
planting. However, the area under cultivation has been restricted by the availability of 
water.  
Other factors limiting further investment and expansion of Frogmore Creek Wines have 
been high capital costs and the local government planning scheme that largely 
determines land use in the region. 
 
Even though, in his view, there is still a lot of potential in the Coal Valley, he would 
not like to see the entire area planted with vines. He believes that the variety of crops 
grown in the region only adds to its natural beauty. 
 
 “We are in the position to offer the world an iconic Tasmanian produce.”88 
 
Tony Scherer strongly believes that Tasmania and the Coal River Valley still have a lot 
of potential. However, for this potential to be realised, he believes there needs to be a 
significant change in mindset. As the Tasmanian economy is not big enough to 
compete on volume, he believes that, “production should be product and demand, not 
commodity-driven”. 
 
Tony strongly believes that Tasmania has a potential to create an iconic brand that is 
associated with top quality. The company’s vision for Frogmore Creek Wines is to be 
an “ambassador” of Tasmanian produce and be a showcase of what the State has to 
offer. 
 
 
DOMAINE A/STONEY VINEYARD, CAMPANIA, TASMANIA 
 
The enterprise 
 
Domain A/Stoney Vineyard was originally established in 1973 by Priscilla and George 
Park. In 1989, the estate was taken over by Peter and Ruth Althaus. 
 
The 20-hectare property is located on the side of a hill in the Coal River Valley. 
Sheltered from westerly winds, it enjoys long hours of sunshine and very little rain. The 
warm climate of the region translates into a long ripening period and essentially creates 
suitable conditions for production of one of Tasmania’s finest wines. 
 
Domaine A/Stoney Vineyard is proud of its Cabernet Sauvignon, Cabernet Franc, 
Merlot, Petit Verdot, Pinot Noir and Sauvignon Blanc. The exquisite flavour and aroma 
of Domaine A/Stoney Vineyard wines have been recognised by wine experts around 
the world. 
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The Domaine A Cabernet Sauvignon was the first Tasmanian red wine to be included 
in the Langton’s Classification of Top 100 wines, a classification that is considered a 
benchmark of Australian wine and wine investment. 
 
Why CRV  
 
When Peter Althaus first arrived in the Coal River Valley, he was quickly named an 
“enfant terrible”. He was a man with a vision and dedication, a newcomer to an area 
dominated by sheep grazing and dryland cropping. 
 
“We wouldn’t have come here if it wasn’t for the water.”89 
 
Since his arrival in the Coal River Valley, Peter has seen a true transformation of the 
area. From a dull landscape dominated by sheep grazing properties, the region now 
enjoys a wide variety of agricultural enterprises taking advantage of its mild warm 
climate and irrigation water. 
 
Peter developed his extraordinary passion and knowledge of wines in Europe. 
However, he saw little opportunity on the old continent and wanted to explore other 
parts of the world suitable for cool climate viticulture. 
 
His exploration of potential sites for his vineyard took him to various places around the 
Southern Hemisphere. Peter visited southern parts of Argentina and Chile that had 
potential to become significant wine producers, but with little industry at the time. 
New Zealand was another possible location, but Peter found that this southern land 
was more abundant in sheep than grapes or even people. 
 
“We fell in love with the scenery.”90 
 
From New Zealand, Peter and his wife Ruth travelled to Tasmania. The wine industry 
on the island was in very early stages of development, but the natural beauty of the 
island quickly won Peter and Ruth’s hearts. 
 
During their visit to Tasmania, Peter discovered a wine he particularly liked. It was a 
product of Domaine A/Stoney Vineyard. 
 
Peter first visited the Stoney Vineyard in March 1989. Six months later, when the 
vineyard was put on sale, Peter returned to Tasmania to purchase the estate. 
 
Business strategy and investment 
 
1990 marked the first commercial vintage of Domaine A/Stoney Vineyard under new 
ownership. Peter identified the soil types found within the boundaries of his property. 
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Expertise and knowledge acquired in Europe enabled him to match grape varieties to 
individual soil types. 
 
As the wine industry in Tasmania was only just starting to develop, and the Australian 
market for wine was relatively small, Peter’s strategy from the very beginning was to 
export his wine. 
 
Based on this approach and by using his already long-established contacts in Europe, 
Peter managed to build a worldwide network of consumers. Currently, fifty percent of 
Domaine A/Stoney Vineyard wines is exported, with a majority sold in China, 
Singapore, Japan and Europe. 
 
His approach to making wines has always been focused on producing the finest quality 
product that anyone with some knowledge about wines would recognise for their 
quality and unique aromas and flavour. 
 
Capabilities 
 
“I have fulfilled my dream.” 91 
 
The key to his hard earned success has been “dedication and hard work”. If you want 
to fulfil your dream, you “cannot take any shortcuts”. 
 
Peter Althaus relied entirely on his own expertise when making early business 
decisions. He brought with him to the Coal River Valley not only knowledge and 
experience, but also the technology to make cool climate wines. 
 
Future challenges 
 
About two years ago, Peter began working on a succession plan for his enterprise. So 
far he has found it difficult to find someone with the same level of expertise and 
passion for the art of winemaking. 
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Appendix D: Sources and Consultation 
(Partial) 
 
 
Prof David Adams, Professor of Management Australian Innovation Research Centre 
Hon. Michael Aird, Treasurer State of Tasmania 
Hon. David Bartlett, Premier State of Tasmania 
A/Prof Colin Birch, Vegetable Centre Tasmanian Institute for Agricultural Research 
Dr Colin Buxton, Director Tasmanian Aquaculture and Fisheries Institute 
Bill Cassimaty, Director StrathAyr 
Don Challen, Secretary Department of Treasury and Finance  
Jock Chudacek, Chief Executive Tasmanian Irrigation Development Board 
Lance Davey, Davey and Maynard Consulting 
Rhys Edwards, Secretary Department of Premier and Cabinet 
A/Prof Jack English, Entrepreneurship Australian Innovation Research Centre 
Kim Evans, Secretary Department of Primary Industries Parks Water and Environment 
Prof Andrew Fearne, Director Centre for Supply Chain Research, University of Kent 
Michael Field, Chairman Tasmanian Innovation Advisory Board 
Aidan Flanagan, General Manager Forests and Forest Industries Council 
Wes Ford, General Manager Department of Primary Industries Parks Water and 
Environment 
Dr Stephen Giugni, Chief Executive Tasmanian ICT Centre 
Bob Gordon, Managing Director Forestry Tasmania 
Sir Guy Green, Chairman of Trustees Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery 
Anthony Houston, Houston’s Farm 
Colin Houston, Houston’s Farm 
Greg Johannes, Deputy Secretary Department of Premier and Cabinet 
Mark Kelleher, Secretary Department of Economic Development Tourism and the Arts 
Chas Kelly, Chas Kelly Transport 
Chris Lock, Director Economic Policy Department of Treasury and Finance 
John Lord, Chairman Tasmanian Irrigation Development Board 
Prof Ian Marsh, Professor Australian Innovation Research Centre 
John Maynard, Davey and Maynard Consulting 
John McCann, Chief Executive Tasmanian Electronic Commerce Centre 
Norm McIlfatrick Secretary Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources 
Prof David McNeil, Director Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research 
Michelle Moseley, Deputy Secretary Department of Primary Industries Parks Water and 
Environment 
Mike Nermut, Chairman The Learning Edge International 
Rob Nicholl, Deputy Secretary Department of Treasury and Finance 
Martin Rees, Partner KPMG 
Denis Rogers, Chairman Tasmanian Development Board 
Robert Rockefeller, Director Nekon Pty Ltd 
Bob Rutherford, Deputy Secretary Department of Infrastructure Energy and Resources 
Mark Ryan, Chief Executive Tassal 
Mark Sayer, General Manager Skills Tasmania 
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Andrew Scobie, Managing Director Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Fritz Shoemaker, Commercial Manager Austal, Margate 
Hadley Sides, Chief Executive Sullivans Cove Waterfront Authority 
Dr Richard Smart, Director Smart Viticulture 
Brett Torossi, Director Tasmanian Development Board 
Dr John Volkman, Chief Research Scientist CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research 
Bradley Watson, Director Little Lion Holdings 
Robert Wilson, Director Tasmanian Development Board 
Rob Woolley, Chairman Forests and Forest Industries Council 
 
